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A Constitutional Jurisprudence  
of Children’s Vulnerability 
LOIS A. WEITHORN* 
The Unites States Supreme Court identified “the peculiar vulnerability of children” as one 
of the “three reasons” for differentiating the treatment of children under the Constitution 
from that of adults. Yet, although explicit and implicit characterizations of children as 
vulnerable abound in the Court’s opinions and scholarly commentary, there has been little 
analysis of how the construct of vulnerability mediates children’s relationship to the 
Constitution. 
 
This Article examines the Court’s analytic uses of constructions of children’s vulnerability. 
Informed by legal scholarship and empirical findings on human vulnerability emerging 
from the field of bioethics, philosophy, psychology, and developmental neuroscience, the 
Article deconstructs the concept of children’s vulnerability and proposes five categories 
derived from the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence and interdisciplinary scholarship: 
harm-based vulnerability; influence-based vulnerability; capacity-based vulnerability; 
status-based vulnerability; and dependency-based vulnerability. It applies the 
classification to representative cases from among the approximately one hundred 
relevant cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Article contextualizes the analyses 
of constitutional jurisprudence and children’s vulnerability with discussions of relevant 
social history and developmental science. It then critically examines the Court’s use of 
vulnerability constructs in a narrower subset of cases, exploring the relationship between 
these constructs and relevant empirical knowledge. 
 
In conclusion, the Article critiques the often-tenuous relationship between the state of 
scientific knowledge and the Court’s characterizations of children’s vulnerability. The 
Court frequently relies upon these constructs when determining constitutional questions. 
This Article contends that when the Court makes “factual” assertions about children’s 
characteristics of functioning¾assertions that are the subject matter of developmental 
science¾these assertions should rest on the best available evidence. The Article 
recommends continued scholarly attention to, and scrutiny of, judicial reliance on notions 
of children’s vulnerability in constitutional analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[C]hildren are constitutionally different from adults. . . .”1 A U.S. 
Supreme Court majority voiced this assertion in Montgomery v. 
Louisiana,2 a recent addition to the remarkable line of Eighth 
Amendment decisions that began in 2005 with Roper v. Simmons.3 Few 
would disagree with the notion that children differ from adults in many 
ways.4 Yet, there is substantially less agreement as to the implications of 
those distinctions for constitutional jurisprudence relating to childhood. 
Although Montgomery and its precedents focused on constitutional 
distinctions “for purposes of sentencing,”5 the question of whether 
matters affecting children’s welfare, rights, or interests require  
child-specific constitutional approaches, and if so, what those 
approaches should be, has been debated by the members of the Court in 
an exceptionally broad range of cases.6 
The Court identified “three reasons” for treating children differently 
under the Constitution in its 1979 decision in Bellotti v. Baird.7 It cited 
“the peculiar vulnerability of children; [children’s] inability to make 
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of 
the parental role in child rearing,” in justifying the constitutionality of 
state limitations on minors’ access to abortion that would be 
unconstitutional if applied to adults. 8 In recent decades, rich bodies of 
 
 1. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016) (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 
471 (2012) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 
68 (2010))). 
 2. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733. 
 3. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (holding unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty on 
minors, rev’g Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (holding 
unconstitutional sentences of life without parole for nonhomicide offenses for crimes committed by 
minors); Miller, 567 U.S. at 465 (holding unconstitutional mandatory sentences of life without parole 
for homicide offenses committed by minors). 
 4. The term “children” is used here to refer to all persons under the age of eighteen, in that 
eighteen is the age at which persons in the United States typically attain majority in most jurisdictions 
and for most purposes. See, e.g., CHILDREN AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 109–10 (Samuel S. Davis, Elizabeth 
S. Scott, Walter Wadlington & Lois A. Weithorn eds., 5th ed. 2014). Clearly, therefore, the limits of 
generalizations about differences between adults and children become immediately apparent, in 
recognizing, as Hillary Rodham did in 1973, that older adolescents, such as seventeen year olds, may 
have more in common based on maturational levels with legal adults aged eighteen than they do with 
newborns. Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 487, 488–89 (1973). 
Indeed, as I have noted elsewhere, “[t]he physiological and psychological immaturity of many minors 
is undeniable, as is the dependency upon adults intrinsic to this immaturity and our social structure. 
Yet, the ages of 18 and 21 delineating majority are arbitrary and stem from currently irrelevant 
historical concerns such as sufficient physical strength to bear heavy armor.” Lois A. Weithorn, 
Involving Children in Decisions Affecting Their Own Welfare, in CHILDREN’S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 
235, 239 (G.B. Melton et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter Weithorn, Involving Children]. 
 5. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733. 
 6. See infra notes Part I.B. 
 7. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). 
 8. Id. In Bellotti, however, the Court did not allow the Massachusetts statute requiring parental 
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scholarship have explored the latter two factors cited by the Court. In 
particular, substantial commentary has examined the constitutional 
significance of children’s decisionmaking capacities and maturity9 and of 
the relative roles and authority of parents, state, and children in matters 
affecting minors’ welfare.10 By contrast, although explicit and implicit 
characterizations of children as vulnerable abound in the Court’s 
opinions, there has been comparatively little analysis of how the 
construct of vulnerability mediates children’s relationship to the 
Constitution.11 
Most commonly, images of children as vulnerable make their way 
into the Court’s opinions in the context of constitutional challenges to 
allegedly child-protective governmental policies that limit the exercise of 
children’s or adults’ constitutional rights. Notions of children as 
vulnerable are most commonly employed to justify the constitutionality 
of differential treatment of children and adults. Sometimes, however, 
 
consent for minors’ access to abortion to stand without modification. The Court held unconstitutional 
parental consent statutes that grant parents exclusive veto power over their minor daughters’ access 
to abortion. It concluded that minors’ unique needs, characteristics, and status under the law required 
an alternative that balanced the competing interests and concerns. The judicial by-pass procedure 
approved by the Court in Bellotti governs in most states, although some jurisdictions, such as 
California, allow minors direct access to abortion, independent of parental or court involvement. See, 
e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 800 (Cal. 1997). 
 9. See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults?: Minors’ 
Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. PSYCHOL. 
583 (2009); ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE (2008); 
Thomas Grisso, Adolescents’ Decision Making: A Developmental Perspective on Constitutional 
Provisions in Delinquency Cases, 32 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3 (2006); Elizabeth S. 
Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 
N.C. L. REV. 793 (2005); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: 
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003); YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE 
JUSTICE (Thomas Grisso & Robert Schwartz eds., 2003); Thomas Grisso, The Competence of 
Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 3 (1997); CHILDREN’S COMPETENCE TO 
CONSENT (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency 
of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589 (1982); Lois 
A. Weithorn, Developmental Factors and Competence to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 5 
CHILD & YOUTH SERVS 85 (1982). 
 10. See, e.g., MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S 
POLITICAL IDEALS (2010); Anne C. Daily, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431 (2006); Emily Buss, Allocating 
Developmental Control Among Parent, Child and the State, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27 (2004); 
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995). 
 11. But see Deanna Pollard, Children’s Developmental Vulnerability and the Roberts Court’s Child-
Protective Jurisprudence: An Emerging Trend?, 40 STETSON L. REV. 777 (2011). Many scholars have 
acknowledged or discussed notions of children’s vulnerability relevant to the Court’s decisions in the 
context of related analytic works. See, e.g., Elizabeth Scott, Thomas Grisso, Marsha Levick, & Laurence 
Steinberg, Juvenile Sentencing Reform in a Constitutional Framework, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 675, 679 (2016) 
(analyzing the Court’s reliance on notions of children’s vulnerability to influence by others and reduced 
ability to control their environment; Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State’s Interest in 
Protecting Children from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427, 502–09 (2000) (discussing the 
role of notions of children as vulnerable to harm in free speech cases). 
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vulnerability constructs are used to challenge the constitutionality of 
policies that treat minors and adults similarly. Other analytic uses of 
these constructs appear as well. 12  
These characterizations of children as vulnerable (or not) are 
assertions about aspects of the psychological or physiological nature of 
children that are endorsed or rejected by the Justices. As such, they 
represent the Justices’ conclusions about certain facts relevant to the 
constitutional cases they are deciding.13 Because these vulnerability 
constructs concern general phenomena (that is, children’s 
characteristics, needs, or responses to certain situations, stimuli, or 
influences more generally) rather than information specific to the parties 
in the litigation, the constructs have been referred to as legislative facts14 
or¾using Monahan and Walker’s formulation¾social authority,15 when 
judges offer them as reflecting the true state of the world. 
One might wonder about the sources of the Justices’ conclusions 
about children’s vulnerability, or more broadly, where judges get the 
“facts” about children’s development (or any phenomenon relating to 
human behavior or functioning) that they cite in resolving constitutional 
 
 12. For a survey of some of the ways in which vulnerability constructs are used by the litigants 
and the Court, see infra notes 96–160. 
 13. In the past thirty years, a rich body of scholarship has provided theoretical frameworks for 
analyzing and appraising judicial use of “facts” in constitutional and other legal decisions. See John 
Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social 
Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986) [hereinafter Monahan & Walker, Social Authority] 
(asserting that social science research should be treated by courts more like legal precedent, or “social 
authority,” than pure facts); David L. Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding: Exploring 
the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1991) [hereinafter 
Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding] (discussing the role that empirical research has 
played in analyzing and interpreting constitutional issues); DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS (2008) [hereinafter FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FICTIONS]; John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Twenty-Five Years of Social Science in Law, 35 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 72 (2011) (discussing the changes over time in how courts have used and relied on social 
science research). For application of the work of these and others to judicial constructs of children’s 
vulnerability in constitutional analysis, see infra notes 14–20, 203–211 and accompanying text. 
 14. “[L]egislative facts are those facts that transcend the particular dispute and have relevance to 
legal reasoning and the fashioning of legal rules.” Faigman, Normative Constitutional Factfinding, 
supra note 13, at 552 (citing Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the 
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942)). Legislative facts can be distinguished 
from adjudicative facts, which are particular to the dispute before the court. Id. Thus, for example, 
facts relating to the developmental maturity of minors for the purpose of fashioning an age-based rule 
regarding the constitutionality of death sentences in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), are 
legislative facts. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS, supra note 13, at 50. By contrast, adjudicative facts 
or the “facts of the case,” are “the who/ where/ why questions that should ultimately go to a jury or fact 
finder.” Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (2012). 
 15. Monahan and Walker reframe Davis’ concept of “legislative facts” using the characterization 
“social authority,” “argu[ing] that courts should treat social science research relevant to creating a rule 
of law as a source of authority rather than as a source of facts. More specifically, we propose that courts 
treat social science research as they would legal precedent under the common law.” Monahan & 
Walker, Social Authority, supra note 13, at 488. 
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questions.16 To the extent that relevant methodologically rigorous 
empirical research addressing the developmental vulnerabilities of 
children exists, one would hope that the Justices would become 
sophisticated consumers of such scientific work and apply that science 
faithfully.17 While this does occasionally occur,18 more frequently the 
Justices rely on unsupported or unsubstantiated assumptions about the 
phenomena at issue.19 In some of these instances, Justices explicitly or 
implicitly eschew the need for scientific data, offering notions about 
children’s nature as statements of reality, sometimes asserting that the 
facts are too well-established to require empirical support. In still other 
cases, the Justices recognize the need for empirical data, but observe that 
the database is inadequate to resolve the questions before the court.20 
Where the Justices make assertions as to children’s functioning or 
characteristics in the real world¾such as constructs of children’s 
vulnerability¾and rely on those constructs in analyzing and deciding a 
case, the constructs should be measured against the state of relevant 
scientific evidence. While constitutional cases must be resolved through 
 
 16. See generally Judicial Notice of “Facts” about Child Development, in REFORMING THE LAW: 
IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 232, 232–247 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1987) [hereinafter 
Judicial Notice of “Facts”] (discussing the problematic role that judicially noticed social facts play in 
children’s cases); see also Gail S. Perry & Gary B. Melton, Precedential Value of Judicial Notice of 
Social Facts: Parham as an Example, 22 J. FAM. L. 633 (1983–84). For in-depth analyses of these 
issues as they relate to social science evidence (and scientific evidence) more generally, see Faigman, 
Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding, supra note 13; FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS, supra 
note 13; Larsen, supra note 14; Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 
1757 (2014); Monahan & Walker, Social Authority, supra note 13; Laurens Walker & John Monahan, 
Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987). 
 17. See, e.g., Monahan and Walker, Social Authority, supra note 13; FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FICTIONS, supra note 13, at 159–81, which provide guidelines for how such social authority or 
legislative facts might be presented to and reviewed by courts. 
 18. The U.S. Supreme Court’s use of empirical research in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 868 
(1990), as discussed infra at notes 305–16 and accompanying text, and of developmental science in 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70, 617 (2005), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62–68 (2010), 
J.D.B. v. N.C., 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470–72 (2012), and 
Montgomery v. Louisiana 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016), reflect reliance on research about child 
development by the Court that is both appropriate and relatively sophisticated. 
 19. See Judicial Notice of “Facts,” supra note 16, at 239 (noting that the Court has characterized 
many of its asserted “facts” about child development as derived from ordinary “human experience,”); 
Perry & Melton, supra note 16, at 636–45 (discussing the evolution of judicial notice of social facts); 
FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS, supra note 13, at 17 (arguing that unsupported judicial 
pronouncements as to the state of the empirical world, or “fact-finding by fiat,” erodes the legitimacy 
of the Court). 
 20. Monahan and Walker note that that when “no research, or inadequate research, exists to 
support empirical assumptions,” courts may rely on their “experience and intuition, along with 
whatever information may be available,” to develop “working hypotheses” as to the phenomena in 
question. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Empirical Questions Without Empirical Answers, 1991 
WIS. L. REV. 569, 579–81 (1991). Yet, importantly, the authors emphasize that “judicial candor about 
the role of empirical assumptions and the speculative nature of their resolution” keeps the door open 
to doctrinal evolution as the data base informing it evolves. Id. at 581. 
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application of constitutional principles, if the Court integrates “facts” 
relating to children’s vulnerability into its analyses¾as it often does 
when scrutinizing state purposes asserted to justify child protective 
legislation¾those facts should ideally reflect the best available 
knowledge regarding children’s functioning and development. 
This Article commences an examination of the Court’s analytic uses 
of constructions of children’s vulnerability. Part I deconstructs the 
concept of children’s vulnerability and proposes five categories derived 
from the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence and interdisciplinary 
scholarship: (1) Harm-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability as 
greater susceptibility to physical or psychological harm from exposure to 
certain stimuli or situations); (2) Influence-Based Vulnerability (that is, 
vulnerability as greater susceptibility to influence, pressure, coercion by 
others); (3) Capacity-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability arising 
from immature decisional and self-protective capacities); (4)  
Status-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability arising from legal, 
social, and situational concomitants of minority status and 
subordination to the authority and control of others); and (5) 
Dependency-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability arising from 
greater dependence or reliance on others to meet one’s basic needs). 
In Subpart A, I define and distinguish these categories. Legal 
scholarship informs the definitional and classification process, as do 
theoretical insights and empirical findings on human vulnerability 
emerging from the fields of bioethics, philosophy, psychology, and 
developmental neuroscience. In Subpart B, for the purpose of clarifying 
the categories and the distinctions among them, I apply the classification 
to representative cases from among the approximately one hundred 
relevant cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.21 
Part II contextualizes the discussions that precede and follow it. 
Subpart A embeds this Article’s analyses in the social and historical 
antecedents of modern constructs of children’s vulnerability. Subpart B 
provides essential understandings from developmental science to 
inform, and create a backdrop for, subsequent Parts. It first highlights 
the need to distinguish between generality and specificity in legal 
responses to perceptions of children’s vulnerability. It then underscores 
two important themes relating children’s vulnerability: children’s status 
at any given moment in time as not-yet-fully-developed persons; and 
children’s nature as persons undergoing a biologically driven, 
environmentally responsive, and exceedingly rapid process of 
maturation, unparalleled when compared with other stages of 
development in the effects experiences may have on future functioning. 
 
 21. The discussion of cases within this format is selective to best illustrate the themes discussed. 
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Each of these facets introduces the potential for distinct¾although 
overlapping¾vulnerabilities. 
Part III considers how the Court uses constructs of children’s 
vulnerability, and in particular, the relationship between the constructs 
offered by the Court and relevant empirical knowledge. In doing so, it 
examines selected cases within the first of the five vulnerability subtypes: 
Harm-Based Vulnerability.22 Subpart A considers constructs of 
children’s vulnerability as alleged or potential victims of abuse in cases 
relating to prohibitions on child pornography and laws developed to 
accommodate the perceived needs of alleged child abuse victims 
testifying in court. Section B focuses on constructs offered to support 
limitations on speech asserted to have a detrimental impact on children’s 
well-being. It examines selected cases restricting children’s access to 
sexual content, “indecent” speech, communications by child speakers in 
school settings, and video games with violent content. 
In its analysis of selected cases involving judicial constructions of 
children’s vulnerability, this Article considers the support, or lack 
thereof, for constructs about children’s vulnerability offered by the 
Justices. It observes that, in some instances, whether in the presence or 
absence of purported empirical support, the Court’s use of vulnerability 
constructs appears highly pretextual. At times, notions of children’s 
vulnerability are strategically manipulated, allowing the Court to 
sidestep the provision of a more credible account of the reasoning leading 
to its result. 
The analysis of constructs of children’s vulnerability deserves 
continued attention by legal policymakers, jurists, and scholars. Policy 
decisions as to the roles of government in protecting children, regulating 
parental discretion, and restricting constitutional rights of children or 
others will be the subject of ongoing debate. Not every policy affecting 
children’s welfare demands scientific examination. But, to the extent that 
policies are justified, in part, by assertions about children’s 
psychological, physiological, or social vulnerability¾that is, matters 
within the purview of developmental science¾we must honestly assess 
the degree to which the factual assumptions and premises underlying any 
such polices are empirically supported. Scrutiny of the Court’s constructs 
about children’s vulnerability, their analytic roles, and their congruence 
with the state of scientific evidence may promote greater fidelity to the 
science employed and greater honesty in the legal reasoning employing 
it. 23 
 
 22. Subsequent scholarship will further examine and analyze cases falling within the other four 
vulnerability subtypes. 
 23. This point has been effectively made by others in related contexts. See, e.g., FAIGMAN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS, supra note 13, at 155–58; Judicial Notice of “Facts,” supra note 16,  
at 240–41. See infra notes 203–11 and accompanying text for further discussion of their insights. 
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I.  CONSTRUCTING CHILDREN’S VULNERABILITY 
Constitutional litigants, amici, and judges rely often on constructs 
of children as vulnerable to bolster their arguments as to the asserted 
need (or lack thereof) for child protective laws facing constitutional 
scrutiny. In addition, in some instances, vulnerability constructions are 
used to argue that children are sufficiently different from adults to 
justify¾indeed mandate¾that certain policies not accounting for such 
differences be held unconstitutional. Depending on the constitutional 
provision at issue, the precise question before the Court, and the 
applicable standard of review, vulnerability constructs may be mobilized 
in service of a wide range of showings regarding alleged “facts” about 
children’s psychological or physiological functioning. 
In Subpart A, I deconstruct the concept of children’s vulnerability, 
proposing, defining, and distinguishing five categories culled from the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, aided by scholarship 
and empirical work in law, bioethics, philosophy, psychological science, 
and developmental neuroscience. The typology includes the following 
subtypes of vulnerability, to be elaborated upon below: (1) Harm-Based 
Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability as greater susceptibility to physical 
or psychological harm from exposure to certain stimuli or situations);  
(2) Influence-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability as greater 
susceptibility to influence, pressure, coercion by others); (3) Capacity-
Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability arising from immature 
decisional and self-protective capacities); (4) Status-Based Vulnerability 
(that is, vulnerability arising from legal, social, and situational 
concomitants of minority status and subordination to the authority and 
control of others); and (5) Dependency-Based Vulnerability (that is, 
vulnerability arising from greater dependence or reliance on others to 
meet one’s basic needs). These subtypes are not wholly independent; 
there exist overlaps and interrelationships. I propose this classification 
as an initial step in clarifying the themes and variables that relate to 
vulnerability constructs used by the Court. In Subpart B, I provide 
illustrative examples of the Court’s references to children’s vulnerability, 
applying these typologies. 
Vulnerability constructs play any of a variety of roles in the Court’s 
decisions. Characterizations of minors as vulnerable may be cited to 
justify more narrowly defined constitutional rights for minors than 
adults and greater oversight over minors’ lives by parents or the state. 
Thus, for example, the Court has rejected minors’ claims for 
constitutional parity with adults in decisionmaking regarding abortion, 
and has held that the Constitution does not guarantee the right to a trial 
by jury in juvenile court, noting in both contexts that “the State is entitled 
to adjust its legal system to account for children’s vulnerability” and 
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special needs for protection and concern.24 The Court has also held 
constitutional certain school-based drug testing policies not generally 
permissible with adults, relying in part on its findings that the “[s]chool 
years are the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects 
of drugs are most severe.”25  
The Court has also relied on vulnerability constructs to justify 
extension of broader constitutional protections to minors than adults. It 
has held that certain penal sentences cannot constitutionally be imposed 
on minors. Here, children’s vulnerability renders them inappropriate 
subjects of the harshest criminal punishments, such as the death penalty 
and in some circumstances, life sentences without parole.26 
At times, the Court employs constructs of children’s vulnerability to 
support limitations of the constitutional rights of others. Thus, for 
example, the Court has held that the state’s interest in “‘safeguard[ing] 
the physical and psychological well-being of child victims [of abuse] 
by . . . minimizing the emotional trauma [of] testifying’” sometimes 
justifies modification of procedures for defendants’ confrontation of 
witnesses under the Sixth Amendment.27 The Court has also held that the 
First Amendment rights of some speakers and prospective  
audience-members may be limited where the speech, or its creation, 
allegedly endangers minors’ well-being.28  
Notions of children’s vulnerability also may be associated with 
broader or more robust constitutional protections for others. Most 
notably, views of children as needing parental protection combine with 
other justifications to support parents’ constitutionally grounded claims 
 
 24. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 
550 (1971) (plurality opinion)). In McKeiver, the Court determined that the Constitution did not 
require that the Sixth Amendment right of trial by jury be extended to juvenile court proceedings. 
 25. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661–64 (1995) (citing empirical research indicating 
that the effects of drugs on “[m]aturing nervous systems . . . are lifelong and profound”); Bd. of Educ. 
v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834–37 (2002) (relying on the findings set forth in Vernonia and evidence of 
the prevalence of teen drug use). 
 26. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (characterizing minors as more 
vulnerable than adults, in part because “juveniles have less control, or less experience with control, 
over their own environment”); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (observing a “greater 
capacity for change’” and that “a child’s character is not as ‘well-formed’ as an adults’; his traits are 
‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievable[e] deprav[ity].”); Miller  
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 466, 471 (2012) (same) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 and Roper,  
543 U.S. at 570). 
 27. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852–57 (1990) (quoting Wildermuth v. State, 530 A.2d 275, 
286 (1987)) (holding constitutional Maryland’s policy allowing minor child abuse victims to testify via 
closed-circuit television under certain circumstances). 
 28. See, e.g., Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (holding 
constitutional a Federal Communications Commission sanction following a daytime radio broadcast 
of a comedic monologue containing language referring to “excretory or sexual activities or organs”); 
N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749, 774 (1982) (upholding a New York statute that criminalized the 
knowing promotion of “sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen by distributing 
materials that depicts such performances”). 
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of authority. Thus, for example, in upholding Utah’s requirement that 
physicians notify parents of a minor seeking an abortion, the Court relied 
on a view that the “particularly” “serious” and potentially “traumatic and 
permanent” “medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of an 
abortion” when patients are minors may be mitigated where parents are 
informed.29 
A. DEFINING AND CLASSIFYING VULNERABILITY 
What does the Court mean when referring to children as vulnerable 
in the context of constitutional jurisprudence? It has provided only 
limited illumination of the meanings it ascribes to the concept of 
vulnerability. For instance, it has never explained its choice of the 
modifier “peculiar,”30 in describing children’s vulnerability in Bellotti  
v. Baird. Common use of the term “peculiar” suggests distinctiveness and 
atypicality.31 Some features of children’s vulnerability are indeed 
distinctive, such as those related to the natural patterns and pace of 
children’s physiological and psychological development, or to the unique 
role of parents in minor children’s lives.32 At the same time, the 
commonalities between children’s vulnerability and that of others in 
society33 help inform our understanding of the term’s relevance in 
constitutional analyses involving children. 
For a concept used so frequently in both lay and scholarly discourse, 
there is remarkably little written to elucidate the nature of the concept of 
vulnerability as it relates to human beings.34 And, unfortunately, when 
 
 29. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411–13 (1981). 
 30. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (citing “the peculiar vulnerability of children”). 
 31. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary provides the following definitional alternatives for the word 
“peculiar:” “1. [C]haracteristic of only one person, group, or thing: distinctive . . . . ; 2. different from 
the usual or normal: (a) special, particular[;] (b) odd, curious [;] (c) eccentric, queer . . . .” Peculiar, 
MERRIAMWEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/peculiar (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). 
 32. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A World Fit for Children Is a World Fit for Everyone: 
Ecogenerism, Feminism, and Vulnerability, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 817, 824 (2009); notes 162–67,  
216–37 infra and accompanying text. 
 33. See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of 
Individual and Societal Responsibility, 20 ELDER L.J. 71 (2012) [hereinafter Fineman, “Elderly” as 
Vulnerable] (discussing the need for state and social institutions to consider the vulnerabilities of the 
elderly population); Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality and Difference—The Restrained State, 66 
ALA. L. REV. 609, 621–23 (2015) [hereinafter Fineman, Equality and Difference] (emphasizing that a 
formal equality approach to implementation of laws ignores the structural disadvantages that certain 
groups face). 
 34. Ironically, there appears to be more systematic investigation and analysis of the meaning(s) 
of the term in the fields concerned with environmental hazards and the effects of climate change. See, 
e.g., BEN WISNER ET AL., AT RISK: NATURAL HAZARDS, PEOPLE’S VULNERABILITY, AND DISASTERS 11–16 
(2d ed. 2004); see also Christina Zarowsky et al., Beyond “Vulnerable Groups”: The Contexts and 
Dynamics of Vulnerability, 20 GLOBAL HEALTH PROMOTION SUPPL. (2013); Susan L. Cutter, 
Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards, 20 PROG. HUM. GEOGRAPHY 529 (1996) (reviewing a range 
of definitions and concepts of vulnerability). The conceptual struggles in that field bear some 
resemblance to the analyses ongoing in other fields. See infra notes 45–76 and accompanying text. 
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the term is used, it is rarely defined, and frequently used interchangeably 
with the conceptually distinct term “risk.”35 In this section, I begin to 
clarify the terms as I use them in this Article, with the help of those who 
have thought through these issues before me. 
The terms “vulnerable” and “vulnerability” are commonly used in 
everyday parlance. Their ordinary meaning provides a useful starting 
point. One dictionary defines the term “vulnerable” as “capable of or 
susceptible to being wounded or hurt physically or emotionally”; or 
“susceptible to temptation or corrupt influence.”36 These two 
threads¾susceptibility to physical or emotional harm and susceptibility 
to coercion or other external sources of influence¾also sit at the core of 
many philosophical, scientific, and legal formulations. Other concepts of 
vulnerability, such as those relating to dependence on others or  
socially imposed restrictions on freedom, also appear in jurisprudence 
relating to childhood. Of course, all persons are, to some extent, 
vulnerable under either of the above definitions. Thus, to the extent that 
the law requires constitutionally relevant distinctions between children 
and adults to justify differential treatment, the Court must consider 
whether differences in vulnerability between children and adults exists, 
and whether such distinctions permit differential treatment under the 
law. 
One frequently cited definition of vulnerability focuses on those 
factors that predispose one, or heighten the possibility of, deleterious 
consequences arising from some exposure or situation: “Vulnerability 
refers to an individual’s predisposition to develop[, or the] susceptibility 
to negative developmental outcomes that can occur under high-risk 
conditions.”37 The potential sources of vulnerability are many, and may 
include genetic, temperament, health or disability status, or other factors 
that we might view as characteristics of the individual.38 Those factors 
need not be unique to the individual. For example, one’s age, 
developmental stage, or gender¾characteristics that one shares with 
other group members¾may render one vulnerable in some situations. 
Feminist philosophers Catriona Mackenzie and colleagues label sources 
of vulnerability attributed to such factors as inherent or intrinsic,39 while 
behavioral scientists might refer to these sources as endogenous 
 
 35. Rick E. Ingram & Joseph M. Price, Understanding Psychopathology: The Role of 
Vulnerability, in VULNERABILITY TO PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: RISK ACROSS THE LIFESPAN 3, 5, 11 (R.E. Ingram 
& J.M Price eds., 2d ed. 2010). 
 36. Vulnerable, THE RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1997). 
 37. Marc A. Zimmerman & Revathy Arunkumar, Resiliency Research: Implications for Schools 
and Policy, 8 SOC. POL’Y REP.: SOC’Y FOR RES. IN CHILD DEV. 1, 2 (1994). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers, & Susan Dodds, Introduction: What is Vulnerability and 
Why Does It Matter for Moral Theory?, in VULNERABILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN ETHICS AND FEMINIST 
PHILOSOPHY 1, 7 (Catriona Mackenzie et al. eds., 2014). 
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factors.40 Yet,  “vulnerability processes within the individual are viewed 
as being in a dynamic interaction with environmental systems 
throughout the lifespan . . . . This dynamic interaction, or transaction, is 
reciprocal in nature, allowing vulnerability processes to both influence 
and be influenced by environmental conditions.”41 In other words, while 
vulnerabilities can be static and enduring, they are also potentially 
modifiable as a person continues to grow and develop. And, to the extent 
that factors relating to immaturity, youth, and developmental processes 
render a person vulnerable, maturation alters the nature and degree of 
that person’s vulnerabilities. 
Mackenzie and colleagues also speak of situational sources of 
vulnerability, such as the “personal, social, political, economic, 
environmental situations of individuals or social groups,” and note that 
such factors can be short-term, intermittent, or enduring.42 Thus, loss of 
a job or health insurance, the experience of penal incarceration, or 
enforcement of a discriminatory policy against a minority group are 
examples of such sources. Behavioral scientists may also focus on the role 
of external or situational sources as risk factors where there are 
statistically demonstrated relationships between the existence of such 
factors and a predisposition to negative developmental outcomes.43 
Recognized developmental risk factors include, for example, exposure to 
domestic violence perpetrated against one’s parent, or growing up in 
poverty. The term “risk . . . signifies an elevated probability of a negative 
outcome,” and “risk factor” is a “measurable characteristic in a group of 
individuals or their situation that predicts a negative outcome on a 
specific outcome” criterion.44 Thus, both vulnerability and risk factors 
can increase the probability of such a negative outcome, and arguably 
interact with each other in the developmental process.45 These concepts 
lead to identification of the first subtype of vulnerability found in the 
 
 40. Endogenous factors are those sources perceived to be residing “within the person,” as 
contrasted with external or situational factors. Ingram & Price, supra note 35, at 8, 28. 
 41. Joseph M. Price & Jennifer Zwolinksi, The Nature of Child and Adolescent Vulnerability: 
History and Definitions, in VULNERABILITY TO PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: RISK ACROSS THE LIFESPAN 18,  
28–29 (R.E. Ingram & J.M Price eds., 2d ed. 2010). 
 42. Mackenzie, Rogers, & Dodds, supra note 39. 
 43. See, e.g., Margaret O’Dougherty Wright et al., Resilience Processes in Development: Four 
Waves of Research on Positive Adaptation in the Context of Adversity, in HANDBOOK OF RESILIENCE 
IN CHILDREN 15, 16–17 (S. Goldstein & R. B. Brooks eds., 2013). 
 44. Id. at 16–18. 
 45. Ingram & Price, supra note 35, at 11. Carl Coleman points out that vulnerability “is not a 
stand-alone concept.” In other words, it is relative to some stress, adversity, influence, or exposure. 
Carl H. Coleman, Vulnerability as a Regulatory Category in Human Subject Research, 37 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 12, 14 (2009). The assertion that “children are vulnerable” or are “more vulnerable than 
adults,” is only meaningful when we elaborate upon the exposures or experiences in which 
vulnerability is triggered or manifested. Thus, while some of the discussion set forth in this Article 
speaks in generalities about certain developmental phenomena and trends, it then strives for greater 
specificity, focusing on identified contexts and exposures. 
WEITHORN-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/17  12:39 AM 
192 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:179 
Court’s jurisprudence and elaborated in scientific and theoretical 
scholarship: susceptibility to physiological or psychological harm 
through exposure to certain stimuli or situations. The first category of 
vulnerability is central to many of the Court’s constructions of children 
and is grounded in the notion of vulnerability as susceptibility to negative 
developmental outcomes under high-risk conditions or in the face of 
stressors or other adversity. 
The field of bioethics and law has incorporated the concept of 
vulnerability into its regulatory and scholarly analyses of and proposals 
for policies governing involvement of human participants in research. A 
brief review of some of these analyses and proposals provides some 
foundation for an elucidation of three additional subtypes of 
vulnerability that appear in the Court’s opinions involving children, and 
thus are reviewed here: influenced-based vulnerability, capacity-based 
vulnerability, and status-based vulnerability. 
The emphasis on these vulnerability themes is understandable, 
when one considers the history of modern bioethics. The field arose 
initially from the need to develop systematic principles, guidelines, and 
legal regulation governing participation of human beings in research. 
The early efforts at regulating such activities followed the horrific abuses 
of Holocaust victims by Nazi physicians in the name of medical research, 
and of human research participants in the United States in subsequent 
decades.46 With these events in mind, concepts of vulnerability focused 
on factors that interfered with one’s ability to exercise autonomous 
choice in decisions whether to participate.47 Thus, incorporation of 
notions of vulnerability into regulatory proposals and schema sought to 
promote free and voluntary choice and to protect against coercive 
influences and exploitation of those whose choices were limited due to 
incapacity or status. 
The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research was established by Congress in 1974 
under the National Research Act,48 following increasing public 
awareness of abuses of human participants in research in the United 
States in a series of studies that exposed institutionalized, ill, disabled, 
poor, uneducated, and otherwise disadvantaged persons or groups to 
substantial risks.49 The National Commission provided guidance in the 
 
 46. For an excellent review of historical events influencing the development of the field of 
bioethics, see, e.g., ALBERT R. JONSEN, A SHORT HISTORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 99–120 (2000). 
 47. As noted below, the risks (or potential harms), of the research endeavor were also factored 
into ethical analyses, but as a separate consideration, to be weighed against prospective benefits of 
participation. They were not considered relative to prospective participants’ vulnerability. See infra 
note 63 and accompanying text. 
 48. Pub. Law 93-348, Title II, Part A, 88 Stat. 342 (1974). 
 49. For a summary of these studies, see, e.g., CARL H. COLEMAN, JERRY A. MENIKOFF, JESSE A. 
GOLDNER, & NANCY NEVELOFF DUBLER, THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN 
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development of regulations to protect human participants in the U.S. In 
its 1979 Belmont Report, the National Commission highlighted the 
notion of vulnerability as a consideration relevant to inclusion of, and 
protections for, human participants in empirical research studies.50 The 
concept was raised in a discussion of the cornerstone requirement of 
“voluntariness” of research participation, with the National Commission 
noting that “especially vulnerable” prospective participants may be 
particularly susceptible to “undue influence” when making the 
participation decision.51 The concept appeared again in the discussion of 
research studies’ risk-benefit ratios. The National Commission implied 
that risks to “vulnerable populations” must be assessed with particular 
care, suggesting that persons in such populations may be at greater risk 
than are others when exposed to the same stimuli.52 Finally, in 
elaborating some of the concerns regarding “justice,” that is, the principle 
grounded in “moral requirements” that there be fairness in the selection 
of research subjects,53 the Commission noted: 
One special instance of injustice results from the involvement of 
vulnerable subjects. Certain groups, such as racial minorities, the 
economically disadvantaged, the very sick, and the institutionalized 
may continually be sought as research subjects, owing to their ready 
availability in settings where research is conducted. Given their 
dependent status and their frequently compromised capacity for free 
consent, they should be protected against the danger of being involved 
in research solely for administrative convenience, or because they are 
easy to manipulate as a result of their illness or socioeconomic 
condition.54 
 
SUBJECTS 31–50 (2005). 
50. The Belmont Report, OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, (Apr. 18. 1979), 
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/belmont-report. 
 51. Id. The notion of voluntariness is one of the core principles of the doctrine of informed consent 
more generally. See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOETHICAL ETHICS 
77–90 (7th ed. 2013). 
 52. The Belmont Report, supra note 50.  
 53. This principle would prohibit unjust distribution of the burdens and benefits of research 
participation within society, avoiding unfair burdens on those groups that experience greater 
disadvantage in society. Id. 
 54. Id. The National Commission’s recommendations ultimately led to the exclusion or reduction 
of certain groups from research participation. As the years passed, however, this guidance has been 
criticized, in part because certain groups were deprived of the benefits of research participation or the 
findings of scientific studies. See, e.g., Holly A. Taylor, Implementation of NIH Inclusion Guidelines: 
Survey of NIH Study Section Members, 5 CLINICAL TRIALS 140 (2008) (discussing the National 
Institutes of Health policy to promote increased inclusion of children in scientific research on 
questions important to their welfare); NAT’L INST. OF MED., COMM. ON ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS 1, 113–136 (Lawrence O. Gostin et al., 2007) (proposing guidelines to 
allow for increased inclusion of prisoners in certain types of research). But see generally Osagie 
Obasogie, Prisoners as Human Subjects: A Closer Look at the Institute of Medicine’s 
Recommendations to Loosen Current Restrictions on Using Prisoners in Scientific Research, 6 STAN. 
J. C.R. & C.L. 41 (2010) (criticizing the National Institute of Medicine recommendations). 
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Thus, although the National Commission never explicitly defined 
vulnerability, it implied that vulnerability derives from greater 
susceptibility to influence, possibly due to characteristics of the persons 
(such as impaired capacities), but perhaps also to situational or 
structural factors, such as discrimination, institutionalization, economic 
disadvantage, or dependency. The federal regulations ultimately 
promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services55 refer to 
vulnerable groups, but do not provide further elucidation on the meaning 
of the term “vulnerability.”56 Several commentators have critiqued the 
field of bioethics’ essentialist reliance on arguably over-inclusive and 
under-inclusive categories and groups as vulnerable, without conceptual 
clarity as to the factors that define vulnerability.57 
One of the most thoughtful analyses of vulnerability in the context 
of research participation appeared in the National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission (“NBAC”) Report on Ethical and Policy Issues in Research 
Involving Human Participants.58 The Report’s emphasis in addressing 
vulnerability in this context is the recognition that some persons may be 
less able to protect themselves from inappropriate involvement in 
research than are others. Thus, the Report defined vulnerability as 
follows: “a condition, either intrinsic or situational, of some individuals 
that puts them at greater risk of being used in ethically inappropriate 
ways in research.”59 It recognized that vulnerability may be manifested 
as “difficulty providing voluntary informed consent arising from 
limitations in decisionmaking capacity (as in the case of children) or 
situational circumstances (as in the case of prisoners), or because they 
are especially at risk for exploitation (as in the case of persons who belong 
to undervalued groups in society).”60 
The Report identified the following subtypes of vulnerability: 
incapacitational vulnerability (that is, limitations in the ability to 
 
 55. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2009). 
 56. See, e.g., Carl H. Coleman, Vulnerability as a Regulatory Category in Human Subject 
Research, 37 J.L., MED., & ETHICS 12, 12 (2009) (discussing the federal regulations’ reference to 
specific groups as examples of “vulnerable populations,” without defining vulnerability). 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 14; Carol Levine, Ruth Faden et al., The Limitations of “Vulnerability” as a 
Protection for Human Research Participants, 4 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44, 46–48 (2004) (referring to the 
concept of vulnerability as both “too broad and too narrow”). 
 58. NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, 1 ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN RESEARCH INVOLVING 
HUMAN PARTICIPANTS 85–92 (2001) [hereinafter NBAC REP. 1]. A more detailed version of the 
vulnerability analysis, which was authored by Kenneth Kipnis, was provided in Volume II, which 
contained the commissioned papers. Kenneth Kipnis, Vulnerability in Research Subjects: A Bioethical 
Taxonomy, in NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, 2 ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN RESEARCH 
INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS G-1 (2001). Kipnis subsequently separately published a slightly 
revised version, focusing solely on children as research subjects. Kenneth Kipnis, Seven 
Vulnerabilities in the Pediatric Research Subject, 24 THEORETICAL MED. 107 (2003) [hereinafter 
Kipnis, Seven Vulnerabilities]. 
 59. NBAC REP. 1, supra note 58, at 85. 
 60. Id. 
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“comprehend information, deliberate, and make decisions regarding 
participation in a proposed research study”);61 institutional vulnerability 
(that is, being “subject to the formal authority of others who have 
independent interests in whether the prospective participant agrees to 
enroll in the research study,” as in the case of persons in prisons or the 
military, or college students who must take part in a study as part of a 
course requirement); deferential vulnerability (that is, like institutional 
vulnerability, these persons are situated so as to be subject to the 
authority of others with independent interests, but here the influence is 
informal rather than the product of formal hierarchies, as when patients 
generally defer to their doctors, or in response to inequalities in class, 
race, or gender); medical vulnerability (that is, when individuals with 
serious health conditions are drawn to research participation because 
there are no other satisfactory treatment options, a scenario that can 
affect one’s willingness to accept certain risks); economic vulnerability 
(that is, when “individuals are disadvantaged in the distribution of social 
goods and services such as income, housing, or health care” which may 
increase the risk of exploitation through participation); and social 
vulnerability (that is, when persons belong to “undervalued social 
groups . . . which includes stereotyping and can lead to 
discrimination.”).62 
As noted above, none of the vulnerability categories cited by the 
NBAC incorporate susceptibility to harm. Rather, the focus is on 
vulnerability as related primarily to concerns about whether prospective 
participants can render voluntary decisions regarding participation, free 
from coercion or undue influence. The framework discussed by the 
NBAC, which is consistent with that embedded in the current federal 
regulations governing human research participation, analyzes potential 
for harms to participants as a result of research involvement separately, 
focusing on the risks posed by research studies as a distinct 
consideration.63 The term vulnerability is not used, however, to address 
whether some participants may be more susceptible than others to 
experiencing harm when exposed to the risks of research participation. 
Consistent with these emphases, the federal regulations impose 
duties on Institutional Review Boards (“IRBs”)—local panels empowered 
to determine when, and under what conditions, studies can go forward—
 
 61. Id. at 88–90. I chose the term “incapacitational vulnerability,” used by Kipnis in his separate 
publication, Kipnis, Seven Vulnerabilities, supra note 58, at 110, rather than the term “cognitive or 
communicative vulnerability,” used in NBAC REP. 1, supra. 
 62. NBAC REP. 1, supra note 58, at 88–90. 
 63. The federal regulations empower Institutional Review Boards (“IRBs”) with the authority to 
determine the ethicality and permissibility of research proposals under the current federal regulatory 
structure. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–46.109 (2017). Under that structure, IRBs must consider the risks 
posed by the research project, the relationship between the risks and possible benefits, informed 
consent procedures, and other factors. 45 CFR § 46.110–46.111. 
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relative to groups identified as “vulnerable populations” (specifically 
“children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally disabled persons, or 
economically or educationally disadvantaged persons”).64 IRBs must 
ensure that adequate “safeguards have been included in the study to 
protect the rights and welfare of these subjects” “[w]hen some or all of 
the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence.”65 
They also instruct IRBs to “be particularly cognizant of the special 
problems of research involving” persons in those groups identified as 
vulnerable.66 Three separate subparts of the regulations provide for 
special protections for (1) pregnant women, human fetuses, and 
neonates, (2) children, and (3) prisoners.67 The specific references to the 
reasons for inclusion of these groups focus on vulnerability to “coercion 
and undue influence,” and the potential for exploitation through 
inequitable selection of participant groups by researchers. 
Yet, the inclusion of pregnant women is puzzling here, as pregnant 
women do not constitute a group that is regarded¾at least in modern 
decades¾as having greater vulnerability to coercion or undue influence. 
Nor do they comprise a group that experiences the same social 
disadvantage or exploitation in the context of the research enterprise as 
have, for example, many economically disadvantaged or incarcerated 
groups. Indeed, the characterization of pregnant women as less able to 
provide voluntary informed consent for research participation seems 
misplaced and patronizing.68 Subsequent guidelines and scholarship 
suggest that, when drafting the regulations, the Department of Health 
and Human Services (“DHHS”) was concerned with the heightened 
physiological sensitivity of pregnant women (and the fetuses they carry) 
to certain substances and stimuli when identifying vulnerability as one 
basis for a more protective approach toward pregnant women, even 
though this definition of vulnerability is not cited explicitly by DHHS in 
the regulations. This concern invokes notions of vulnerability as greater 
susceptibility to harm. And indeed, vulnerability as greater susceptibility 
to harm is one factor in modern thinking about the need for special 
safeguards for pregnant women as research participants.69 
 
 64. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b). 
 65. Id. 
 66. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3) (addressing equitable selection of research participants). Vulnerable 
groups or populations are also mentioned in the regulations in sections dealing with composition of 
IRBs. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a). 
 67. See Subparts B, C, and D respectively. 
 68. For a thoughtful analysis and critique of the characterization of pregnant women as 
vulnerable research participants, see Verina Wild, How Are Pregnant Women Vulnerable Research 
Participants?, 5 INT’L J. FEMINIST APPROACHES TO BIOETHICS 82 (2012). 
 69. See, e.g., AM. C. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY COMM’N ON ETHICS, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
INCLUDING WOMEN AS RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS (2015), https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee 
-Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/co646.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20170312T1821081805; Mary C. Blehar et al., 
Enrolling Pregnant Women: Clinical Issues in Research, 23 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 39 (2013). 
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Carol Levine and colleagues critique the absence of susceptibility to 
harm as a dimension of vulnerability under the federal regulations and 
subsequent analyses in an analysis of the use of the concept of 
vulnerability in the context of protections for human research 
participants.70 They assert that “[w]hile consent is surely a serious 
concern, the root of the concept of vulnerability lies in the possibility of 
physical harm. . . . In contemporary bioethical discourse, one can be 
vulnerable to being harmed or being wronged.”71 Carl Coleman 
articulates similar critiques, and suggests that vulnerabilities in the 
context of research participation be classified as falling into three 
primary categories: consent-based vulnerabilities, risk-based 
vulnerabilities, and justice-based vulnerabilities.72 Here, risk-based 
vulnerabilities would consider whether certain characteristics of the 
individuals “may enhance the level of risks associated with the subjects’ 
participation in a study,” which in the research participation context 
would require the investigators and IRB to assess potential risks and the 
risk-benefit ratio with particular care and attention to those factors.73 
The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences 
(“CIOMS”), in its 2016 revision of International Ethical Guidelines for 
Health-Related Research Involving Humans,74 became the first 
influential group to incorporate into its concept of vulnerability a harm-
based notion. A pertinent portion of the commentary to the relevant 
guideline reads: 
 
According to the Declaration of Helsinki, vulnerable groups and 
individuals “may have an increased likelihood of being wronged or of 
 
 70. Levine et al., supra note 57, at 46–48. 
 71. Id. at 47. More recently, the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethics, in a module 
on Vulnerable Populations intended as a resource for instructors and others, adopted much of the 
language and the taxonomy set forth by the NBAC. However, it expanded the initial definition of 
vulnerability as follows: “Vulnerability means that an individual or groups of individuals lack the 
ability to fully and independently protect their own interests and so are vulnerable to being harmed 
or wronged.” Vulnerable Populations Background, PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF 
BIOETHICAL ISSUES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/node/4035.html 
(emphasis added). Yet, even this expansion does not fully envelop the concept of Harm-Based 
Vulnerability, in that it focuses on vulnerability as inability to protect one’s own interests rather than 
vulnerability as resulting from an organism’s greater susceptibility to harm from the interventions or 
exposures that occur during research participation. For further discussion of these problems, as well 
as a summary of other definitions in the context of research ethics, see Dearbhail  
Bracken-Roche et al., The Concept of “Vulnerability” in Research Ethics: An In-Depth Analysis of 
Policies and Guidelines, 15 HEALTH RES. POL’Y & SYS’S 1 (2017). 
 72. Coleman, supra note 45, at 15. 
 73. Id. 
 74. COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORGS. OF MED. SCI., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR  
HEALTH-RELATED RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMANS 57–59 (2016), https://cioms.ch/wp-content/ 
uploads/2017/01/WEB-CIOMS-EthicalGuidelines.pdf [hereinafter CIOMS]. This document was 
developed in collaboration with the World Health Organization. 
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incurring additional harm.” This implies that vulnerability involves 
judgments about both the probability and degree of physical, 
psychological, or social harm, as well as a greater susceptibility to 
deception or having confidentiality breached. It is important to 
recognize that vulnerability involves not only the ability to provide 
initial consent to participate in research, but also aspects of the ongoing 
participation in research studies.75 
The 2016 CIOMS report clearly goes beyond vulnerabilities as 
relating solely to the consent process, adopting a notion of vulnerability 
as greater susceptibility to “physical, psychological, or social harm” 
arising both from direct involvement in the ongoing research, and from 
concrete and relational effects of breaches of confidentiality by the 
research team or exposure to deception as a feature of the experimental 
design. These harm-based notions of vulnerability are integrated by the 
CIOMS report into a more comprehensive catalog of dimensions of 
vulnerability, which encompasses substantially similar principles as the 
NBAC, but combines both capacity-related and influence-related 
themes: 
In some cases, persons are vulnerable because they are relatively (or 
absolutely) incapable of protecting their own interests. This may occur 
when persons have relative or absolute impairments in decisional 
capacity, education, resources, strength, or other attributes needed to 
protect their own interests. In other cases, persons can also be 
vulnerable because some feature of the circumstances (temporary or 
permanent) in which they live makes it less likely that others will be 
vigilant about, or sensitive to, their interests. This may happen when 
people are marginalized, stigmatized, or face social exclusion or 
prejudice that increases the likelihood that others place their interests 
at risk, whether intentionally or unintentionally . . . .76 
Applying the analyses in this Part to the concepts of children’s 
vulnerability that appear in the Court’s opinions, three additional 
subtypes of vulnerability can be identified: vulnerability as susceptibility 
to influence, pressure, or coercion by others (influence-based 
vulnerability); vulnerability arising from immature decisional and self-
protective capacities (capacity-based vulnerability); and vulnerability 
arising from legal, social, and situational concomitants of minority status 
and subordination to the authority and control of others (status-based 
vulnerability). I will distinguish and elaborate upon these three subtypes, 
and their relationship to the foregoing themes. 
Clearly, a predominant theme in bioethical formulations and 
regulatory guidelines is a concern about the role of vulnerability in 
impairing an individual’s opportunity or ability to make choices. Indeed, 
in their classic treatise on Principles of Bioethics, Beauchamp and 
 
 75. Id. at 57. 
 76. CIOMS, supra note 74, at 57. 
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Childress characterize the field’s concerns about vulnerable persons as 
relating to perceived limitations in such persons’ capacities to “protect[] 
their own interests because of sickness, debilitation, mental illness, 
immaturity, cognitive impairment, and the like. . . . Those who are easily 
susceptible to intimidation, manipulation, coercion, or exploitation are 
commonly classified among the vulnerable.”77 One can further 
subclassify this set of ideas by distinguishing between impairments of 
one’s opportunity or ability to make choices due to the influence or 
pressure of others or due to limitations in one’s opportunity or ability to 
understand, process, analyze, or exercise judgment about information 
(including, but not limited to, the potential risks and benefits of 
particular courses of action). While there are unquestionably some 
intersections between these concepts, one emphasizes a more influence-
based dimension of vulnerability while the other a more capacity-based 
dimension of vulnerability. 
The legal and ethical doctrines of informed consent, which regulate 
health care decisionmaking as well as research participation decisions, 
require that a person’s decision be made voluntarily as well as 
competently.78 Formulations of voluntariness identify the aspiration that 
health care decisionmaking be relatively free from coercion, 
manipulation, or unfair inducements.79 Formulations of competence 
emphasize the ideal that health care decisions be made with 
understanding of the information material to their decision (such as 
potential risks, benefits, and probabilities of various outcomes), with the 
ability to reason about that information, and with an appropriate degree 
of judgment or appreciation of the nuances of the decision for them, 
given their situation.80 
The second subtype of vulnerability found in the Court’s 
jurisprudence and elaborated in scientific and theoretical scholarship 
therefore is influence-based vulnerability, which emphasizes children’s 
purported susceptibility to influence, pressure, or coercion of others as 
a basis for differential constitutional treatment of minors and adults. In 
our dictionary definitions above, this form may be defined as 
 
 77. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 89 (6th ed. 
2009). Beauchamp and Childress caution against the potential for stereotyping and overprotection 
with classification of an entire group as vulnerable. Id. at 90. Beauchamp and Childress also recognize 
vulnerability as susceptibility to harm. Id. at 89, 254. 
 78. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 77, at 117–35; see also Alan Meisel, Loren H. Roth,  
& Charles W. Lidz, Toward a Model of the Legal Doctrine of Informed Consent, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
285 (1977). 
 79. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 77, at 132–33; Meisel et al., supra note 78, at 286. 
 80. Several of these concepts are central to modern notions of competence to provide informed 
consent. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’ Competence to Consent to Treatment, 
357 N. ENG. J. MED. 1834, 1835–36 (2007) (as applied to adults); Weithorn, Developmental Factors 
and Competence to Make Informed Decisions, supra note 9, at 88–95 (as applied to measurement of 
children’s competence). 
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“susceptib[ility] to temptation or corrupt influence.”81 It captures notions 
of vulnerability as greater susceptibility to influence, pressure, or 
coercion by others. This category focuses on influence-based 
vulnerability related primarily to inherent or intrinsic factors, as 
identified by Mackenzie, above.82 Thus, some individuals, due to age, 
stage of development, or other psychological or endogenous 
characteristics, may be more susceptible to influence, pressure, or 
coercion by others. They may be more likely to conform with the 
directives or expectations of others, or be more susceptible to role 
modeling by others. In addition, in specific situations, they may defer to 
respected, trusted, or powerful others’ preferences, due to any of a range 
of relational and interpersonal processes and dynamics. Indeed, this 
phenomenon may be analogized to the NBAC’s notion of deferential 
vulnerability, which recognizes the subtle impact of relationships, 
including hierarchical relationships, on the choices one makes in those 
situations when one is provided with the opportunity to elect options. 
By contrast, capacity-based vulnerability, or vulnerability arising 
from immature decisional and self-protective capacities, focuses 
primarily on the ways in which limitations in capacities for effective 
decisionmaking render one vulnerable. The CIOMS report 
characterization of vulnerability as flowing from incapacity to protect 
one’s own interests related to reduced decisional capacities. This notion 
is consistent with the concept of incapacitational vulnerability laid out in 
the NBAC analysis, embodies a theme present in many of the Court’s 
decisions.  
It is important here to clarify the relationship between decisional 
capacities and vulnerability. Psychological capacity or competence for 
decisionmaking is usually a legal prerequisite for authority to make 
important decisions, such as those regarding medical treatment. Such 
capacity is presumed for adults, whereas incapacity is typically 
presumed for minors, subject to certain exceptions.83 
As the Court’s language in Bellotti detailing the “three reasons” 
justifying differential treatment of children and adults under the 
Constitution, reveals,84 the Court views decisional capacity and 
vulnerability as distinct factors.85 Yet, as the bioethics formulations by 
 
 81. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 82. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 83. See generally Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 9, at 1590 (finding that denying adolescents 
the right of self-determination in health care situations is not supported on the basis of a presumption 
that they lack the capacity to make meaningful health care decisions). 
 84. The Court cited “the peculiar vulnerability of children; [children’s] inability to make critical 
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing” as 
bases for differential treatment of minors and adults under the Constitution. Bellotti v. Baird,  
443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). 
 85. Id. In Bellotti, however, the Court did not allow the Massachusetts statute requiring parental 
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CIOMS and the NBAC make clear, vulnerability may, in some instances, 
arise from reduced decisional capacity. Those whose decisional 
capacities are immature may be more prone to make unwise choices, and 
therefore, may be less able to protect themselves from potential harms or 
dangers present in their lives. Reduced capacity to seek or understand 
information, to appreciate its relevance for oneself, to perceive and weigh 
risks and benefits, or to exercise self-control and restrain oneself from 
acting impulsively, creates a greater risk of making choices that lead to 
negative outcomes. Research reveals differences in decisional capacities 
based on age, although the patterns are not always linear and do not 
always mesh with everyday assumptions or legal presumptions.86 
A fourth subtype of vulnerability focuses on the structural realities 
of children’s status as legal minors. Status-based vulnerability arises 
from legal, social, and situational concomitants of minority status and 
subordination to the authority and control of others. In focusing on the 
concomitants of legal minority for children, status-based vulnerability 
addresses the effects of being in a formal class whose members are 
typically subject to the authority of others. The concept draws, in part, 
from the NBAC’s notions of institutional vulnerability. As minors, 
children are limited by legal, social, economic, and restrictions that 
reduce their freedom of choice, movement, and autonomy. Others are 
charged with making decisions about their custody (that is, where they 
go and with whom they spend time), their education, their religion, their 
health care, their discipline, and so on. In most cases, their opportunities 
to make choices and exercise freedoms are contingent on the discretion 
of others. 
Within the legal framework that empowers adults with the 
supervision and control of minors in our society, we rely on adults to use 
this authority in a manner that is nonexploitative, ideally promoting 
children’s welfare and positive socialization. Most adults do not abuse 
this power, yet the control by some adults charged with supervision and 
decisionmaking regarding children can create a range of risks to children. 
Children have limited recourse in such situations. In some instances, the 
Court has noted that children’s lesser control over their own lives limits 
their choices in ways that are constitutionally relevant.87 
 
consent for minors’ access to abortion to stand without modification. The Court held unconstitutional 
parental consent statutes that grant parents exclusive veto power over their minor daughters’ access 
to abortion. It concluded that minors’ unique needs, characteristics, and status under the law required 
an alternative that balanced the competing interests and concerns. The judicial by-pass procedure 
approved by the Court in Bellotti governs in most states, although some jurisdictions, such as 
California, allow minors direct access to abortion, independent of parental or court involvement.  
See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997). 
 86. See e.g., sources cited supra note 9. 
 87. See, e.g., infra notes 147–48 and accompanying text. 
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The fifth and final subtype of vulnerability—dependency-based 
vulnerability—arises from children’s greater dependence or reliance on 
others to meet one’s basic needs. Initially, it may appear that this subtype 
is similar to status-based vulnerability. Indeed, the law and society have 
created structures to formalize children’s dependence on adults with 
statuses such as minority and parenthood. Dependency-based 
vulnerability focuses on minors’ functional reliance on adults to meet 
their needs. Thus, while status-based vulnerability highlights the risks to 
minors arising out of the authority of others over them and their 
concomitant lack of control over their own lives, dependency-based 
vulnerability highlights the risks arising from children’s functional 
reliance on adults, particularly caregivers, to meet their essential 
physiological and psychological needs.  
As discussed in Part II, children’s development occurs in interaction 
with their environments. At times, children’s development is acutely 
sensitive to environmental experiences. Throughout a child’s life, but 
particularly in the early years, adults control whether those experiences 
facilitate positive development, neglect essential needs, or introduce 
harmful exposures. Children, especially young children, rely almost 
exclusively on caregivers, teachers, and, at times, other adults to provide 
an environment that facilitates positive developmental trajectories and 
protects against environmental risks. With dependence on adults come 
risks due to deficits, inadequacies, or dangers presented by the care of 
others. It is this dependence and the attendant risks it entails that is 
captured by dependency-based vulnerability. 
Several writers have addressed the concept of dependency-based 
vulnerability. Martha Fineman emphasizes the interrelationships 
between dependency and vulnerability more generally.88 Philosopher 
Susan Dodds characterizes dependence as a form of vulnerability: 
“Dependence is vulnerability that requires . . . care.”89 Mianna Lotz 
asserts that children’s unique vulnerability “arises from their particular 
dependency on the actions and choices of others, especially their 
caregivers, and from their (at least present) lack of the full complement 
of skills and capacities that might mitigate such dependency.”90 She 
points out further that it is precisely those inputs from caregivers that 
help develop the capacities that will ultimately allow children to exercise 
autonomy. Thus, the impact caregivers have on a child is lifelong. The 
research reviewed in Part II below underscores how important early 
 
 88. Martha Albertson Fineman in Law and Politics, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL 
FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS 13, 17–19 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Greer eds., 2013). 
 89. Susan Dodds, Dependence, Care, and Vulnerability, in VULNERABILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN ETHICS 
AND FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 181, 182–83 (Catriona Mackenzie et al. eds., 2014). 
 90. Mianna Lotz, Parental Values and Children’s Vulnerability, in VULNERABILITY: NEW ESSAYS 
IN ETHICS AND FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 242, 243–44 (Catriona Mackenzie et al. eds., 2014). 
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inputs are to social, emotional, and medical well-being throughout the 
lifespan, consistent with Lotz’s observation that psychological and 
emotional relationships with caregivers are necessary for children to 
flourish.91 Adults involved in raising children, such as parents, extended 
family, teachers, and others, have substantial influence over the course 
of a child’s life, through formation of children’s preferences and values 
occurring during socialization.92 
In addition, because of their undeveloped physical selves, children 
are dependent on caregivers for the most basic material sustenance 
necessary for their survival, such as food and shelter.93 “To be dependent 
is to be in circumstances in which one must rely on other individuals to 
access, provide, or secure (one or more of) one’s needs . . . .”94 Small 
children may be physically incapable of extricating themselves from 
dangerous situations created by acts of omission or commission by their 
caregivers. A stark example, highlighted by recent news reports, occurs 
when adults leave children unattended in locked cars, with lethal 
consequences.95 The statistics on the rates of reported child neglect 
reveal that substantial numbers of children in our society may not have 
their basic needs for care adequately met. They and others rely on the 
legal system to remedy these failures. 
B. CHILDHOOD VULNERABILITY CONSTRUCTS AND THE COURT:  
AN INTRODUCTION 
In this Section, I apply the typologies developed above, illustrating 
the Court’s use of vulnerability constructs, for the purpose of clarifying 
the categories and the distinctions among them. 
1.   Harm-Based Vulnerability 
The first typology emphasizes vulnerability as greater 
susceptibility to physical or psychological harm from exposure to 
certain stimuli or situations. Members of the Court have invoked 
 
 91. Id. at 244. 
 92. See generally HANDBOOK OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (Melanie Killen & Judith G. Smetana eds., 
2d ed. 2014) (noting that the family structure plays a significant role in the way children’s moral 
sensitivity and behavior develop); HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION: THEORY AND RESEARCH (Joan E. 
Grusec & Paul D. Hastings eds., 2d ed. 2015) (finding that young children learn socialization skills 
from adult role models). 
 93. Id.; Dodds, supra note 89, at 183–84. 
 94. Dodds, supra note 89, at 183. 
 95. This phenomenon is tragically illustrated by deaths of children in fires after being left alone 
by their caregivers, or the all-too-common incidence of children who die after having been left 
strapped in a car seat on a hot day. See, e.g., Gene Weingarten, Fatal Distraction: Forgetting a Child 
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constructions of this subtype of vulnerability, for example, in considering 
the constitutionality of policies allegedly protecting children from harm, 
or in determining whether a classification violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. Part III focuses in depth on the Court’s use of vulnerability 
constructs in a subset of cases involving the constitutionality of 
regulation of child labor, child pornography, modifications of courtroom 
procedures to accommodate children as courtroom witnesses against 
alleged abusers, and children’s exposure to certain types of speech (such 
as speech communicated by peers in school and speech containing sexual 
images, “indecent” language, violent content).96 Thus, in this Section, my 
illustrations are selected from other cases. 
Harm-based vulnerability constructs abound in the adolescent 
abortion cases, where the Justices present dueling sets of constructs of 
children’s vulnerability. The majority in H.L. v. Matheson, a case 
challenging a Utah parental notification provision, asserted that the 
“emotional and psychological effects of the pregnancy and abortion 
experience are markedly more severe in girls under 18 than in adults” 
and that the “medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of an 
abortion are serious and can be lasting . . . ; particularly . . . when the 
patient is immature.”97 By contrast, the dissenters focused more on the 
special risks to minors of being forced to continue with an unwanted 
pregnancy and childbirth. Justice Marshall’s dissent argued that unwed 
adolescents who give birth must face reduced “educational and job 
opportunities, as well as the more immediate problems of finding 
financial and emotional support for offspring dependent entirely on 
[them] . . . . Of course, for minors, the mere fact of pregnancy and the 
experience of child-birth can provide psychological upheaval.”98 
Images of children as susceptible to harm have also been employed 
in Equal Protection cases to emphasize the risks to children of unequal 
treatment. One of the most famous references to children’s vulnerability 
in Supreme Court jurisprudence appeared in the Court’s unanimous 
opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.99 The Court cited the 
potentially deleterious effects of segregated educational experiences on 
adults, as articulated in earlier cases, and then stated that “[s]uch 
considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high 
schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications 
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority that may 
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”100 
 
 96. See infra Part III. 
 97. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412–13 (1981) (citing the “potentially grave emotional and 
psychological consequences of [teenagers’] decision[s] to abort”). 
 98. Id. at 438–39 n.38, 444 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 99. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 100. Id. at 494–95 & n.11. 
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While the criticisms and controversies regarding the use of psychologist 
Kenneth Clark’s studies to support this conclusion are many,101 the use 
illustrates how images of children as more susceptible to potential harms 
than adults make their way into the Court’s opinions. The Court 
continued its reliance on this vulnerability theme in subsequent school 
desegregation cases.102 
Race-based decisionmaking was rejected in Palmore v. Sidoti, 
where the Court determined that assertions about children’s 
vulnerability to “social stigmatization” would not influence its 
decision.103 The Court unanimously refused to review a custody decision, 
despite a father’s concerns that his child might be socially ostracized if 
she remained in her mother’s custody, given that the mother’s marriage 
was an interracial one.104 The Court held that race-based factors such as 
these were not constitutionally permissible considerations in 
determining custody of a child. 
More recently, in Obergefell v. Hodges105 and United States  
v. Windsor,106 in expanding constitutional protections for the marital 
rights of same-sex couples, the Court cited the “harm and humiliate[ion]” 
experienced by the children of same-sex couples.107 Referring to the 
potentially-painful confusion that the law’s and society’s rejection of 
their parents’ relationship may create, the Court observed that children 
may have difficulty understanding why their families are treated as “less 
worthy” of formal recognition under the law.108 The Court referred as well 
to harms to children of uncertainties accompanying nonmarital family 
life.109 
 
 101. For discussions about the use of social science in this case, in particular, see e.g., DAVID L. 
FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 101–06 (1999). Dean Faigman 
concludes that “the Court willingly relied on research but with little concern for its validity.” Id. at 105. 
“That the factual insight was indispensable to the immediate holding in Brown is plain. Still, serious 
doubt attaches to whether the Court truly relied on the social science research for this insight. The 
simplest way to determine just how seriously the Court considered the factual showing is to ask 
whether the result would have been different if the evidence had shown the contrary.” Id. at 102; see 
also Lois A. Weithorn, Professional Responsibility in the Dissemination of Psychological Research in 
Legal Contexts, in REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 253, 261–62 (Gary 
B. Melton ed., 1987). 
 102. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 287–88 (1977). 
 103. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
 104. Id. at 431–43. 
 105. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 106. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 107. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600–01. 
 108. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. (“The law in question makes it even more difficult for the children 
to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in 
their community and in their daily lives.” Id.). 
 109. The Court also cited the tangible consequences to children if their parents are barred from the 
institution of marriage, in that there is a myriad of economic and social benefits of which they could 
be deprived. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600–01; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695. It is noteworthy to contrast 
these formulations with those that had been offered by states for decades as justification for 
WEITHORN-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/17  12:39 AM 
206 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:179 
These cases, as well as those discussed in Part III, provide examples 
of a larger body of cases invoking images of children as particularly 
susceptible to physiological or psychological harm. While concerns about 
protecting children from such perceived risks are the most common 
images of children’s vulnerability appearing in the Court’s constitutional 
opinions, the Court also relies on notions of the other four subtypes of 
children’s vulnerability. 
2.   Influence-Based Vulnerability. 
The second typology focuses on vulnerability as greater 
susceptibility to influence, pressure, or coercion by others. The Court 
has invoked (or rejected) this concept in a range of cases, including those 
concerning religious exercises in schools, criminal sentencing, and the 
Miranda custody inquiry.110 For example, as early as the 1960s, the Court 
relied on notions of children as susceptible to the influence of peers, 
teachers, and the government in cases involving Establishment Clause 
challenges to policies allowing school prayer. 
In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the Court 
struck down a Pennsylvania school district’s prayer policy, despite an 
excusal provision that purportedly rendered participation voluntary.111 
The Court cited developmental research to support its conclusion that 
children could not be expected to flout social expectations and “peer-
group norms” that favored participation in the religious exercises.112 The 
Court further distinguished religious exercises in public school from 
those in legislative bodies, arguing that, in contrast to school children, 
“mature adults . . . may presumably absent themselves . . . without 
incurring any penalty, direct or indirect.”113 Even minors on the verge of 
adulthood may be susceptible to pressures from peers and authority 
figures, according to a 1992 opinion by the Court. In Lee v. Weisman, the 
 
restrictions on same-sex couples to marry. States had frequently argued that childrearing by 
heterosexual parents was superior to that offered by same-sex couples, and that therefore, state 
sanctioning of marriage by same-sex couples would encourage formation of family types less suitable 
for childrearing. In addition, states asserted, and many courts accepted, notions that childrearing by 
gays and lesbians could be harmful to children’s development and adjustment. See, e.g., Hernandez v. 
Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2D 354 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2D 1187 (1971). See also Lynn 
D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833; 
Lofton v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 826 (11th Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc 
denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005). 
 110. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271–73 (2011) (holding that the age of a child is 
relevant to a determination of whether, as the subject of a police interrogation, he believed he was in 
police custody, therefore rendering any statements made prior to Miranda warnings inadmissible, 
because, among other factors, children “‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures’ 
than adults.” (citing to Roper v. Simmons, 534 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).). 
 111. Sch. Dist. Of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963). 
 112. Id. at 290–91 & n.69. 
 113. Id. at 299–301.  
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Court described minors as susceptible to the pressure to conform in the 
context of a purportedly nonsectarian prayer offered by a clergy member 
at a public high school graduation ceremony, even where participation in 
the religious exercise was presented to students as voluntary.114 In 
vigorous dissent, Justice Scalia rejected the assertion that older minors, 
such as graduating high school seniors, are susceptible to “psychological 
coercion” in such situations.115 
In Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence highlighted 
an aspect of susceptibility to influence that goes to the heart of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence: concern about the message sent to 
individuals when government appears to endorse religion.116 She 
distinguished the impact of prayer in governmental settings involving 
adults from school prayer by focusing on children’s and adults’ 
differential susceptibility to “unwilling religious indoctrination.”117 She 
opined: “[There is] a distinction when government-sponsored religious 
exercises are directed at impressionable children who are required to 
attend school, for then government endorsement is much more likely to 
result in coerced religious beliefs.”118 Concerns about children’s 
impressionability and susceptibility to peer pressure were also cited by 
the Court in striking down a Louisiana statute requiring the teaching of 
“creation science” whenever evolution is taught.119 
In a series of decisions concerning the constitutionality of imposing 
the harshest criminal penalties on juvenile offenders, the Court has relied 
on developmental science to support a number of constructs relating to 
children’s vulnerability.120 Although many of the decisions on these 
issues were published in earlier decades,121 the Court’s 2005 decision in 
Roper v. Simmons122 enthusiastically embraced psychological and 
neuroscientific research when applying Eighth Amendment 
proportionality doctrine. 
In Roper, which held that imposition of the death penalty was 
categorically unconstitutional for persons who committed their crimes as 
minors, the Court cited distinctions between minors and adults in three 
 
 114. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 578 (1992). 
 115. Id. at 636–37 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 116. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 77 (1985). 
 117. Id. at 81 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id.  
 119. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987). 
 120. Psychological research and policy analyses appeared very influential in the Court’s decisions. 
For example, the Court heavily cited articles developed as part of the John D. and Catherine T. 
MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, e.g., 
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 9, as well as briefs submitted by amici curiae. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 
567 U.S. 460, 471–72 & n.5 (2012). 
 121. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 
(1989); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). 
 122. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
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areas of human functioning, one of which focused on vulnerability. The 
Court concluded that “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to 
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”123 
The Court reinforced this conclusion five years later, in Graham  
v. Florida, extending Roper’s reasoning to hold unconstitutional statutes 
that permit sentences of life without parole to be imposed on minors.124 
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court extended this line of precedent one step 
further, striking as unconstitutional statutes that impose mandatory life 
sentences without parole on those who were minors at the time of 
commission of homicide offenses.125 
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, decided after Roper and Graham, 
addressed the question of whether the age of a minor at the time of police 
questioning can inform a court’s determination of whether a reasonable 
person in the defendant’s position would appreciate his freedom to 
terminate questioning and leave.126 The Court relied heavily in J.D.B. on 
images of children as susceptible to the influence of others, noting that 
even adults may confess to crimes they did not commit under the 
“pressure of custodial interrogation.”127 Indeed, in the context of police 
interrogation, which is recognized to be inherently coercive, and where 
waivers of one’s rights must be voluntary as well as informed and 
intelligent, the Court considers whether “the suspect’s free choice” or his 
“will to resist” have been undermined.128 The Court in J.D.B. relied on 
constructs of children as more susceptible to influence and pressure to 
support its conclusion that a child’s age could affect how a reasonable 
person perceived the freedom to leave: “That is, a reasonable child 
subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit 
when a reasonable adult would feel free to go.”129 J.D.B. and the 
sentencing cases are also rich with language asserting constitutionally 
relevant notions of capacity-based vulnerability and status-based 
vulnerability, discussed in the two subsections that follow. 
 
 123. Id. at 569. 
 124. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 125. Miller, 562 U.S. at 460. 
 126. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011). 
 127. Id. at 269–71. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 271–72. The Court also observed that a child’s perception of the coercive elements of 
situations with adults may be influenced by the reality that, children’s lives are generally controlled by 
adults. Thus, to some extent, the default perception is that one’s freedom of choice is limited by 
authority figures. 
A student¾whose presence at school is compulsory and whose disobedience at school is 
cause for disciplinary action¾is in a far different position than, say, a parent volunteer on 
school grounds to chaperone an event, or an adult from the community on school grounds 
to attend a basketball game. Without asking whether the person ‘questioned in school’ is a 
‘minor,’ . . . the coercive effect of the schoolhouse setting is unknowable. 
Id. at 276. 
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3.   Capacity-Based Vulnerability. 
The concept of capacity-based vulnerability focuses on the risks to 
one’s welfare that may accompany limitations of one’s decisional 
capacities. Those with immature decisional capacities may be less able to 
protect themselves from potential harms or dangers. They may be less 
likely to perceive and understand relevant information, to weigh risks 
and benefits, to exercise planning, to employ forethought and 
deliberative decisionmaking, and to use self-restraint against impulsive 
action. Indeed, these are the characteristics identified by the Court in 
J.D.B. and the recent sentencing cases cited above.130 
In J.D.B., the Court summarized centuries of common law 
assumptions about children’s nature: “children characteristically lack the 
capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete 
ability to understand the world around them.”131 The Court has made this 
type of observation previously. In Parham v. J.R., a case considering 
what Due Process protections are required before children are 
“voluntarily” admitted to psychiatric hospitals with parental consent, 
Justice Burger cited the law’s presumption that children are less capable 
of making decisions due to developmental immaturity: “Most children, 
even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments 
concerning many decisions, including their need for medical care or 
treatment.”132 In the context of abortion, the Supreme Court’s majority 
opined that minors “often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment 
to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.”133 The 
extent to which these assumptions reflect reality across these settings, 
and across all minors faced with decisionmaking in these contexts, is an 
empirical question that has been challenged by social scientists.134 
Focusing on minors who engage in criminal offending, the Court in 
Roper asserted that minors lacked maturity and were more likely than 
adults to engage in “impetuous and ill-considered actions and 
decisions.”135 It cited developmental research for the proposition that 
“adolescents are overrepresented statistically in virtually every category 
of reckless behavior.”136 In Miller, the Court went further, noting the 
 
 130. See supra notes 122–125 and accompanying text. 
 131. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 273. 
 132. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979). 
 133. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979). 
 134. Full analysis of the research addressing minors’ decisional competencies across legal settings 
is beyond the scope of this Article. It is noteworthy, however, that depending on the specific legal 
capacities of relevance and the ages of the children whose capacities are at issue, minors’ may in some 
instances perform in a manner comparable to adults, while in other instances, may differ significantly 
from adult standards. See infra notes 220–222 and accompanying text. 
 135. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 136. Id. at 569 (citing Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental 
Perspective, 12 DEV. REV. 339, 339 (1992)). 
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neuroscientific basis for many of its conclusions.137 In citing an amicus 
brief authored by the American Medical Association for Graham v. 
Florida, the Court emphasized “fundamental differences between 
juvenile and adult minds” “in parts of the brain involved in behavior 
control,”138 noting “adolescent brains are not yet fully mature in regions 
and systems related to higher-order executive functions such as impulse 
control, planning ahead, and risk avoidance.”139 It concluded that 
“transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess 
consequences” rendered children less morally culpable for the criminal 
acts in which they may engage.140 
In a totally different context¾choices minors make about use of 
tobacco products¾the Court in Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly,141 noted that 
“it is understandable for the States to attempt to prevent minors from 
using tobacco products before they reach an age where they are capable 
of weighing for themselves the risks and potential benefits of tobacco 
use . . . .”142 In Lorillard, however, the Court struck down most of the 
Massachusetts regulations restricting advertising of tobacco products. 
Despite the recognized harms of tobacco use by children and the 
acknowledged vulnerability of children to the influence of advertisers, 
the Court decided that First Amendment considerations limited the 
state’s authority to regulate in the manner laid out by the challenged 
statutes. The framing of the issue in Lorillard, however, demonstrates 
the possible interplay of decisional capacity and vulnerability. In the 
opinion, the Court acknowledged the special risks to youth of immature 
choices to use tobacco products, which may then lead to long-term 
addiction with lifelong consequences. 
4.   Status-Based Vulnerability. 
Status-based vulnerability arises from legal, social, and situational 
concomitants of minority status and subordination to the authority and 
control of others. In focusing on the concomitants of the minority status 
for children, this form of vulnerability addresses the structural effects of 
being subject to the authority of others. As such, it draws from the 
NBAC’s concept of institutional vulnerability. At its extreme, 
institutional vulnerability considers the limits on a person’s freedom 
when, like a prisoner, one is captive in a total institution. Most children’s 
 
 137. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012). 
 138. Id. at 471–72 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (referring to Brief for the 
American Medical Association and the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 16–24, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)  
(Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621) (2009 WL 2247127, at *16–24).). 
 139. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472, n.5. 
 140. Id. at 472. 
 141. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 142. Id. at 570–71. 
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lives are, fortunately, not as confining as is institutionalization, but the 
restrictions on many of their choices are real. 
The law governing family relations, and our society, is structured on 
parental discretion in most areas of children’s upbringing—with some 
limited state involvement—an arrangement that usually serves minors’ 
interests.143 Ideally, adults with such authority act to promote the child’s 
and society’s interests, as well as the child’s developing autonomy and 
self-direction, and grants of minors’ freedom are somewhat 
commensurate with minors’ acquisition of developmental capacities. 
One of the implications of this legally- and socially-mandated 
allocation of power over minors’ lives is that minors typically cannot 
choose where and with whom to live, and with whom to associate. In 
Troxel v. Granville, the Court reinforced parental discretion to 
determine the parameters of court-ordered third-party visitation of their 
children by grandparents. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that just as 
parents have fundamental due process rights that protect their 
relationships with their children, children’s relationships with adults 
deserve constitutional protection.144 In particular, he observed that the 
majority’s decision did not recognize a child’s liberty interest in 
preserving particular family or family-like bonds, such as with 
grandparents. As such, he recognized the vulnerability of children to 
emotional losses from the severing of such bonds. 
In his dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder, a case in which the Court 
recognized the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of Amish parents 
to remove their teenaged children from public school earlier than the 
statutorily determined age of school exit, Justice Douglas bemoaned the 
losses to the children of irreplaceable educational opportunities, as a 
result of their lack of freedom to choose whether to remain in school.145 
He argued that the Court’s prior cases, recognizing that the Constitution 
applies to children as well as adults, mandated that the court should have 
solicited the children’s choice on a matter so seriously affecting their 
welfare. Noting that the early termination of a child’s education may have 
dramatic repercussions for the child’s future, he impliedly emphasized 
the vulnerabilities inherent in certain exercises of parental discretion.146 
 
 143. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 144. Id. at 88–90 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 145. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245–46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 146. Justice Douglas opined:   
If a parent keeps his child out of school beyond the grade school, then the child will 
be forever barred from entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have 
today. . . . If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those in authority over him 
and if his education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed. 
Id. 
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In Roper, the Court characterized minors as more vulnerable than 
adults “in part by the prevailing circumstance that juveniles have less 
control, or less experience with control, over their own environment.”147 
Children are less able to extricate themselves from homes and 
communities in which socialization patterns and role models promote 
criminal conduct. In Miller, the Court addressed not only the 
constitutionality of Alabama’s policy of mandating life sentences for 
homicide offenders, but also the appropriateness of a life sentence for 
youth who had been fourteen years old at the time of the offense. In so 
doing, it highlighted the powerlessness of the offenders to escape the 
violent home situations in which they were living.148 
In an ironic characterization of minors’ lack of day-to-day control 
over their lives as a form of captivity, the U.S. Supreme Court in Schall v. 
Martin defended less stringent due process protections in the context of 
pretrial preventive detention for minors versus adults, Justice Burger 
stated starkly that “juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of 
custody.”149 While most of us would not liken the limitations of most 
minors’ freedom to incarceration in a state detention facility (where one 
is held in locked quarters, separated from loved ones, and is vulnerable 
to physical and sexual assaults) the analogy provides a poignant 
depiction of the vulnerability potentially accompanying minority status, 
much like a form of institutional vulnerability. 
The Court’s conclusion in Ingraham v. Wright was also ironic.150 
The Court held that the Constitution does not protect minors from 
exposure to exceptionally harsh corporal punishment, even though it 
acknowledged that such treatment could not legally be meted out to 
adults, including prison inmates.151 In Ingraham, one child had been 
“paddled” so harshly that he suffered a “hematoma requiring medical 
attention and keeping him out of school for several days” and another 
“was struck on his arms, once depriving him of the full use of his arm for 
a week.”152 Justice White’s dissent criticized the majority for its 
unwillingness to treat school children committing minor disciplinary 
infractions with the same protective instincts that it applied to adult 
prisoners.153 The limited recourse available to minors against adults who 
control their lives underscores the potential vulnerability of children if 
 
 147. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 148. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012). 
 149. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984). 
 150. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
 151. Id. at 671, 680 (holding that due process safeguards, such as informal hearings, were 
unnecessary and unduly burdensome prior to the administration of corporal punishment in the 
schools). 
 152. Id. at 657. 
 153. Id. at 683–92 (White, J., dissenting). 
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adults fail to exercise their authority in a manner that is wise, fair, and 
nonexploitative. 
Finally, the Court in J.D.B. concluded that failure to consider the age 
of a minor in the Miranda custody inquiry ignores the pervasiveness of 
adult control over minors and the way such control is likely to shape a 
child’s world view.154 Calling such failure “nonsensical” and “absurd,” the 
Court recognized the structures of adult control and attendant 
consequences for children’s noncompliance that are a part of the child’s 
daily experience. In other words, according to the Court, children see the 
world differently relative to questions of whether they are or are not in 
police custody and are or are not “free to go,” not only because of the 
actual features of the situation or not-yet-fully-developed psychological 
capacities, but also because most facets of their lives are subject to the 
authority of adults. Therefore, in the language of Schall, they are likely to 
experience themselves as always in some form of custody. 
5.   Dependency-Based Vulnerability. 
Minors of different ages manifest varying levels of capacity to meet 
their own basic needs. While an infant is incapable of even the most basic 
self-care, teens can feed, clothe, and bathe themselves, even if some may 
be thought not to make the best choices in executing those tasks. As noted 
above, dependency-based vulnerability recognizes the implicit reliance of 
children upon others to meet their most basic needs. Needs for material 
sustenance are, of course, fundamental to survival. Needs for protection 
from dangers¾such as knives, poisons, traffic, loaded firearms¾are also 
fundamental to survival. Yet, as decades of developmental research 
confirms, children also have psychological needs to be nurtured and 
loved, to be educated and intellectually stimulated, and to be protected 
from a range of abusive or brutal practices detrimental to adaptive 
human development. 
As noted above, there are some overlaps between status-based 
vulnerability and dependency-based vulnerability. The inherent 
dependency of many minors is one of the central reasons that society has 
created legally recognized status differentials between minors and adults. 
At the same time, the status-based authority of parents and other adults 
over minors renders minors more dependent upon the decisions of adults 
for their welfare. The two forms of vulnerability differ in that status-
based analyses focus on vulnerabilities due primarily to the structural 
status relationships, while dependency-based analyses focus on 
children’s developmental needs and vulnerabilities arising out of their 
functional biological and psychological reliance on others to meet those 
needs. 
 
 154. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 275–76 (2011). 
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An illustration of dependency-based vulnerability analyses can be 
found in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services.155 The Justices’ opinions in DeShaney underscore the risks to 
children arising from their dependence on adults. Evidence that Joshua 
DeShaney was being brutally abused by his father was substantial. 
Concerned parties reported suspicions of abuse to the Department of 
Social Service (“DSS”), which repeatedly failed to protect Joshua. After 
his father’s beatings led to permanent severe brain damage, Joshua’s 
mother sued DSS under § 1983, alleging that DSS had deprived Joshua 
of liberty without due process by failing to protect him.156 Although 
acknowledging the “grievous harm” Joshua suffered, the Court’s majority 
held that Wisconsin did not have an actionable duty under the federal 
Constitution to protect Joshua. It emphasized that the harm inflicted 
upon Joshua “was inflicted not by the State of Wisconsin, but by Joshua’s 
father.”157 
In this case, the Court’s majority and dissent disagreed as to whether 
DSS had a duty to protect a young child from the brutal violence of his 
father. None of the Justices appears to dispute the general premise, 
implicit in their opinions, that a young child is totally dependent upon 
the quality of care provided by those entrusted with protecting his 
welfare. The majority and dissent diverged on the question of who owed 
four year old Joshua DeShaney a duty of care in light of his total 
dependence on adults. Concluding that “nothing in the language of the 
Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and 
property of its citizens against invasions by private citizens,”158 Justice 
Rehnquist’s decision indicates that, at least under the federal 
Constitution, dependents such as Joshua are owed no duties of care and 
protection by the state. Rather, duties of care and protection are born 
solely by the family as a private entity. 
The dissent painted a different picture. It argued that duties owed to 
children in response to their dependence-based vulnerability are 
multifaceted.159 While our societal default imposes primary duties on 
 
 155. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 156. Id. at 193. 
 157. Id. at 203. 
 158. Id. at 195. 
 159. Joshua’s vulnerability inhered first in his dependence on his father, who subjected him to 
repeated assaults. The majority characterized Joshua’s devastating injuries as a private matter for 
which the state bore no responsibility. Id. at 201–02. In contrast, Justice Brennan emphasized that 
“Wisconsin has established a child-welfare system specifically designed to help children like Joshua” 
to which it channels all reports by private persons and governmental agencies regarding suspicions of 
child abuse or neglect. Id. at 208 (Brennan, J., dissenting). By assuming this purportedly protective 
role, but failing to act, “Wisconsin’s child-protection program . . . effectively confined Joshua DeShaney 
within the walls of Randy DeShaney’s violent home until such time as [it] took such action to remove him. 
Conceivably, then, children like Joshua are made worse off by the existence of this program when the 
persons and entities charged with carrying it out fail to do their jobs.” Id. at 210. In the dissenters’ view, 
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parents or guardians for care and protection of their children’s welfare, 
Justice Brennan’s dissent implicitly characterized children such as 
Joshua as dependents of the state when the state has set up a child 
protection apparatus, and has begun to rescue after reliance on the 
private family fails.160 
Dependency-based vulnerability constructs do not appear 
frequently in the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional cases. The 
majority’s analysis and resolution of DeShaney may explain why. Our 
Constitution is generally viewed as protecting individuals from 
government action, rather than bestowing positive rights to 
governmental assistance or services. Constitutional challenges, 
particularly after DeShaney, are less likely to characterize matters 
addressing government’s role in meeting the needs of dependent persons 
as falling within the purview of the Constitution. 
C. GENERATIVITY, PLASTICITY, AND RESILIENCE: VULNERABILITY AS 
CAPACITY FOR POSITIVE GROWTH, ADAPTATION, AND RECOVERY 
There is a somewhat paradoxical feature of vulnerability. Martha 
Fineman¾whose important work on human vulnerability and the law 
has stimulated substantial commentary¾observes that vulnerability is 
frequently viewed negatively, characterized solely in terms of 
susceptibility to harm, introducing stigmatizing effects when used to 
speak about various population subgroups or individuals.161 Yet, as 
Fineman’s work suggests, while vulnerability can be associated with 





[O]ur vulnerability presents opportunities for innovation and growth, 
creativity, and fulfillment. It makes us reach out to others, form 
relationships, and build institutions. Human beings are vulnerable 
because as embodied beings we have physical and emotional needs for 
 
the state had enhanced Joshua’s vulnerability to the dangers of his father’s actions by impliedly 
representing to emergency room physicians and others reporting the abuse that it would step in. Id. By 
failing to carry out its self-appointed role as protector for endangered children, according to the dissent, 
DSS substantially exacerbated Joshua’s vulnerability to his father’s brutality. Id.  
 160. This view of the state’s relationship to individuals’ and groups’ vulnerability is a focus of the 
important work on vulnerability theory by Martha Fineman. Fineman, supra note 88, at 13. Fineman’s 
normative analysis recognizes the role of state policies as responses to those vulnerabilities inherent 
in the human condition and argues “for a responsive state¾a state built around recognition of the 
vulnerable subject.” Id. This view is echoed in Dodds, supra note 89, at 189 and ROBERT E. GOODIN, 
PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE: A REANALYSIS OF OUR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES (1985). 
 161. Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable, supra note 33; Fineman, Equality and Difference, supra 
note 33. 
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love, respect, challenge, amusement, and desire. This vulnerability can 
bring positive or negative results . . .”162 
This perspective is of particular relevance to notions of children’s 
vulnerability because a central and defining dimension of childhood is 
that children are constantly growing and developing. Arguably, this is 
true of all human beings. Yet, the nature, trajectory, and rapid pace of 
children’s development distinguish childhood from other stages of life163 
and heighten myriad potential vulnerabilities: positive and negative. 
Modern discussions about vulnerability in the behavioral sciences 
generally incorporate and are intimately interrelated with analyses of 
concepts of resilience. While behavioral science formulations of 
vulnerability often emphasize persons’ susceptibility to negative 
outcomes when confronted with certain stressors or adverse 
circumstances, concepts of “resilience” focus on the potential for and 
processes of healthy development and outcomes in the face of such 
stressors or circumstances: “Resilience is a dynamic developmental 
process [referring to] an individual’s attainment of positive adaptation 
and competent functioning despite having experienced chronic stress or 
detrimental circumstances, or following exposure to prolonged or severe 
trauma.”164 A somewhat broader definition of resilience focuses on “[t]he 
capacity of a dynamic system to withstand or recover from significant 
challenges that threaten its stability, viability, or development.”165 
Research has identified a range of “protective factors”: variables that bear 
a demonstrated empirical relationship to prediction of better outcomes, 
 
 162. Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable, supra note 33, at 96. 
 163. “There is general recognition that the developing nervous system is qualitatively different 
from the adult nervous system.” Deborah Rice and Stan Barone, Jr., Critical Periods of Vulnerability 
for the Developing Nervous System: Evidence from Humans and Animal Models, 108 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSP. 511 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 164. Dante Cicchetti & Jennifer A. Blender, A Multiple-Levels-of-Analysis Perspective on 
Resilience: Implications for the Developing Brain, Neural Plasticity, and Preventive Interventions, 
in RESILIENCE IN CHILDREN 248, 249 (Barry M. Lester et al. eds., 2006). 
 165. Ann S. Masten, Resilience in Children Threatened by Extreme Adversity: Frameworks for 
Research, Practice, and Translational Synergy, 23 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 493, 494 (2011). For 
further discussion of the topic, see ANN S. MASTEN, ORDINARY MAGIC: RESILIENCE IN DEVELOPMENT 
(2014); RESILIENCE IN CHILDREN (Barry M. Lester et al. eds., 2006); Michael Rutter, Implications of 
Resilience Concepts for Scientific Understanding, in RESILIENCE IN CHILDREN 1–2 (Barry M. Lester et 
al. eds., 2006); RISK AND RESILIENCE IN CHILDHOOD: AN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (Mark W. Fraser ed., 
2d ed. 2004); Suniya Luthar et al., The Construct of Resilience: A Critical Evaluation and Guidelines 
for Future Work, 71 CHILD DEV. 543 (2000). While an early phase of empirical work focused on the 
role of children’s own characteristics in promoting resilience, and subsequent research examined 
“protective” factors in children’s family environments and broader social worlds (such as close, 
positive relationship with adult caregivers), the most recent generation of science has been 
investigating the processes and mechanisms of resilience. See e.g., Luther et al., supra at 545,  
554–555; Ann S. Masten & Jelena Obradović, Competence and Resilience in Development, in 
RESILIENCE IN CHILDREN 13–14, 21–22 (Barry M. Lester et al. eds., 2006); Mark F. Fraser et al., Risk 
and Resilience in Childhood, in RISK AND RESILIENCE IN CHILDHOOD: AN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 13, 
27–31 (Mark W. Fraser ed., 2d ed. 2004) (discussing concepts of “protective” factors). 
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particularly in situations of risk or adversity.166 Protective factors can 
help explain manifestations of greater resilience observed in the face of 
stressors or adversity. Research reveals, for example, that the existence 
of strong, stable, and supportive relationships between parents or other 
adult caregivers and children serves as a protective factor that can help 
children cope with stressful, and even traumatic, life events and achieve 
more adaptive outcomes.167 
Although many of the Court’s constructs of children’s vulnerability 
focus on the potentially negative concomitants of the perceived 
differences between children and adults, the Court also observes that the 
developmental vulnerabilities of childhood offer constitutionally-
relevant potential for positive change. The view of children as malleable 
helped a majority of the Court justify why sentences not constitutionally 
prohibited for adult offenders¾such as the death penalty,168 life without 
parole for non-homicide offenses in Graham,169 and mandatory life 
without parole for homicide,170€should be held unconstitutional for 
minors.171 The Court concluded that minors have a “greater ‘capacity for 
change’” and that “a child’s character is not as ‘well-formed’ as an adults’; 
his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of 
irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].”172 The Court rejected the idea, implicit in the 
justification for sentences such as death and life without parole, that one 
can easily determine whether or not a young person is “incorrigible” (that 
is, unable to change), and noted that most children have the potential to 
outgrow the tendencies that led to the serious criminal offending.173 In 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, considering the retroactivity of Miller, the 
Court noted that “Miller drew a line between children whose crimes 
reflect transient immaturity and those rare children whose crimes reflect 
irreparable corruption.”174 
Thus, while much of the discussion by the Court, and therefore in 
this Article, focuses on vulnerability as creating risks and potential 
challenges to children’s well-being, these vulnerability themes are 
conceptually intertwined with those addressing children’s plasticity 
 
 166. Wright et al., supra note 43, at 17. 
 167. Id. at 20. 
 168. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 169. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 49 (2010). 
 170. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012) (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 60–61 and Roper, 
543 U.S. at 569). 
 171. For further discussion of these cases and this perspective on children’s vulnerability,  
see supra notes 122–125, 135–140, 147–148 and accompanying text. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Miller, 567 U.S. at 473. 
 174. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016). 
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more broadly¾that is their capacity to change in response to 
experience175¾and therefore their potential for positive growth as well. 
II.  CHILDREN’S VULNERABILITY IN CONTEXT 
This Part seeks to place our examination of judicial constructs of 
children’s vulnerability in context. Subpart A recognizes that societal 
concerns about children’s vulnerability are not of recent origin. Indeed, 
they have been present in our society’s discourse about children for some 
time. Over time, the sources of the harms and deleterious influences 
purported to endanger children have changed. Yet, concerns about 
children’s vulnerability are nothing new. Subpart A provides a brief 
analysis of some of the historical and social trends. Subpart B touches on 
some of the insights that developmental science may bring to bear on 
inquiries about children’s vulnerability. It identifies some of the general 
principles relevant to thinking about vulnerability, as well as some of the 
challenges inherent in studying vulnerability and applying scientific 
findings to judicial decisions. 
A. SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF MODERN  
CONSTRUCTS OF CHILDREN’S VULNERABILITY 
Historians suggest that Americans became increasingly concerned 
about the welfare of our nation’s children in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Barbara Finkelstein noted that, although prior generations “were aware 
of childhood vulnerabilities and believed that children required 
protection and supervision,” social developments¾such as immigration 
and industrialization¾and new ways of thinking about childhood 
combined with other forces to lead to a more self-conscious approach to 
socializing and protecting the nation’s youth.176 Those new ways of 
thinking “reflected a growing consciousness of children as learners, 
vulnerable to the force of circumstance.”177 A range of social innovations, 
such as compulsory school attendance and institutions for the care and 
control of children, developed to facilitate the socialization process.178 
Michael Grossberg noted a “fundamental tension in American 
beliefs and policies toward the young,” as we are “torn between a fear for 
children and a fear of children.”179 Many of our societal efforts to affect 
 
 175. DAVID R. SHAFFER, DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 620 (6th ed. 2002). 
 176. Barbara Finkelstein, Casting Networks of Good Influence: The Reconstruction of Childhood 
in the United States, 1790–1870, in AMERICAN CHILDHOOD: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND HISTORICAL 
HANDBOOK 111, 117 (Joseph M. Hawes & N. Ray Hiner eds., 1985). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Lois A. Weithorn Second-Order Change in America’s Responses to Troubled and 
Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1437–42 (2005). 
 179. Michael Grossberg, Changing Conceptions of Child Welfare in the United States, 1820–1935, 
in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 3 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002). 
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children’s lives reflect our dual, and often inextricably intertwined, goals 
of promoting children’s welfare for children’s own benefit (that is, parens 
patriae goals) and for the benefit of society at large (that is, police power 
goals). The convergence of parens patriae and police power180 
justifications for the most influential policies for governing childhood, 
such as compulsory school attendance and prohibitions on child labor, 
reveals this relationship between altruistic benevolence on the one hand, 
and social control and engineering, on the other, that our society’s legal 
regulation of children typically entails. In the 19th century, social leaders 
began to structure policies to “immerse [children] in networks of good 
influence,” while eliminating what they perceived to be noxious or 
debasing influences.181 These trends persist today, as demonstrated by 
many of the statutes at issue in the cases reviewed within this Article. 
The Progressive Era introduced a variety of new perspectives about 
children’s capacities, development, and the ways in which parents, 
educators, and society could promote and enhance children’s functioning 
and well-being.182 Philosophers, scientists, physicians, psychologists, 
educators, and penologists offered theories, many of which remain with 
us today. The most influential themes of this era emphasized stage-based 
notions of child and adolescent development and a robust debate pitting 
the roles of genetics and experience in determining the type of person 
one becomes.183 
Indeed, child psychology emerged as a discipline in the Progressive 
Era, and with it, clearer notions of childhood and adolescence as stages 
of life distinct from adulthood.184 Psychologist G. Stanley Hall had a 
significant impact on Progressive thinking, particularly with the 
 
 180. As discussed in greater detail below, parens patriae and police power interests are the most 
common justifications for state authority to regulate the lives of children or the lives of others for the 
benefit of children. See infra notes 244–254 and accompanying text. In particular, parens patriae 
justifications focus on regulatory goals targeting benefits to the group regulated (for example, 
compulsory school attendance promotes children’s own well-being), while police power justifications 
emphasize benefits to the general welfare (for example, compulsory school attendance by children 
benefits society as a whole). 
 181. Finkelstein, supra note 176, at 117. 
 182. Hamilton Cravens, Child Saving in Modern America 1870s–1990s, in CHILDREN AT RISK IN 
AMERICA: HISTORY, CONCEPTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 4 (Roberta Wollons ed., 1993). Cravens referred to 
“[o]rganized child saving” as “institutionalized concern for children as members of, and participants 
in, the social order.” Id. 
 183. For a discussion of the history of the “nature-nurture” debate in psychology, see Gregory A. 
Kimble, Evolution of the Nature-Nurture Issue in the History of Psychology, in NATURE, NURTURE, & 
PSYCHOLOGY 3–15 (Robert Plomin & Gerald E. McClearn eds., 1993); see also Ronald D. Cohen,  
Child-Saving and Progressivism, in AMERICAN CHILDHOOD: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND HISTORICAL 
HANDBOOK 273, 290–91 (Joseph M. Hawes & N. Ray Hiner eds., 1985); Hamilton Cravens, Child-
Saving in the Age of Professionalism, 1915–1930, in AMERICAN CHILDHOOD: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND 
HISTORICAL HANDBOOK 417–18 (Joseph M. Hawes & N. Ray Hiner eds., 1985). 
 184. William Kessen, The American Child and Other Cultural Inventions, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
815, 816 (1979); see also Cravens, supra note 183, at 415, 423.  
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publication of his two-volume work on adolescence.185 Hall’s work was 
heavily influenced by the writings of Charles Darwin and, like Darwin, he 
viewed behavior as the “joint result of pressures of the environment and 
events occurring within the organism itself.”186 Hall’s theories also 
reflected the perspective that human development progressed in 
sequential and biologically predetermined stages, during each of which 
the organism confronts distinct physiological and psychological tasks, 
with environmental inputs critically affecting developmental 
outcomes.187 He characterized adolescence as the period during which 
individuals prepare for adulthood, and identified some of the 
developmental changes.188 Other influential writers, such as John 
Dewey,189 and Arnold Gesell,190 asserted that children’s intellectual, 
social, and moral development progressed in a stage-based fashion and 
could be highly influenced by appropriate environmental inputs at these 
stages.191 At one end of the nature-nurture continuum, behaviorists like 
John Watson went so far as to imply that humans are, to a significant 
extent, no more than the sum total of their life experiences.192 
These new ideas raised the stakes for those concerned with 
promoting the welfare of children for the benefit of the children and for 
the welfare of society. The more receptive children were to exposures and 
influences, the more vulnerable they were as well. As John Dewey 
suggested in his 1916 book, Democracy and Education, children can be 
said to have an inherent “plasticity” and the “power to grow . . . and to 
 
 185. G. STANLEY HALL, 2 ADOLESCENCE: ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONS TO PHYSIOLOGY, 
ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, SEX, CRIME, RELIGION, AND EDUCATION (1904). For discussions of Hall’s 
influence, see, for example, Cohen, supra note 183, at 291–292; Cravens, supra note 183, at 423–26; 
JOHN DEMOS, PAST, PRESENT, AND PERSONAL: THE FAMILY AND THE LIFE COURSE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 93–
96, 105, 107 (1986); John Modell & Madeline Goodman, Historical Perspectives, in AT THE THRESHOLD: 
THE DEVELOPING ADOLESCENT 93, 101–102 (S. Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliott eds., 1990). 
 186. HOWARD GARDNER, DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 148–149 (2d ed. 1978). 
 187. Cravens, supra note 183, at 424. 
 188. Modell & Goodman, supra note 185, at 102. Writers frequently attribute to Hall a significant 
role in the delineation of adolescence as a discrete stage in child development. Cohen, supra note 183, 
at 290–92. 
 189. JOHN DEWEY, THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY: THE CHILD AND THE CURRICULUM (1899). 
 190. ARNOLD GESELL, THE NORMAL CHILD AND PRIMARY EDUCATION (1912). 
 191. Cravens, supra note 183, at 429. See, e.g., David Bakan, Adolescence in America: From Idea 
to Social Fact, 100 DAEDALUS 979, 979 (1971); Hugh Cunningham, The History of Childhood, in 
IMAGES OF CHILDHOOD 27–35 (C. Philip Hwang, Michael E. Lamb, & Irving E. Sigel, eds., 1996); Arlene 
Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and Social Context, 39 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 38, 45–46 (1975). 
 192. JOHN WATSON, BEHAVIORISM 124 (1924): 
Give me a dozen healthy infants and my own specified world to bring them up in, and I’ll 
guarantee to take anyone at random and train him to become any kind of specialist I might 
select¾doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief, and yes, even beggar and thief, regardless of 
his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations and race of his ancestors. 
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learn from experience.”193 Thus, the importance of providing the proper 
experiences and reducing potentially deleterious ones became 
paramount. Progressive Era criminologists drew connections between 
the deleterious conditions of urban environments and the development 
of criminal behavior.194 Optimism about our ability to prevent, interrupt, 
and repair “damage” caused by inadequate, improper, and destructive 
life experiences provided an important foundation for 20th century 
policies governing children and families.195 
Thus, despite our nation’s historical cautiousness about broad-
based state authority over citizens’ lives, there was a sense of urgency that 
propelled increasing governmental regulation of the lives of children and 
families, which picked up dramatically during the Progressive Era.196 
Some historians suggest that social reforms of this era were motivated by 
a kind of “moral panic,” that is, fear “that urbanization, industrial 
capitalism, and massive immigration were undermining the nation’s 
homes and thus, the republic itself.”197 “Adults worried about 
children¾everyone’s children, not just their own¾for their own sake 
and also out of fear for the country’s future.”198 The efforts of reformers 
focused initially on those children viewed as more vulnerable, and 
therefore at greatest risk: children who were orphaned, ill, or 
impoverished; children of immigrants or other underclasses; and 
children viewed as inadequately supervised or poorly socialized.199 
 
 193. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 44–46, 52–53 (1916). 
 194. Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency 41 (2d ed. 1977). 
 195. “Nativis[tic]” assumptions about differences among individuals and societal subgroups, 
supported by “scientific” theories such as biological determinism also prevailed during this period, as 
did notions that certain racial and ethnic groups were superior to others. See, e.g., Cravens, supra note 
183, at 421; Cohen, supra note 183, at 289–291. Thus, whereas some Progressives might attribute 
perceived differences among population subgroups to environmental causes, such as “poverty, poor 
health, inadequate nutrition, or insufficient education . . . others employed the language of 
contemporary natural science and attributed conduct to Mendelian unit characters, racial traits, 
instincts, and other evidences of original human nature.” Cravens, supra note 183, at 418–19. Reliance 
on notions of inherent differences also fit neatly within Progressive intervention strategies, which 
often targeted different approaches to different subgroups within society. Thus, for example,  
lower-class, impoverished, and immigrant youth would be more likely than middle- and upper-class 
and nonminority youth to fall under the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system, with its attendant 
discretion over all facets of the lives of its charges, its substitution for parental authority, and its 
institutional settings. For the rest of society’s children, compulsory schooling served as the primary 
socialization strategy. 
 196. Historians have generally referred to the period of time between 1885 and 1915 as the 
Progressive Era. During these years, “reformers” expressed pervasive concerns about social and 
economic conditions in the United States, particularly those that affected children, and sought 
comprehensive social and legal change. For a thoughtful and balanced historical analysis of this era, 
see Cohen, supra note 183, at 273; Cravens, supra note 182, at 3–31.  
 197. Michael Grossberg, Balancing Acts: Crisis, Change, and Continuity in American Family 
Law, 1890–1900, 28 IND. L. REV. 273, 275 (1995). 
 198. Cohen, supra note 183, at 274. 
 199. In the early 20th century, the establishment of the juvenile court was the most dramatic 
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Eventually, however, the policies reached all of the nation’s children.200 
The ideology of this era and the language of humanitarianism made it 
almost impossible to disentangle the myriad of functions served by the 
expanding governmental regulation of children’s lives. 
Concerns about dangers to America’s children persisted throughout 
the 20th century, and of course continue today. Over time, society has 
changed its perception about many of the identified sources of danger as 
our images of childhood change and our experience with and knowledge 
about certain phenomena thought to affect children evolve as well.201 Yet, 
just as in the Progressive Era, the social goals and functions served by 
images of children as vulnerable today are plentiful and diverse. It can be 
difficult to disentangle these goals and functions when constructs of 
children’s vulnerability appear in the Court’s opinions as well. Evaluation 
of those constructs, however, against what we know about children from 
existing developmental science helps discern whether the constructs 
relied upon by the Court bear any relation to empirically verifiable facts 
in the real world. To the extent that these concepts are inconsistent with 
existing knowledge, greater skepticism as to their uses by the Court may 
be warranted. 
B. DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE AND CHILDREN’S VULNERABILITY:  
THE BASICS 
1.   Generality and Specificity in Child Development 
Developmental science generally supports the notion that exposures 
or experiences during childhood can have profound and enduring effects 
on an individual’s development, often to a greater degree than during 
 
developments in social policy targeting a subgroup of youth. As Weithorn observed: 
While the establishment of the juvenile court was an extension of the organized child 
welfare and child reform interventions commenced in the prior century, it was, in many 
ways, more far-reaching. The child welfare movement, with its proliferation of orphanages, 
was the product of private, nonprofit organizations and societies, which operated with tacit 
legal approval. By contrast, the juvenile court at once consolidated legal authority over all 
children perceived to be in need of some extrafamilial intervention in one state agency. 
Beginning with the initiation of the first juvenile court in Illinois in 1899, the juvenile 
justice movement formalized state intervention in the lives of troubled and troublesome 
youth and their families. . . . The numbers of children institutionalized in child welfare and 
juvenile justice facilities under the authority of the juvenile court mushroomed during the 
twentieth century. 
Weithorn, supra note 178, at 1441–42.  
  200. See generally Finkelstein, supra note 176. 
 201. See, e.g., VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF 
CHILDREN (1994); CHILDREN AT RISK IN AMERICA: HISTORY, CONCEPTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (Roberta 
Wollons ed., 1993); Gary B. Melton, The Clashing of Symbols: Prelude to Child and Family Policy, 42 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 345 (1987); STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND 
THE NOSTALGIA TRAP (1992). 
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adulthood.202  Yet, while statements about children’s greater 
vulnerability than adults may be true in some instances, such broad 
generalizations tell us nothing about how children and adults differ with 
regard to each of the countless variables related to children’s 
vulnerability on which such distinctions may be of interest. These 
statements also do not tell us about the nature and quality of differences 
between children and adults or about the role that age (within childhood) 
and a host of individual, environmental and other factors play in 
determining one’s vulnerability. The concept of vulnerability is, in the 
real world, only meaningful when we focus the inquiry and ask, for 
example, “vulnerability to what, by whom, and under what 
circumstances”? In Part III, I examine the Court’s use of more specific 
notions of children’s vulnerability as relevant to certain constitutional 
questions. In this Section, however, I step back and examine two more 
general themes related to children’s development that provide some 
context for examining these more focused questions. 
Before proceeding, I make some observations on the distinction 
between generality and specificity as relevant to this inquiry. First, as 
noted above, in order to be relevant to legal policy, constructs about 
children’s vulnerability must move from general assertions such as 
“children are more vulnerable than adults” to greater specificity as to the 
particular exposures, experiences, or stimuli viewed as creating special 
risks (for example, the asserted coerciveness of prayer in schools or, the 
purported messages of inferiority sent to African-American children 
through state-mandated school desegregation). Second, greater 
specificity is required as to the child “outcomes” sought to be avoided (for 
example, predictions that a child may feel coerced to comply with prayer 
exercises in the school setting or that African-American children will 
develop poorer senses of self-worth as a result of messages of racial 
inferiority conveyed through state-mandated school desegregation 
policies). To the extent empirical research can inform questions about 
children’s vulnerability relevant to legal questions, those questions must 
be framed with some degree of specificity. 
Even where scientific findings are not introduced in court and 
subject to the rules of evidence, the findings must relevant to the question 
at hand203 and obtained through methods and principles consistent with 
 
 202. See, e.g., Jianghong Liu & Gary Lewis, Environmental Toxicity and Poor Cognitive Outcomes 
in Children and Adults, 76 J. ENVTL.. HEALTH 130, 133 (2014) (“Due to the fact that children are 
continuously undergoing neurological and physical changes, they may be more susceptible to the 
harmful effects of toxins. This is in contrast to adults, whose nervous systems are more mature and 
developed, and therefore more resistant to injury.”). 
 203. See David L. Faigman, John Monahan, & Christopher Slobogin, Group to Individual (G2i) Inference 
in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 428 (2014) [hereinafter Faigman et al., Group to 
Individual] (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (emphasizing the 
importance of the “fit” between the proffered evidence and the factual question at issue)). 
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the field of scientific inquiry in order to be meaningful in informing the 
courts.204 A MacArthur Foundation-sponsored group has been devoting 
substantial attention to systematic analysis of a problem that has plagued 
the application of scientific findings in the courts for decades: The 
challenges of applying research findings about general group trends to 
cases concerned with factual questions about individuals.205 The authors 
refer to this type of inference as “group to individual,” or “G2i.”206 While 
the constitutional cases described in this Article do not require the Court 
to adjudicate issues relating to the vulnerability of a particular individual, 
the general framework still holds conceptual relevance. 
Legislative facts about childhood used in the adjudication of 
constitutional issues necessarily constitute generalizations about 
childhood. The generalizations may not hold true for all children, and 
may also be true for adults who are, under the policy in question, treated 
differently than children. The Court can fashion general rules, requiring 
for example, age-based distinctions that are necessarily over- and  
under-inclusive, as in Roper v. Simmons, in holding unconstitutional 
statutes that permit imposition of the death penalty on persons who 
committed offenses as minors. Or, the Court can uphold age-based bright 
lines in the legislative or regulatory provisions it reviews.207 
Alternatively, the Court can require case-by-case determinations of a 
child’s vulnerability by decisionmakers below in individualized hearings. 
This approach was taken by the Court in Miller v. Alabama, which struck 
down mandated life without parole sentences for persons who committed 
homicide offenses as minors, opting instead for judicial discretion in 
sentencing.208 In Craig v. Maryland, the Court approved  
case-by-case determinations of the need for certain modifications of the 
traditional courtroom confrontation of witnesses when children testify 
against their alleged abusers.209 The rationales for choosing bright-line 
age-based per se rules versus case-by-case application of discretionary 
standards by decisionmakers are many.210 In the context of constitutional 
 
 204. Id. at 428–31. For more in depth analyses of the issues and debates regarding the use of 
scientific evidence in the courts, see, e.g., JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 
(7th ed. 2010); DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 1–129 (2013–2014 ed.). 
 205. See Faigman et al., Group to Individual, supra note 203; David L. Faigman, Christopher 
Slobogin, & John Monahan, Gatekeeping Science: Using the Structure of Scientific Research to 
Distinguish Between Admissibility and Weight in Expert Testimony, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 859 (2016) 
[hereinafter Faigman et al., Gatekeeping Science]. 
 206. Faigman et al., Gatekeeping Science, supra note 205, at 419. 
 207. See, for example, infra notes 324–334 and accompanying text for discussion of Ginsberg  
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
 208. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012). 
 209. See infra notes 18–27 and accompanying text. 
 210. See, e.g., Michael N. Tennison & Amanda C. Pustilnik, And If Your Friends Jumped Off a 
Bridge, Would You Do It Too?: How Developmental Neuroscience Can Inform Legal Regimes 
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adjudication of questions that appear to turn, at least in part, on notions 
of children’s vulnerability, the choice between these legal mechanisms 
for addressing the asserted differences between children and adults may 
reflect the challenges of generalizations about children in the particular 
context or the Court’s interpretation of how it must apply the 
constitutional standard of review in the case before it.211 These themes of 
generality versus specificity resurface in Part III, in the analysis of the 
Court’s use of vulnerability constructions in select cases. 
The subsections immediately below address two key aspects of 
children’s vulnerability: (1) the reality that, on some dimensions, 
children are not yet fully developed and (2) that children’s physiological 
and psychological systems are continually undergoing major 
developmental shifts. In other words, I observe that children’s present 
state of immaturity as children, and the nature of the dynamic 
developmental process of human maturation each create inherent 
vulnerabilities.212 As noted above, however, these vulnerabilities, while 
creating potential risks to children also create potential opportunities.213 
In addition, these vulnerabilities have led to the formation of social and 
legal structures, such as the authority of parents and institutions (for 
example, schools, the child welfare system, the juvenile justice system) 
 
Governing Adolescents, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 533, 535–42 (2015); Annette R. Appell, The Child 
Question, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1137, 1143–71 (2013); Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should 
Not) Learn from Developmental Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 37–41 (2009); Emily Buss, 
Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Empowerment of Child Clients, 84 CORNELL L. REV.  
895, 919–20 (1999). 
Developmental psychology does not offer what lawyers would most like: definitive, fixed 
information upon which to ground simple, age-based rules. What the discipline does offer 
is a general picture of how we change as we grow up. We then can use this general picture 
to assess what we might reasonably expect of children and how we might enhance certain 
valued capacities in specific contexts for specific children. It is then our place as lawyers to 
determine when bright-line rules are justified despite the lack of developmental clarity, 
when society is better off with discretionary standards that defer to the decision maker’s 
assessment of an individual child’s capacity, and to what extent extradevelopmental 
considerations also should be given weight. 
Id. 
 211. To the extent that the Justices perceive individual and situational variables to be more 
significant in determining a person’s vulnerability than the dichotomous distinction between juveniles 
and adults, case-by-case inquiries may best satisfy the requirements of the standard of constitutional 
review applied in the case. On the other hand, where the Justices have concerns about the fairness or 
administrability of discretionary determinations, age-based bright-lines may best promote those 
goals. 
 212. Philosophers Mackenzie, Rogers, and Dodds identify “inherent vulnerability,” or “ontological 
vulnerability that is inherent in the human condition,” as one source of vulnerability. Mackensie et al., 
supra note 39, at 7. These authors suggest that “extremes of age exaggerate the everyday 
vulnerabilities of embodiment in proportion to the capacity of the individual to meet her everyday 
physical needs. Inherent vulnerability also varies depending on a person’s resilience and capacity to 
cope.” Id. Furthermore, other limitations, such as disability, ill health, or other factors may also 
increase an individual’s inherent vulnerability. Id.  
 213. See supra Part I.C. 
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over children’s lives, generating situational vulnerabilities, as well as 
myriad protective factors.214 
The general trends summarized in this Section do not speak to the 
accuracy of assumptions by members of the Court as to whether children 
are more vulnerable than adults to specific asserted harms or influences 
related to the contexts or fact patterns presented by cases before it. 
Rather, the scientific concepts and findings presented below indicate 
that, as a general proposition, children may be more vulnerable than 
adults with respect to one or more of the typologies in the face of certain 
exposures. Focused investigations of carefully tailored research 
questions are necessary to determine, however, the effects of specific 
experiences on particular subsets of children under particular 
circumstances.215 
2.   Children as Not-Yet-Fully-Developed Persons 
Children are in the formative or early stages of development in the 
human life cycle.216 “Development refers to systematic continuities and 
changes in the individual that occur between conception . . . and death. 
By describing the changes as ‘systematic,’ we imply that they are orderly, 
patterned, and relatively enduring.”217 As such, their capacities in a wide 
range of areas of functioning have not reached adult levels of maturity. 
Although all human beings continue the developmental process 
throughout their lives, children have not yet achieved certain target levels 
of functioning we think of as “adult-like.”218 Many disciplines, such as 
psychology, neuroscience, and a range of specialties of the biological and 
health sciences are devoted to studying the developmental trajectories of 
human beings, and seek to expand our knowledge about the 
vulnerabilities and capacities that characterize various ages and phases 
of development. 
Many of dimensions of physical or psychological development on 
which children have not yet reached species-typical adult levels are 
relevant to the vulnerability typology proposed in Part I. At the most 
 
 214. Mackenzie et al. contrast inherent vulnerability with “situational vulnerability,” that is, 
“context specific” vulnerability “caused or exacerbated by the personal, social, political, economic, or 
environmental situations of individuals or groups.” Mackenzie et al., supra note 39. Mackenzie et al.’s 
concept of “context specific” vulnerability overlaps with status-based vulnerability arising from the 
legal, social, and situational concomitants of minority status (including risks resulting from restriction 
of movement and choices, and other limitations of subordinate status), and dependency-based 
vulnerability (which recognizes children’s dependence on others, and the impact that the conduct of 
others has upon the child’s life). 
 215. I address certain relevant empirical debates in Part III of this Article. 
 216. SHAFFER, supra note 175. 
 217. Id. at 2. 
 218. Of course, depending upon the particular aspect of development in question, persons may 
reach adult-like developmental levels at different ages.  
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basic level, an infant’s physical and psychological immaturity creates 
dependency-based vulnerabilities, as she is unable to feed herself or meet 
any of her own basic survival needs. Indeed, the complete “helplessness” 
of human infants sets them apart from newborns of many other 
species.219 Without care from others, a newborn infant will die. Children 
continue to develop and grow during minority, and many of the 
capacities that allow individuals to become more self-sufficient mature 
over time. Depending on the aspect of human anatomy or functioning, 
the age-related patterns of development will vary.220 Age eighteen is a 
relatively crude and often inaccurate point of demarcation for the 
acquisition of the legal and social status of adulthood. Yet, differences 
exist, and the Court’s analyses in the cases described in Parts I and III of 
this Article reveal just how puzzling it can be to try to apply the general 
concept of “children are different” to the specific questions about 
children’s development and functioning relevant to the cases. 
 Increasingly in the past several decades, researchers have attempted 
to study some of the developmental phenomena of interest to the Court, 
or to apply existing research findings to the narrower legal issues. 
Research has indicated that on many cognitive tasks, including some 
relevant to health care decisions, teens may exhibit decisionmaking 
capacities on a par with adults.221 By contrast, adolescents often 
demonstrate immaturities “in situations that elicit impulsivity, that are 
typically characterized by high levels of emotional arousal and social 
coercion. . . .”222 In an attempt to integrate a broad range of seemingly 
contradictory findings, Steinberg and colleagues observed that the 
answer to the questions about whether adolescents are as mature as 
adults depends on the aspects of maturity under consideration. By age 
sixteen, adolescents’ general cognitive abilities are essentially 
indistinguishable from those of adults, but adolescents’ psychosocial 
functioning, even at the age of eighteen, is significantly less mature than 
that of individuals in their mid-twenties. In this regard, it is neither 
inconsistent nor disingenuous for scientists to argue that studies of 
psychological development indicate that the boundary between 
adolescence and adulthood should be drawn at a particular chronological 
age for one policy purpose and at a different age for another.223 
 The answer to the question of whether and how children and adults 
differ will vary dramatically depending upon the particular aspects of 
functioning of interest. At a minimum, we can observe that differences 
 
 219. See, e.g., Kate Wong, Why Humans Give Birth to Helpless Babies, SCI. AM. (Aug. 28, 2012), 
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/why-humans-give-birth-to-helpless-babies/. 
 220. See supra note 218. 
 221. See, e.g., Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 9; Steinberg et al., supra note 9. 
 222. Steinberg et al., supra note 9, at 592. 
 223. Id. 
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do exist, while the specifics as to their nature and degree raise empirical 
questions. While this subsection touched on how the particular state of a 
child’s development at a particular point in time may contribute to her 
vulnerabilities, I briefly examine below how the process of development 
contributes to the vulnerabilities of relevance to the law. 
3.   Children as Organisms Engaged in Rapid Maturational 
Process 
Children are engaged in a biologically driven, environmentally 
responsive, and exceedingly rapid process of maturation, and 
experiences that occur throughout this process can have  
highly significant and potentially lifelong effects on their functioning.224 
From the moment of birth, a baby is in the process of extraordinarily 
rapid growth and development. As they grow up, children develop 
cognitive, physical, social, emotional and moral capacities, the 
acquisition of which influences communication, decisionmaking, 
exercise of judgment, absorbing and evaluating information, self-
directed action, autonomous decisionmaking, extending empathy, 
awareness of others and foresight. While people continue to develop 
throughout life, all societies acknowledge a period of childhood during 
which children’s capacities are perceived as evolving rather than 
evolved . . . .225 
This factor may render children both more vulnerable to potential 
harm, while also presenting them with substantial opportunities for 
positive growth. Indeed, several decades of theoretical and empirical 
research have provided insights as to a wide range of factors that place 
children at serious risk, that foster healthy development, and that help 
build resilience that promotes positive adaptation in the face of 
adversity.226 
The timing of exposures can be very influential. “Developmental 
processes occur in phases, setting the stage of potential periods of 
vulnerability.”227 Notions of “critical periods” and “sensitive periods” 
recognize that the process of normal development presents certain 
windows of opportunity, during which the organism is particularly 
susceptible to the effects of a wide range of experiences or inputs. For 
example, focusing on brain development, neuroscientist Eric Knudsen 
explains: 
The term ‘‘sensitive period’’ is a broad term that applies whenever the 
effects of experience on the brain are unusually strong during a limited 
 
 224. See, e.g., SEBASTIAN J. LIPINA & JORGE A. COLOMBO, POVERTY AND BRAIN DEVELOPMENT DURING 
CHILDHOOD: AN APPROACH FROM COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROSCIENCE 32–38 (2009) (noting 
stages in brain development and windows of vulnerability). 
 225. GERISON LANSDOWN, UNICEF, THE EVOLVING CAPACITIES OF THE CHILD xiii (2005). 
 226. See infra notes 164–167 and accompanying text. 
 227. Lipina & Colombo, supra note 224, at 33. 
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period in development. Sensitive periods are of interest to scientists and 
educators because they represent periods in development during which 
certain capacities are readily shaped or altered by experience. Critical 
periods are a special class of sensitive periods that result in irreversible 
changes in brain function. The identification of critical periods is of 
particular importance to clinicians, because the adverse effects of 
atypical experience throughout a critical period cannot be remediated by 
restoring typical experience later in life.228 
The organism is especially sensitive to influences and exposures, 
positive and negative, during such periods.229 Interferences with the 
normal developmental process at these times can have serious or 
permanent effects on the individual’s ability to achieve important 
developmental goals. Because childhood is chock-full of such 
challenges¾to a much greater extent than is adulthood¾vulnerability is 
greatly enhanced. Influences or exposures that might be neutral, positive, 
or only mildly harmful at one point in a person’s life may cause long-term 
difficulties if experienced at another stage of development. At the same 
time, other influences or exposures may have powerful positive impacts. 
Children’s developmental vulnerability presents heightened receptivity, 
creating unparalleled growth opportunities for the organism. The nature 
and rapidity of the developmental processes that children undergo in the 
first two decades of life, and the heightened sensitivity accompanying 
these processes, clearly enhance children’s vulnerability as contrasted 
with that of adults in a range of situations and contexts. 
The last decades have provided scientists with extraordinary 
insights as to the long-term impacts of certain early childhood 
experiences. For example, it is now widely recognized in the scientific 
community that early adverse life experiences can have a profound effect 
on health throughout the lifespan. In a 2009 article in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association, Shonkoff, Boyce and McEwen observed 
that “[a] scientific consensus is emerging that the origins of adult disease 
are often found among developmental and biological disruptions 
occurring during the early years of life. These early experiences can affect 
adults in [two] ways¾either by cumulative damage over time or by the 
biological embedding of adversities during sensitive developmental 
 
 228. Eric I. Knudsen, Sensitive Periods in the Development of the Brain and Behavior,  
16 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1412 (2004). 
 229. See Robert Siegler, Judy DeLoache & Nancy Eisenberg, HOW CHILDREN DEVELOP 110–114 
(Peter Deane et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006); Lipina & Columbo, supra note 224, at 31–49. 
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periods.”230 Research on the impact of the “toxic stress”231 engendered by 
adverse childhood experiences reveals that a wide array of physical and 
mental health disorders can follow traumatic childhood exposures.232 
Such exposures, for example, can lead to an increased risk of serious 
health conditions (such as heart disease, cancer, chronic bronchitis, and 
emphysema), premature death in adulthood, as well as problems relating 
to learning and educational achievement, vocational success, mental 
health functioning, substance abuse, and criminal justice system 
involvement.233 In recent years, scientists have been learning as well 
about the ways in which certain deprivations, such as those that 
 
 230. Jack P. Shonkoff, W. Thomas Boyce & Bruce S. McEwen, Neuroscience, Molecular Biology, 
and the Childhood Roots of Health Disparities: Building a New Framework for Health Promotion 
and Disease Prevention, 301 JAMA 2252, 2252, 2257 (2009) (“[T]he origins of many adult diseases 
can be found among adversities in the early years of life that establish biological ‘memories’ that 
weaken physiological systems and produce latent vulnerabilities to problems that emerge well into the 
later adult years.”). 
 231. The National Scientific Council on the Developing Child [hereinafter Council] and the 
American Academy of Pediatrics distinguish among the possible effects of different levels of stress. 
Comm’n on Psychosocial Aspects of Child & Family Health et al., Policy Statement: Early Childhood 
Adversity, Toxic Stress, and the Role of the Pediatrician: Translating Developmental Science into 
Lifelong Health, 129 PEDIATRICS e224, e227–29 (2012) [hereinafter AAP, Policy Statement]; Jack P. 
Shonkoff et al., The Lifelong Effects of Early Childhood Adversity and Toxic Stress: Technical Report, 
129 PEDIATRICS e232, e234 (2011); Council, Excessive Stress Disrupts the Architecture of the 
Developing Brain, 1 (Harvard Univ. Ctr. on the Developing Brain, Working Paper No. 3, 2005), 
http://developingchild.harvard.edu/resources/reports_and_working_papers/working_papers/wp3/. 
The Council defined “toxic stress” as “strong, frequent or prolonged activation of the body’s stress 
management system.” Id. at 2. “[S]tressful events that are likewise chronic, uncontrollable, and/or 
experienced without the child having access to support from caring adults tend to provoke these types 
of toxic stress responses.” Id. Consistent with this definition, the American Academy of Pediatrics 
defines “toxic stress” as “the excessive or prolonged activation of the physiologic stress response 
systems in the absence of the buffering protection afforded by stable, responsive relationships.” AAP, 
Policy Statement, supra, at e225. 
 232. Robert F. Anda et al., The Enduring Effects of Abuse and Related Adverse Experiences in 
Childhood: A Convergence of Evidence from Neurobiology and Epidemiology, 256 EUR. ARCHIVES 
PSYCHIATRY CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 174 (2006) (“The organization and functional capacity of the 
human brain depends upon an extraordinary set and sequence of developmental and environmental 
experiences that influence [genetic expression]. Unfortunately, this elegant sequence is vulnerable 
to . . . patterns of stress that can impair, often permanently, the activity of major neuroregulatory 
systems, with profound and lasting neurobehavioral consequences.”). 
 233. See, e.g., L.K. Gilbert et al., Childhood Adversity and Adult Chronic Disease: An Update from 
Ten States and the District of Columbia, 2010, 48 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 345 (2015); Xiangming 
Fang et al., The Economic Burden of Child Maltreatment in the United States and Implications for 
Prevention, 36 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 156, 162 (2012); David W. Brown et al., Adverse Childhood 
Experiences and the Risk of Premature Mortality, 37 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 389, 394 (2009); 
Vincent J. Felitti, Adverse Childhood Experiences and Adult Health, 9 ACAD. PEDIATRICS 131 (2009); 
Robert F. Anda et al., supra note 232, at 174; Vincent J. Felitti et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse 
and Household Dysfunction to Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults: The Adverse 
Childhood Experiences (ACE) Study, 14 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 245, 250 (1998). For a review and 
analysis of the research on the effects of child maltreatment on the brain, see Lois A. Weithorn, 
Developmental Neuroscience, Children’s Relationships with Primary Caregivers, and Child 
Protection Policy Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1487, 1508–37 (2012) [hereinafter Weithorn, 
Developmental Neuroscience]. 
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accompany neglect and poverty, affect children throughout their 
lifespan.234 Children’s biological blueprints offer them tremendous 
potential for positive growth and development, but often that potential 
cannot be achieved without the presence of particular environmental 
experiences, opportunities, and stimulation. 
There are bright spots among the scientific findings. Exposure to 
risks can have different effects, even among children who are at similar 
points in development. One of the factors that distinguishes how children 
cope with potentially deleterious impacts is the phenomenon referred to 
as resilience.235 Despite exposure to severe, prolonged, or chronic 
stressors or traumas, many children “withstand or recover from” these 
experiences, emerging with developmentally appropriate “positive 
adaptation and competent functioning.”236 As scholars continue to refine 
conceptual and methodological approaches, studies of resilience remind 
us that development of the detrimental outcomes associated with “a 
range of potentially harmful childhood experiences “are neither universal 
nor inevitable.”237 
In sum, not only are children different from adults in that they 
function in ways manifesting an earlier point in maturation across a wide 
range of domains, but they differ as well because of the nature of the 
developmental process. As the developmental process unfolds, children’s 
minds and bodies are characterized by a heightened sensitivity to 
environmental inputs and experiences. That heightened sensitivity to 
inputs and exposure that accompanies the rapid developmental 
processes of childhood, however, not only magnify susceptibility to harm, 
but also foster a degree of plasticity or malleability that generates 
opportunities for positive development. In other words, childhood 
represents a point in a human being’s development when he or she is 
unusually responsive to a range of experiences, both positive and 
negative. 
III.  JUSTIFYING CHILD-PROTECTIVE POLICIES: CHILDREN  
AS VULNERABLE TO PHYSIOLOGICAL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM 
In this Part, I consider the Court’s constructions of children’s 
vulnerability as susceptibility to physiological or psychological harm.  
While subsequent writings will examine the Court’s jurisprudence 
relating to the other four vulnerability subtypes, this Part focuses on 
 
 234. See generally Lipina & Colombo, supra note 224; Stanford Center for the Study of Poverty 
and Inequality, Does Poverty Get Under the Skin?: The Effects of Deprivation on Blood, the Brain, 
and the Body, PATHWAYS: A MAGAZINE ON POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND SOCIAL POLICY, Winter 2011. 
 235. See supra notes 164–165 and accompanying text. 
 236. Masten, supra note 165, at 494; Cicchetti & Blender, supra note 164, at 249. 
 237. Weithorn, Developmental Neuroscience, supra note 233, at 1512; see also Cicchetti  
& Blender, supra note 164, at 250, 254–57; Masten & Obradović, supra note 165, at 23–24. 
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notions of children’s vulnerability articulated in a selection of cases 
invoking the first subtype. Specifically, I focus on concepts of 
vulnerability present in the Court’s opinions in the context of regulations 
relating to child labor, child abuse, and children’s exposure to certain 
types of speech. These cases are but a subset of the larger body of 
constitutional cases that fall within this first subtype of children’s 
vulnerability. The cases below are analyzed to explore, in greater depth, 
the Court’s use of constructs of children’s vulnerability. This Part 
examines, as well, the nature and sources of the “facts” about children’s 
vulnerability upon which the Justices rely.238 
In these cases, the Court either adopts or rejects assertions about 
children’s susceptibility to physiological or psychological harm in 
determining whether the state’s cited regulatory purpose, which is 
allegedly child-protective, passes constitutional muster. The specific 
standard of review applied by the Court depends on the precise 
constitutional question at issue. When the state seeks to limit a 
fundamental right, as it does when restricting traditional realms of 
parental discretion, and the Court applies strict scrutiny, the asserted 
state interest must be compelling.239 This characterization is an 
important¾although not always dispositive¾factor in the analysis of the 
constitutionality of a statute or its application, in that the means used by 
the state to achieve the interest must also be necessary, or most 
narrowly tailored.240 Sometimes the Court applies a rational basis test, 
which requires the state to demonstrate that its goals are legitimate or 
permissible, and that its means are reasonable in relation to those goals. 
In other instances, the Court may apply a different mode of analysis, such 
as a balancing test,241 or any of a myriad of tests relevant to the specific 
 
 238. I chose harm-based vulnerability for this first article, however, because of the centrality of this 
notion of vulnerability to the Court’s formulations in a broad range of cases involving children. The 
specific cases were selected because, as a group, they allow for some fascinating contrasts across cases, 
particularly in the sources on which the Justices’ purportedly rely in citing concepts of children’s 
vulnerability. 
 239. Under modern jurisprudential standards, if the constitutional interest restricted by the state 
rises to the level of a fundamental right, strict judicial scrutiny is often applied, placing the burden on 
the state to demonstrate that its regulation seeks to achieve a compelling state interest, and that the 
means used to achieve this interest are most narrowly tailored. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 794–98 (3d ed. 2006). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Yet, strict scrutiny may not be applied in all such cases where fundamental rights are at issue. 
“For example, although one might initially expect that strict scrutiny would be applied when state laws 
interfere with parental authority over their children’s lives, the Supreme Court has typically applied 
alternative modes of analysis, such as balancing tests, customized to the particular issues and 
constellation of parties and interests.” Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & Lois A. Weithorn, Responding to the 
Childhood Vaccination Crisis: Legal Frameworks and Tools in the Context of Parental Vaccine 
Refusal, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 881, 908–09 (2015) [hereinafter Reiss & Weithorn, Childhood Vaccination 
Crisis]. For instance, the Court applied a balancing test to its consideration of the respective interests 
of parents, minors, and the state in some cases, such as in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) and 
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constitutional challenges raised in a case.242 Over time, as well, the 
standards of review have evolved.243 Unfortunately, the Court is at times 
unclear or inconsistent in its identification and application of a standard 
of review, leading to a confused jurisprudence that is difficult to 
interpret. Its cases involving children’s welfare often reflect these 
inconsistencies. 
A. PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FROM HARM AS A STATE INTEREST 
Characterizations of children’s vulnerability to physical or 
psychological harm play an essential jurisprudential role in justifying or 
restricting state action that may limit or expand the constitutional rights 
of others, such as parents, guardians, or the children themselves. At the 
heart of state authority to regulate children are its parens patriae and 
police power interests. Prince v. Massachusetts, decided almost three-
quarters of a century ago, remains one of the best sources for 
understanding those dual goals. 244 
In Prince, the Court upheld an application of a provision of the 
Massachusetts child labor statute over the objection of a nine year old’s 
legal guardian. The guardian¾the child’s aunt¾claimed that the 
statute’s application violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights to authorize her ward to sell religious materials on the streets.245 
The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Rutledge, appeared to apply 
 
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), which considered minors’ challenges to state statutes governing 
consent to abortion and psychiatric hospitalization, respectively. 
 242. For example, in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Court determined that 
Congress had exceeded its authority in passing the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, holding that 
the regulated activity did not substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 559–68. This Act created 
federal criminal liability for certain gun possession offenses within a school zone. Constructs of 
children’s vulnerability were therefore only relevant to the constitutional analysis to the extent they 
informed the relationship between gun possession in school zones and interstate commerce. While the 
majority did not even discuss whether this association created sufficiently substantial effects, the 
dissent relied on a litany of empirical studies. Justice Breyer and three colleagues cited evidence of 
harms to children’s well-being to bolster their argument that Congress could have concluded that gun 
violence near schools has significant effects on interstate commerce. Id. at 619–26 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). The dissent cited the impact of gun violence on the physical and psychological welfare of 
children, which it concluded “significantly interferes with the quality of education in . . . schools,” 
leading to higher dropout rates and difficulties in teaching and learning. Id. at 619–20. Given the 
relationship between education, the welfare of society, and the country’s economy, Justice Breyer 
opined that these effects on the educational system creates a sufficient nexus between the statute and 
interstate commerce to provide Congress with authority to legislate, and to conclude that the presence 
of guns near schools is inextricably intertwined with the Nation’s economy. Id. 
 243. Most constitutional scholars cite the Court’s decision in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), as the beginning of differential levels of scrutiny for legislation affecting 
various classes of rights. Tara Leigh Grove, Tiers of Scrutiny in a Hierarchical Judiciary, 14 GEO. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 475 (2016); Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE 
L.J. 3094, 3127 (2015). 
 244. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 245. Id. at 164. 
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a balancing test, considering the rights of parents and guardians on the 
one hand, and the state’s parens patriae and police power goals on the 
other.246 The Court rejected a more stringent test, as would be applied 
when children’s welfare is not a focus of the regulation, emphasizing that: 
“The state’s authority over children’s activities is broader than over like 
actions of adults.”247 It then proceeded to enunciate the parens patriae 
and police power interests that justify the state’s greater regulatory 
authority over children, and distinguish the state’s relationship with 
children versus adults.248 
The state’s parens patriae power is asserted to justify protective 
state regulation for the benefit of those regulated, and is most frequently 
invoked relative to those perceived as vulnerable, immature, dependent, 
or disabled, in that such persons arguably require the heightened 
concern of the state as benevolent protector.249 In a case such as Prince, 
where the legal guardian’s decisions were viewed as endangering the 
minor, children’s heightened vulnerability is cited to justify limitation of 
the traditional and constitutionally protected decisional discretion 
typically accorded parents and legal guardians.250 At the core of the 
Court’s analysis in Prince and other cases citing parens patriae 
justifications for child protective regulation, is the premise that children 
require greater protection from harm than do adults. In Prince, the Court 
used terms such as “crippling” in describing the possible effects of the 
child’s activities, referring to myriad “harms,” noting that the “streets 
afford dangers for [children] not affecting adults,” and that this 
“difference may be magnified” under some circumstances.251 It observed 




 246. Citing the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of parents and guardians, the Court stated: 
“Against these sacred private interests, basic in a democracy, stand the interests of society to protect 
the welfare of children, and the state’s assertion of authority to that end . . . .” Id. at 165. 
 247. Id. at 168. 
 248. Throughout the decades following Prince, the Court has repeatedly recognized governmental 
power to regulate the lives of children far exceeding its parallel authority relative to adults. See 
Weithorn, supra note 178, at 1401–07. 
 249. “Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may 
restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor 
and in many other ways.” Prince, 321 U.S. at 166–67. For a discussion of the origins of, and for judicial 
and scholarly commentary regarding, the concept of parens patriae power, see Weithorn, supra note 
178, at 1388–89; see also Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal for the Twenty-
First Century: Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children’s Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381 
(2000); Gregory Thomas, Limitations on Parens Patriae: The State and the Parent/Child 
Relationship, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51 (2007). 
 250. “[T]he state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things 
affecting the child’s welfare.” Prince, 321 U.S. at 166–67. 
 251. Id. at 169. 
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may and at times [do] create situations difficult enough for adults to 
cope with and wholly inappropriate for children, especially of tender 
years, to face. Other harmful possibilities could be stated, of emotional 
excitement and psychological or physical injury.252 
The state’s police power interests also justify greater regulation of 
children’s lives and intervention in parental decisions, although for the 
purpose of promoting the general welfare. Children are regulated under 
this theory, not for their own benefit, but for the benefit of society. The 
end results of children’s upbringing and socialization are consequential 
not only for the children, but for the future of society as a whole.253 In the 
frequently quoted words of the Prince Court: “A democratic society rests, 
for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young 
people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure 
this against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of 
selection.”254 
Prince has been criticized as overly intrusive in parental authority to 
make decisions regarding their children’s welfare more generally, and 
about religious matters specifically. One wonders if the case might have 
turned out differently if the people in question were not members of an 
unpopular religious minority group. Yet, the result is entirely 
understandable, and was arguably essential, at a time when the allocation 
of authority between parents and the state around matters relating to 
compulsory education and child labor were still undergoing negotiation 
and refinement. Twenty years after the Court made clear in Meyer  
v. Nebraska255 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters256 that the Progressive 
Movement’s increasing regulation of the family must give way to some 
level of parental discretion, Prince underscored that the state’s interests 
in protecting and helping to socialize children provide limits on that 
discretion. While recognizing a “private realm of family life within which 
the state cannot enter,” and that “the custody, care and nurture of the 
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom 
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor 
 
 252. Id. at 169–70. 
 253. See Weithorn, supra note 178, at 1403–04 (distinguishing between two subtypes of police 
power state interests concerning children: a public-safety oriented interest, justifying state regulation 
of children’s lives in order to protect society from dangers presented by the children (such as, 
protection from exposure to a disease that might be transmitted by an unvaccinated child or protection 
from a lawbreaking minor’s offending behavior), and a socialization-oriented interest, justifying state 
regulation of children’s lives “to further the common good by promoting the child’s healthy 
development into well-educated, productive, . . . well-adjusted,” and healthy adults). See, e.g., Clark, 
supra note 249, at 392 (“[C]hildren may be special objects of governmental coercion, not because they 
need the state but because they are needed by the state [as future citizens].”). 
 254. Prince, 321 U.S. at 168–69 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 255. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 256. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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hinder,” the Court emphasized that “the family itself is not beyond 
regulation.”257 
Prince’s legacy is enduring, and its impact magnified by the 
virtually-universal reliance upon it as precedent for the assertion of state 
interests in protecting children from physical or psychological harm in a 
wide range of constitutional cases, and for the concomitant broader state 
authority over children versus adults. That said, Prince can easily be 
criticized for what some might view as a possibly exaggerated, and 
perhaps alarmist, characterization of the risks facing a child in the 
position of Ms. Prince’s ward. Indeed, given that the challenge was to an 
application of the statute, the Court could have considered the fact that 
the child was accompanied by her guardian when engaging in the 
prohibited activities, potentially mitigating any risks she might have 
faced.258 
Not surprisingly, no sources were offered in Prince to support the 
many assertions about children’s vulnerability. Arguably, however, the 
fields of psychology and psychiatry, and particularly developmental 
science, were in their infancy in 1944 when Prince was decided, and thus 
little scientific support would have been available, nor could the 
assertions made by the Court be easily studied. Yet, the tendency for the 
Court to rely on unsubstantiated assumptions about children’s 
vulnerability as susceptibility to greater psychological or physiological 
harm than adults as justification for paternalistic regulation has not 
changed.  
Commentators have observed that, in many cases, the Court fails to 
scrutinize an asserted legislative purpose and focuses its meaningful 
review on the means used to achieve the goal.259 For example, Richard 
Fallon has noted that in applying strict scrutiny, “the Supreme Court 
[has] frequently adopted an astonishingly casual approach to identifying 
compelling interests.”260 
At the time Prince was decided, tiered constitutional review and 
strict scrutiny were not yet staples of constitutional analysis.261 Thus, 
Prince did not apply strict scrutiny, and therefore did not require that the 
state’s interests to be compelling. Subsequent cases, however, have relied 
on Prince as precedent to support the proposition that certain child 
 
 257. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 258. The Court explicitly rejected this opportunity. Id. at 169 n.18. 
 259. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297 (1997) 
[hereinafter Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny]; Ashutosh Bhagwat, What if I Want My Kids to Watch 
Pornography?: Protecting Children from “Indecent” Speech, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 671 (2003) 
[hereinafter Bhagwat, Protecting Children]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA 
L. REV. 1267, 1321–23 (2007).  
 260. Fallon, Jr., supra note 259, at 1321. 
 261. For a brief historical summary of the development of tiered scrutiny, see, for example, 
Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny, supra note 259, at 306–11. 
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protective interests are compelling.262 This reliance suggests that, if 
decided more recently, the Court might have characterized the state’s 
interests in Prince as compelling.263 
Fallon’s point is made more broadly, however, by Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, regarding “purpose scrutiny” across the tiers, noting a 
tendency of the Court to defer to the validity of the state’s articulated 
goals, while more carefully scrutinizing the means used to achieve those 
goals.264 The Court’s reluctance to second-guess whether the 
government’s asserted interests for a challenged regulation rise to the 
level required by the applicable constitutional standard of review is 
particularly flagrant where those interests are characterized as child 
protective: “Sometimes . . . the Supreme Court labels interests as 
compelling on the basis of little or no textual inquiry. Examples include 
cases in which the Court has found a compelling interest in protecting 
children from one or another purported injury . . . .”265 Bhagwat observes 
that, in particular, in cases related to restrictions on sexual speech 
“imposed in the name of protecting children,” the Court generally accepts 
the “government’s asserted justifications with little skepticism,” focusing 
instead on the adequacy of the tailoring of the means used.266 Also of 
importance is the level of generality with which the government’s interest 
is defined. After all, who can argue with the assertion, at the highest level 
of generality, that the government has a compelling interest in protecting 
children from harm and promoting children’s well-being? By contrast, 
somewhat less consensus may exist on the strength and potency of the 
government’s interest in protecting children from specific sexual or 
violent content.267 
Constructs of children as vulnerable become relevant, of course, 
when and if the state must justify its restriction of someone’s rights in 
order to protect children’s welfare. To the extent that the government can 
demonstrate that children need the state’s protection to avoid serious 
injury, the case for justification is more likely. The more carefully and 
 
 262. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982) (“It is evident beyond the need for 
elaboration that a State’s interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor’ 
is ‘compelling.’”) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) and 
introducing discussion of Prince). 
 263. I have argued elsewhere that, in those cases in which the state’s parens patriae and police 
power interests concerning children’s welfare converge¾as they are portrayed as converging in 
Prince¾the state’s authority to intervene in the family to regulate children’s lives is frequently treated 
as particularly potent. Reiss & Weithorn, Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 241, at 912. 
 264. Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny, supra note 259, at 301, 319–25. Professor Bhagwat’s article 
examines, however, the Court’s “renewed interest in the previously forbidden terrain of purpose 
scrutiny, including a new willingness to examine, and pass independent judgment on, the reasons why 
the state has chosen to burden individual rights.” Id. at 312. 
 265. Fallon, Jr., supra note 259, at 1322. 
 266. Bhagwat, Protecting Children, supra note 259, at 676. 
 267. See infra Part III. 
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specifically articulated the state’s asserted interest, the more focused can 
be the inquiry into whether the government’s help is needed, and then, 
of course, whether the manner of regulation meets the “means” portion 
of the standard of review. The failure to carefully articulate or scrutinize 
the governmental purpose creates a wide berth for similarly general and 
vague assertions about children as vulnerable. This gap opens the door 
wider for the armchair psychological assumptions about children’s 
nature attributed to common sense or common knowledge that the 
Justices so often rely upon, as observed in several of the cases below. 
B. CHILDREN’S VULNERABILITY AS VICTIMS OF ABUSE 
The Court has considered the vulnerability of children who are 
abused in several types of cases. I focus here on two such instances: when 
children are used in the production of child pornography, and when 
children must provide courtroom testimony against alleged abusers.268 
While generally agreeing that protecting children from abuse or 
subsequent emotional trauma is a state interest of great importance, the 
Justices have disagreed on the question of when the potential harms to 
children justify certain restrictions of the constitutional rights of others. 
1.   Children as Subjects of Pornography 
The members of the Court were virtually unanimous in agreeing that 
involving actual children as models in the creation of child pornography 
is a form of child abuse and exploitation that is “harmful to the 
physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child.”269 In New York 
v. Ferber, citing the state’s compelling interest in “safeguarding the 
physical and psychological well-being” of minors, “an objective of 
surpassing importance,” the Court easily upheld a New York statute that 
criminalized production, direction, or promotion of “a sexual 
performance by a child . . . , knowing the content and character thereof 
 . . . ”270 Justice Brennan’s concurrence explicitly invoked the “particular 
vulnerability of children” a theme implicit throughout the majority 
opinion.271 Under the statute, the definition of “promotion” included sale, 
 
 268. Other cases involving abuse of children are not included in this discussion because they relate 
most directly to an alternate subtype of vulnerability, as in the case of DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), where dependency-based vulnerability predominates (see 
supra notes 155–159 and accompanying text). In other cases involving child abuse, vulnerability 
constructs do not play a central role in the Court’s analyses. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 
407 (2008) (holding unconstitutional the application of the death penalty in a crime of rape of a child 
which did not result, and was not intended to result, in the death of the child); Stogner v. California, 
539 U.S. 607 (2003) (holding unconstitutional application of California statute that allowed 
prosecution of previously time-barred sex-related child abuse claims). 
 269. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 750 (1982). 
 270. Id. at 751, 756–57. 
 271. Id. at 776 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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transfer, distribution, exhibition, as well as several other means of 
dissemination.272 In rejecting the First Amendment claims of the 
defendant bookstore owner, the Court distinguished the concerns 
underlying the New York statute at issue in Ferber (that is, protecting 
children from sexual victimization and exploitation) from those 
regulating obscenity more generally (that is, “protecting the ‘sensibilities 
of unwilling recipients’ from exposure to pornographic material”).273 As 
such, it noted that the states were entitled to “greater leeway in the 
regulation of pornographic depictions of children.”274 In Ferber, the 
Court cited a range of psychological and medical sources, as well as 
legislative reports, emphasizing the detrimental impact such 
participation has on children’s development.275 
It further stated that the harms to children exceed those experienced 
during the performance of the sexual activities that are depicted. It 
observed that the creation of a permanent record of the children’s 
participation, and the subsequent circulation of the pornographic 
materials, exacerbate the harm.276 The majority also invoked the invasion 
of individual privacy as a factor further compounding the potential 
dangers to children’s well-being.277 The Ferber Court’s analysis has been 
criticized for relying on relatively weak studies, and for drawing 
conclusions that exceeded the studies’ findings.278 In addition, there 
exists substantial criticism today as to the breadth of the net in which 
alleged offenders may be caught, including, for example, youth who may 
distribute “sexted” images of themselves.279 
 
 272. Id. at 751. 
 273. Id. at 756–61. 
 274. Id. at 756. 
 275. Id. at 758–59 n.9 & 10. Among the potential harms cited were the possibility that “sexually 
exploited” children may be unable to develop healthy affectionate relationships later in life, tend to 
become sexual abusers as adults, and are predisposed to self-destructive behavior such as drug abuse, 
alcohol abuse, and prostitution. Id. at 758 n.9. 
 276. Furthermore, the Court noted that the “permanent record” made of the children’s 
participation perpetuates the harm: “the pornography may haunt him in future years, long after the 
original misdeed took place. A child who has posed for a camera must go through life knowing that the 
recording is circulating within the mass distribution system.” Id. at 759 n.10 (citing David P. Shouvlin, 
Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 545 
(1981)). In addition, the Court quoted with approval: “The victim’s knowledge of publication of the 
visual material increases the emotional and psychic harm suffered by the child.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 
760 n.10 (citing Mary Annette Horan, Note, Protection of Children from Use in Pornography: Toward 
Constitutional and Enforceable Legislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 295, 301 (1979)). It cited also 
potential harms resulting from the “‘fear of exposure and the tension of keeping the act secret.” Ferber, 
458 U.S. at 759 n.10. 
 277. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758–59 n.9 & 10. 
 278. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1981 Term: E. Child Pornography and Unprotected Speech, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 141–150 (1982). 
 279. See, e.g., Mary Graw Leary, Sexting or Self-Produced Child Pornography? The Dialog 
Continues—Structure Prosecutorial Discretion Within a Multidisciplinary Response, 17 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 486, 551 (2010). 
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Yet, to the extent that the definition of child pornography focuses on 
“sexual conduct” involving persons under the age of sixteen, as in Ferber, 
the production of such images involves conduct that will often fall within 
the purview of sexual abuse.280 Decades of research studying children 
who have experienced sexual abuse reveal that the victims are at a greater 
risk than non-abused children for a range of psychological, health, and 
social difficulties, many of which persist into adulthood.281 In addition, 
more generally, developmental neuroscientific findings reveal that 
various forms of child maltreatment can have serious, long-term, and 
potentially devastating effects on the brain, the nervous system, and 
overall health that, depending upon their nature, intensity, and duration, 
may be experienced throughout the life span.282 
No members of the Court dissented in Ferber. Concurring Justices 
differed from the majority primarily with respect to their concerns that 
certain future applications of the statute not before the Court might 
infringe protected First Amendment interests. Subsequent cases 
reinforced this split within the Court. For example, despite clear 
agreement that “the coercive enlistment, both overt and subtle, of 
children in the production of pornography is a grave and widespread 
evil,” the Justices disagreed in Massachusetts v. Oakes about where the 
lines should be drawn between protected and unprotected speech,283 and 
in Osbourne v. Ohio about whether individuals who merely possess child 
pornography bear a sufficiently attenuated relationship to the harm to 
children to claim First Amendment protection.284 
 
 280. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1165.1 (2016) (providing definition and examples of child sexual 
abuse subject to mandatory reporting requirements in California). 
 281. See, e.g., Lucy Berliner, Child Sexual Abuse: Definitions, Prevalence, and Consequences, in 
THE APSAC HANDBOOK ON CHILD MALTREATMENT 215, 221–26 (John E.B. Myers ed., 3d ed. 2011); U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES  
108–12 (2012); CINDY L. MILLER-PERRIN & ROBIN D. PERRIN, CHILD MALTREATMENT: AN INTRODUCTION 
127–39 (Kassie Graves ed., 2d ed. 2007); EVA J. KLAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING CHILD., CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY: THE CRIMINAL-JUSTICE-SYSTEM RESPONSE 10–11 (2001). As in the case of other 
exposures to harm, the effects vary across those exposed. Children who have experienced exposure to 
multiple forms of abuse, or other adverse childhood experiences, may be more likely to demonstrate 
negative effects, or may experience more serious consequences. Berliner, supra, at 221–222; see also 
supra notes 230–233 and accompanying text. Furthermore, as noted above, children’s resilience in 
particular situations may also affect the long- and short-term impact of negative exposures. See supra 
notes 164, 230–233. The additive effect of “recurrent victimization through existence of images” has 
not be subjected to substantial empirical investigation and consists primarily of the opinions of experts 
and reports by victims. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra, at 112–114. 
 282. Weithorn, Developmental Neuroscience, supra note 233.  
 283. Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 591–93 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that 
while Ferber’s restriction clearly permitted criminalization of involvement of persons under age 
eighteen in “live sexual performance” or acts “for the purpose of visual representation or 
reproduction,” certain other visual depictions reached by the statute might not harm minors, and 
therefore deserve First Amendment protection). 
 284. In Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110–11 (1990), the Court held that the state’s attempts to 
“stamp out [child pornography] at all levels in the distribution chain” was constitutionally permissible 
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Twenty years after Ferber, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the 
Court drew a clear line between what it viewed as the unequivocal and 
direct harms to children from participation in the creation of 
pornography and the potential, and arguably more speculative and 
indirect, harms to children related to production or distribution of 
materials that “appear to be” or “convey the impression of” depictions of 
a “minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” but which do not use 
children in their creation.285 The production and distribution of the latter 
types of materials were proscribed by the federal Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”).286 Congress defined these materials as 
including computer-generated images (that is, virtual child 
pornography) or images using youthful-looking adult models.287 
In striking down the CPPA as unconstitutionally overbroad, the 
Court clarified that its prohibitions against child pornography are 
grounded on the law’s condemnation of the criminal sexual abuse of 
children by using real children in the production of the materials.288 The 
Court rejected Congressional justifications for the restriction of speech 
under the CPPA. Congress had asserted that virtual child pornography 
and other pornographic materials that appear to picture children (even 
though no real children are used in their creation) can be used by 
pedophiles to “encourage” children to participate in sexual activity, or to 
“‘whet their own sexual appetites,’” thereby increasing the likelihood that 
actual children will be abused and exploited.289 The Court held that the 
“[g]overnment may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress 
unlawful speech.”290 In a separate opinion, Justice O’Connor, joined by 
Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, indicated that she viewed the scope of the 
CPPA as constitutional, in light of the asserted dangers to children of 
“being molested with the aid of child sex pictures.”291 Six years later, in 
 
given the asserted harms to children of the child pornography industry. The dissenters, while 
concurring in the assessment of harm, concluded that the “panoply of laws prohibiting creation, sale, 
and distribution of child pornography and obscenity involving minors” was an appropriate response, 
while criminalizing possession infringed on First Amendment rights to view such materials in the 
privacy of one’s own home pursuant to Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Osborne, 495 U.S. at 
141–44 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 285. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240–41 (2002). 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 244–45. 
 289. Id. at 241–42, 255. For a summary of empirical research on the claims of these more 
attenuated effects of pornographic images of children on future molestation of children, see, for 
example, Emily Weissler, Note, Head Versus Heart: Applying Empirical Evidence About the 
Connection Between Child Pornography and Child Molestation to Probable Cause Analyses,  
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1487 (2013); Erik Faust et al., Child Pornography Possessors and Child Contact 
Offenders: A Multilevel Comparison of Demographic Characteristics and Rates of Recidivism,  
27 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 460 (2015). 
 290. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 255. 
 291. Id. at 267 (O’Connor, J., partially concurring and partially dissenting). 
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United States v. Williams, the Court upheld Congress’ replacement for 
the CPPA, the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the 
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, because of the narrowing 
provisions added by Congress.292 In so doing, the Court observed that 
“[c]hild pornography harms and debases the most defenseless of our 
citizens,”293 a point about which none of the Justices appears to disagree. 
While observers may disagree as to many of the elements of regulatory 
approaches to child pornography, the jurisprudence appears relatively 
consistent with the current state of scientific knowledge to the extent that 
it recognizes children’s susceptibility to experience physiological and 
psychological harm if involved in the production of materials depicting 
sexual conduct. 
2.   Children as Courtroom Witnesses Against Alleged Abusers 
The Supreme Court has also considered two distinct constitutional 
questions relating to courtroom testimony by alleged victims of child 
abuse. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, it determined the 
constitutionality of excluding the press and public from a courtroom 
during the testimony of such a victim.294 In Globe, a trial judge presiding 
over the prosecution of a defendant charged with raping three girls, who 
were minors at the time of the trial, closed the courtroom during the girls’ 
testimony pursuant to a governing Massachusetts statute.295 
Emphasizing the important role that press and public access to criminal 
trials play in our democracy under the First Amendment, the Court noted 
that in order to limit that right, “it must be shown that the denial is 
necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest.”296 It held that “safeguarding the physical 
and psychological well-being of a minor” is such an interest, consistent 
with the Massachusetts’s legislature’s concern about “protecting minor 
 
 292. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008). Specifically, the Act criminalizes “knowing” 
promotion or distribution of materials “in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause 
another to believe” that the material is or contains either “an obscene visual depiction of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct” or “a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.” Id. at 289–90. As such, the statute “prohibits offers to provide and requests to obtain 
child pornography” without requiring the “actual existence of child pornography.” Id. at 293. The 
Court rejected the claim that the statute criminalizes substantial protected activity by noting “[o]ffers 
to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection” and 
both types of transactions prohibited by the statute are illegal. Id. at 297. For further analysis of this 
exception to First Amendment protection for communications soliciting a crime and its treatment of 
Williams, see Eugene Vokohl, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL L. 
REV. 981, 993–98 (2016). 
 293. Williams, 553 U.S. at 307. 
 294. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
 295. Id. at 598–600. 
 296. Id. at 606–07. 
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victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment.”297 Yet, it 
struck down the statute’s mandatory closure requirement as 
insufficiently narrowly tailored. The Court held that to pass 
constitutional muster, a First Amendment restriction of this type 
requires judges to make individual findings as to the necessity for closure 
on a case-by-case basis, considering factors such as “the minor victim’s 
age, psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime, 
the desires of the victim, and the interests of parents and relatives.”298 
In dissent, Justice Burger indicated that he would have upheld the 
statute, and in support of that position, he elaborated extensively on the 
state’s interest in protecting children from “the severe¾possibly 
permanent¾psychological damage,” of having his or her victimization 
publicized.299 In so doing, he focused on children’s special vulnerability 
to “significant trauma, embarrassment, or humiliation” by noting that 
the “ordeal could be difficult for an adult; to a child the experience can be 
devastating and leave permanent scars.”300 
The Justices therefore agreed that protecting children from the 
harms that might accompany testifying in open court justifies restriction 
of First Amendment rights under certain circumstances. While the 
majority required individualized showings of harm from press and public 
presence, the dissent would permit a generalized presumption of risk of 
harm to trigger closure for all minors. Indeed, there may be support for 
both positions. On the one hand, children respond and cope differently 
with victimization due to a range and interaction of factors, arguing for 
individualized determinations.301 Furthermore, while in general, 
testifying in court following such trauma can indeed enhance the 
detrimental psychological effects, some children tolerate this experience 
better than others, and some might even perceive their “day in court” as 
empowering or cathartic.302 Finally, it is not clear what roles an open 
courtroom and press coverage play in moderating or contributing to the 
more general impact of testifying on children’s welfare. The Globe 
Newspaper majority placed reliance on trial judges’ assessments 
regarding the needs of individual victims, seeking to minimize First 
Amendment restrictions. 
 
 297. Id. at 607–08. 
 298. Id. at 608. 
 299. Id. at 612–20 (1982) (Burger, J., dissenting). 
 300. Id. at 617–18. Justice Burger further cited several authorities to support his contention that 
the courtroom experience can be “almost as traumatic as the crime itself.” Id. at 619. 
 301. Children’s ability to process and cope with traumatic experiences such as abuse varies 
significantly, depending upon the nature and circumstances of the abuse, other traumas the child may 
have experienced, the child’s own characteristics, and the existence of family and environmental 
supports in the child’s life. See infra notes 315–316 and accompanying text. 
 302. Id. 
WEITHORN-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/17  12:39 AM 
244 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:179 
By contrast, the dissenters would have avoided risking the 
possibility that a given judge would fail to be sufficiently protective of any 
given victim. The empirical database on the effects of testifying on 
children suggest that child witnesses’ responses to the prospect and 
experience of testifying vary across children and situations. 303 Thus, the 
model of case by case determinations regarding children’s needs is not 
inconsistent with what we know of children’s vulnerability in this 
context. That said, as noted below, it is unclear whether trial court judges 
have the expertise to make those case by case determinations, and 
whether, with the aid of mental health specialists, prediction of the 
effects can be reliably made. 304 
In Coy v. Iowa and Maryland v. Craig, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of state statutes that permitted modifications of the 
face-to-face courtroom testimony typically required to satisfy the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.305 In Coy, the Court held that a 
statute allowing child abuse victims to testify via either closed-circuit 
television or behind a screen in the courtroom violated the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment rights.306 Emphasizing the importance of face-to-face 
confrontation, it held unconstitutional the state’s “legislatively imposed 
presumption of trauma,” and failure to require individualized findings of 
the necessity of modified procedures for the protection of particular 
victims.307 While Justice Scalia’s majority opinion did not elaborate upon 
child abuse victims’ vulnerability in the courtroom setting, Justice 
Blackmun, in dissent, cited to research suggesting that courtroom 








 303. Id. 
 304. See infra note 316 and accompanying text. 
 305. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
 306. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014–15, 1021. 
 307. Id. at 1021. 
 308. Id. at 1031–33. Some of the work cited is scientific, while other sources are grounded on 
clinical observations. For example, the work of Gail Goodman and colleagues typically employs 
rigorous empirical methods and is careful and conservative in its interpretations. While the specific 
source referred to in the opinion has been difficult to obtain, Professor Goodman’s work is well-known. 
For a summary of some of the research in the article referred to by Justice Blackmun, see, for example, 
Gail S. Goodman et al., Testifying in Criminal Court: Emotional Effects on Child Sexual Assault 
Victims, 57 MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOC’Y FOR RES. IN CHILD DEV. v (1992). By contrast, Suzanne Sgroi’s 
methods are grounded primarily on clinical observations and many of the assessment strategies she 
employs do not satisfy scientific standards. See SUZANNE M. SGROI, HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL 
INTERVENTION IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1982). 
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He stated that: 
[T]he fear and trauma associated with a child’s testimony in front of 
the defendant have two serious identifiable consequences: They may 
cause psychological injury to the child, and they may so overwhelm the 
child as to prevent the possibility of effective testimony, thereby 
undermining the truth-finding function of the trial itself.309 
He thus concluded “that a State properly may consider the 
protection of child witnesses to be an important public policy” allowing 
use of the modifications permitted by the statute.310 
Two years later, Justice O’Connor wrote for a divided court in 
Maryland v. Craig. At issue in Craig was the constitutionality of allowing 
child abuse victims to testify via one-way closed-circuit television rather 
than in the presence of the defendant, after the trial judge makes an 
individualized determination that requiring in-courtroom testimony by 
the child would cause “serious emotional distress such that the child 
cannot reasonably communicate.”311 In Craig, the state presented expert 
testimony to inform the court’s deliberations regarding the child’s need 
for the alternative procedure. The majority held that the modifications 
permitted by the statute were necessary to further an important state 
interest, that is, the protection of the physical and psychological  
well-being of child abuse victims.312 It relied both on its prior decisions 
(for example, Prince, Ferber, Globe Newspaper) and additional scientific 
authority on the “psychological trauma suffered by child abuse victims 
who must testify in court” to uphold the Maryland statute.313 Justice 
Scalia, in dissent, was unpersuaded that Maryland’s asserted interests 
outweighed the defendant’s right to face-to-face confrontation.314 The 
majority opinion closely tracks many of the conclusions of an amicus 
brief submitted by the American Psychological Association, relying on a 
compilation of the best empirical work available at that time.315 
 
 309. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1032. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 840–41 (1990). 
 312. Id. at 852–53. 
 313. Id. at 852–57. 
 314. Id. at 866–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 315. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association Supporting Neither 
Party, Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (No. 89-478), 1990 WL 10013093; see also Gail S. 
Goodman et al., Child Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause: The American Psychological 
Association Brief in Maryland v. Craig, 15 L. & HUM. BEH. 13 (1991). Justice Scalia, in dissent, was 
more impressed with empirical research suggesting that “children are more vulnerable to suggestion 
than adults,” thus impairing the reliability of their courtroom testimony. Maryland, 497 U.S. at 868. 
Such vulnerability would fall within the second subtype identified in Part I, supra: (susceptibility to) 
influenced-based vulnerability. In Justice Scalia’s view, face-to-face confrontation reduced the 
likelihood of children’s proffering of false testimony that could result in erroneous convictions. Id. at 
869–70. Justice Scalia emphasized what he saw as the “value of the confrontation right in guarding 
against a child’s distorted or coerced recollections.” Id. at 869. Research conducted contemporaneous 
with Craig and subsequent to the decision does not bear out Justice Scalia’s concerns. NATALIE R. 
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The scientific database identified by Justice O’Connor cited in Craig 
as a “growing body of academic literature” has continued to develop. The 
findings, however, while generally tracking the majority’s conclusion, are 
complex, with a range of situation-specific and child-specific variables 
affecting the impact of participation in criminal courtroom proceedings 
on children. Thus, while the Court’s holdings that individualized findings 
of necessity are constitutionally required in each case, trial court judges 
may find the array of considerations that inform the needs of each child 
victim to be challenging to apply on a case-by-case basis.316 
The Court’s constructs of children as needing the state’s protection 
because of greater susceptibility to experiencing psychological or 
physiological harm in the cases reviewed in this Part appear to loosely 
track, albeit with some deviations and variability, the general state of 
knowledge about the phenomena addressed. Consistent with the 
observations of the constitutional scholars cited above, the Court 
requires little supplementary support to accept the state’s justification 
for its asserted child protective purpose. Substantially more scrutiny 
attends its review of the means employed, particularly in the cases 
 
TROXEL ET AL., CHILD WITNESSES IN CRIMINAL COURT, IN CHILDREN AS VICTIMS, WITNESSES, AND 
OFFENDERS: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW 150, 160–62 (Bette L. Bottoms et al. eds., 2009). 
 316. In a comprehensive review of the literature, Quas and Goodman summarize the data: 
As mentioned, the links between testifying and adverse outcomes are complex and often 
depend on additional factors, including not only how many times children testify, but also 
such factors as corroborative evidence, maternal support, and severity of the 
abuse. . . . [C]hildren who testified in cases that lacked corroborative evidence and testifiers 
who lacked maternal support during the case were at greatest risk for adverse mental health 
outcomes, and . . . testifying repeatedly in cases involving particularly severe child sexual 
abuse was related to higher levels of subsequent problems. . . . Without caregiver support, 
the stress of testifying may simply overwhelm children’s coping resources. Finally, severe 
abuse cases typically involved a closely related perpetrator and abuse that occurred over a 
long period of time. Pressures from the perpetrator or family members and conflictual 
feelings about the perpetrator are likely greatest in these circumstances, making it especially 
challenging for children to face the perpetrator repeatedly and answer pointed questions on 
the stand about their experiences. 
Jodi A. Quas & Gail S. Goodman, Consequences of Criminal Court Involvement for Child Victims,  
18 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 392, 400 (2012) (citations omitted). The researchers also note that, for 
some children, testifying may be helpful to the healing process, particularly in less severe cases. They 
hypothesize that “[p]erhaps some children need clear acknowledgment that the abuse occurred and 
was sufficiently wrong as to warrant public intervention. This acknowledgement may come from 
taking the stand.” Id. at 400–01. Although more study of this phenomenon is needed, the authors 
conclude that the findings emphasize the importance of refraining from “overly simplistic” 
generalizations about the effects of testifying in all cases. Id. at 401. Finally, the research indicates that, 
in addition to the variables mentioned above, the age of the child may relate to the child’s vulnerability 
to negative concomitants of providing testimony in abuse cases: “Models of development and 
risk . . . suggest that traumas occurring early rather than later in childhood have particularly 
deleterious effects on psychological functioning. Insofar as legal involvement represents a trauma” the 
negative impact on younger children may be more pronounced. Id. at 401–02. Yet, the authors note, 
sometimes older children are treated more harshly in the courtroom, a factor that may lead to more 
adverse outcomes. Id. 
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relating to courtroom testimony. The cases discussed below, invoking 
notions of children as vulnerable recipients of certain types of speech, 
demonstrate substantially less correlation between the Court’s 
endorsement of vulnerability constructs and existing scientific 
understandings. Indeed, the dominant constructions of children’s 
vulnerability in the speech cases bear little relationship to what we 
actually know about children. 
C. CHILDREN’S VULNERABILITY AS RECIPIENTS OF SPEECH 
Governmental regulation of speech based on content is typically 
premised on the assumption that the speech will cause some form of 
harm.317 The Court has decided a range of cases that consider the 
constitutionality of regulations developed, at least in part, with the goal 
of protecting children from exposure to speech that has been asserted by 
the state to be harmful to children.318 This Subpart focuses on the Court’s 
use of vulnerability constructs to address the alleged harms to children 
of challenged speech. 
The cases involving alleged harm to children from exposure to 
speech vary on many dimensions, such as the setting in which the speech 
is communicated, the medium by which it is communicated, the extent 
to which the category of speech regulated is protected by the First 
Amendment, whether the regulation is content-based, and importantly, 
whether a restriction on speech aimed at protecting children would also 
impair the rights of adults. For example, the government retains greater 
leeway in regulating the speech of minors in the school setting, even 
when the exposure occurs off school grounds at a school-supervised 
event, than it does with respect to speech occurring in a setting not falling 
within the purview of school authorities.319 The Court has underscored 
that student speech can be limited in ways “in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment.”320 
The government’s authority to regulate speech sometimes varies 
with the medium through which the speech is communicated.321 Thus, 
 
 317. David S. Han, The Mechanics of First Amendment Audience Analysis, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1647, 1647 (2014). Yet, constitutional commentators have observed that First Amendment doctrine 
gives relatively little attention to the question of how the regulated speech is thought to cause the harm 
in question. Id. at 1657; see also Bhagwat, Protecting Children, supra note 259; Catherine Ross, 
Anything Goes: Examining the State’s Interest in Protecting Children from Controversial Speech,  
53 VAND. L. REV. 427, 501–07 (2000). 
 318. This Part examines regulations and vulnerability constructs that focus on children as 
recipients of speech, rather than as speakers. In some of these cases, however, children are also 
speakers. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Distr. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Morse v. Frederick, 551 
U.S. 393 (2007). 
 319. See, e.g., Morse, 551 U.S. at 396–97. 
 320. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 321. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). 
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the government’s reach is greater in regulating broadcast media than 
many other mediums because of the “uniquely pervasive presence” of 
material broadcast over the “airwaves” in Americans’ lives, and because 
“broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to 
read.”322 
Furthermore, certain types of speech receive greater protection than 
others. For example, the Court has held that speech characterized as 
“obscenity,” “incitement,” or “fighting words[]” is not protected by the 
First Amendment.323 In addition, the Court permits legislatures greater 
flexibility in determining what is obscene “from the perspective of a 
child,” thus expanding the category of what constitutes obscenity when 
children are the audience.324 “Indecent” speech that is not obscene is 
protected by the First Amendment, but is subject to greater regulation 
than many other forms of speech for the purpose of shielding children 
from exposure.325 
The standard of review applied to speech regulation differs, as well, 
depending on whether the regulation is content-based or content-
neutral, since the government is expected to remain neutral in the 
“marketplace of ideas.”326 Thus strict scrutiny is applied to content-based 
regulations, while intermediate scrutiny is applied to content-neutral 
regulations.327 Because of the stringency of constitutional review of 
content-based regulations, the determination that a particular content 
category of speech (for example, obscenity) does not merit First 
Amendment protection provides the government with substantial 
authority over regulation of that type of speech, where governmental 
reach would otherwise be quite constrained.328 In a widely criticized 
decision discussed below,329 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants’ 
Association, the Court recently determined that because the violent 
content of certain video games did not fall within one of those categories 
of speech excluded from First Amendment protection, the content-based 
nature of the regulation mandated strict scrutiny review of a California 
 
 322. Id. at 749. The state, for example, has greater leeway in regulating the speech of minors than adults. 
 323. Brown v. Entm’t. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
 324. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968). 
 325. James F.X. Petrich, Constitutionality of Sexually Oriented Speech: Obscenity, Indecency, 
and Child Pornography, 16 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 81, 87 (2015). Indecent speech, as defined by Fed. 
Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 732, is “intimately connected to the exposure of 
children to language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary 
community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs . . . .” 
 326. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716–17 (2012); David S. Han, Transparency in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359, 368 (2015); Petrich, supra note 325, at 82–83. 
 327. Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Fissures, Fractures & Doctrinal Drifts: Paying the Price 
in First Amendment Jurisprudence for a Half Decade of Avoidance, Minimalism & Partisanship, 
24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 943, 979–80 (2016). 
 328. Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Speech, 115 MICH. L. REV. 439, 451 n.85 (2017). 
 329. See infra Part III.C.4. 
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statute that would have restricted minors’ independent ability to 
purchase or rent violent video games.330  
Finally, the impact that regulations aimed at protecting children 
have on adults’ access to such speech plays an important role in the 
constitutional analysis, in light of the Court’s unwillingness to reduce the 
level of discourse in society to what might be viewed as appropriate for 
children’s consumption.331 Because the government has greater reach in 
regulating minors, regulations affecting only children’s access to speech 
may be more restrictive than regulations also limiting adults’ access to 
the regulated speech.332 Indeed, as discussed within, it appears that, at 
least with respect to minors’ access to sexually explicit speech, rational 
basis review may be all that is required where a restriction leaves adults’ 
access unaffected.333 
1.   Children’s Exposure to Sexual Images 
Ginsberg v. New York334 was one of the earliest cases concerning 
children’s access to allegedly indecent materials. A merchant who had 
sold two “girlie” magazines to a sixteen year old boy appealed his 
conviction under a New York statute forbidding sales to minors under the 
age of seventeen of magazines “depict[ing] [] ‘nudity’” and “which [are] 
harmful to minors.”335 Although the magazines would not have been 
considered “obscene” under the definition applied to adults, New York 
argued that a child-specific definition of obscenity was appropriate to 
serve its child-protective goals.336 Highlighting the state’s authority to 
promote children’s well-being, the Court relied on two sets of 
justifications for such regulation. First, it opined, the state has an interest 
in supporting parental decisionmaking authority regarding their 
children’s welfare, including children’s access to sexually explicit 
 
 330. Brown v. Entm’t. Merchs. Ass’n., 564 U.S. 786, 798–99 (2011); Kozel, supra note 328, at 451. 
 331. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74–75 (1983)) (“‘[R]egardless of the strength of the government’s interest’ 
in protecting children, ‘the level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which 
would be suitable for a sandbox.’”). 
 332. Martin Guggenheim distinguishes the types of regulations restricting materials for the alleged 
benefit of children. Martin Guggenheim, Violent Video Games and the Rights of Children and 
Parents: A Critique of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 707, 
710–28 (2014). Guggenheim sorts the cases as follows: Category A (regulations that completely ban 
dissemination of particular materials on the ground that the materials are inappropriate for everyone); 
Category B (regulations that completely ban dissemination of particular materials on the ground that 
it is inappropriate for children); Category C (regulations that attempt to “restrict the time, place, or 
manner in which adults may have access to [particular] materials in order to reduce the risk that 
children will also be able to gain access”); Category D (regulations that seek to reduce children’s access 
to particular materials without interfering in adults’ access). Id. at 710. 
 333. See infra notes 339–340 and accompanying text. 
 334. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
 335. Id. at 632. 
 336. Id. at 634, 638. 
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materials. A statute that bars minors from accessing such materials 
independently, but allows parents to access such materials for their 
children if they so choose, could be viewed as supporting such parental 
discretion according to the Court.337 Second, the Court cited the state’s 
parens patriae and police power interests in promoting children’s  
well-being as additional, but distinct, bases for regulations of sexually 
explicit materials. 
The Court applied rational basis review in Ginsberg.338 The Court 
did not discuss its choice of rational basis review, an anomaly given that 
content-based restrictions on speech are typically strictly scrutinized. 
Perhaps this choice relates to the fact that the restrictions in Ginsberg 
only affected minors’ access to the speech in question.339 Even when a 
particular type of restriction affecting adults would warrant heightened 
scrutiny, the Court sometimes applies rational basis when the 
constitutional rights of minors are at issue because the state has greater 
leeway in regulating minors’ lives and activities. This approach may 
explain the standard of review in Ginsberg.340 
The Court held that the New York legislature could rationally have 
decided that the statute in question was necessary to safeguard minors 
from harm.341 The opinion did not explicate precisely what harms were 
expected to follow from minors’ exposure to these materials, referring 
vaguely to impairment of the “ethical and moral development” of 
youth.342 Only in a footnote did the Court suggest that its concern focused 
on the possibility that exposure to these materials will “create a danger 
of antisocial conduct.”343 The Court acknowledged that the collective 
findings of scientific studies concerning the alleged harmfulness to 
children of exposure to obscene materials were ambiguous, at best.344 
Indeed, it stated: “It is very doubtful that [the New York legislature’s] 
 
 337. Id. at 639. 
 338. Id. at 643. 
 339. See Bhagwat, Protecting Children, supra note 259, at 676. The limited effect of the regulation 
would place it in Guggenheim’s Category D, see supra note 332. 
 340. See Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cty., 329 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(attributing the lower standard of review in Ginsberg to the category of speech regulated—that is, 
speech falling within the modified definition of obscenity specific to minors). 
 341. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 643. As Monahan and Walker indicate, where no adequate empirical 
support exists for a factual proposition relevant to evaluation of statutory purpose or means, the 
statute is likely to be sustained under rational basis review. Monahan & Walker, supra note 20, at 586. 
This standard of review grants substantial deference to legislative findings or its empirical 
assumptions, rejecting them only sufficient data are marshalled to demonstrate the inaccuracy of those 
assumptions. Id. 
 342. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642 n. 10. 
 343. Id. at 642. 
 344. Id. at 641–42. 
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finding [of purported harm to the ethical and moral development of 
youth] expresses an accepted scientific fact.”345 
In addition, the allusion to antisocial behavior implies the need to 
restrict minors’ access as a means of social control. Invoking capacity-
based vulnerability constructs, Justice Stewart, in his Ginsberg 
concurrence, suggested that children are like those in a “captive 
audience” upon whom obscene material is forced, because children are 
“not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the 
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.”346 This formulation of 
minors’ vulnerability illustrates the synergistic effect of heightened 
sensitivity to harm and more limited capacities for self-protection 
attendant to immature decisionmaking skills characterized by 
susceptibility to harm-based and capacity-based vulnerability. Notably, 
in the Court’s discussions in the “obscenity” cases, children and 
unconsenting adults have been frequently grouped together and 
differentiated from consenting adults with respect to the states’ interests 
in regulating obscene material.347 
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Ginsberg, rejected the majority’s 
fears about harms to children. He implied that the Court adopted the 
image of childhood put forward by Comstock in the late 1800’s (that is, 
that people have an “inborn tendency toward wrongdoing”).348 While 
reserving judgment on whether sexually explicit literature is harmful in 
general, he argued that there is no evidence that the materials are more 
harmful to children than to adults: “The ‘juvenile delinquents’ I have 
known are mostly over 50 years of age. If rationality is the measure of 
validity of this law, then I can see how modern Anthony Comstocks could 
make out a case for ‘protecting’ many groups in our society, not merely 
children.”349 Ultimately, he condemned what he characterized as the role 
of the Court as a “censor” as well as the entire exercise of trying to judge 
what is obscene or harmful to others.350 Justice Douglas referred to 
children’s interest in reading materials of the type regulated in Ginsberg 
as the “fresh, evanescent, natural blossoming of sex,” an interest Justice 
Douglas asserted should not be confused with “sin.”351 
The Justices’ concerns about the link between sexual themes and 
antisocial behavior were raised in subsequent cases concerning adults’ 
access to such materials. For example, the next year, in Stanley v. 
Georgia, in an opinion authored by Justice Marshall, the Court rejected 
 
 345. Id. at 641. 
 346. Id. at 649–50 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 347. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18–19 (1973). 
 348. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 651 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 349. Id. at 654–55.  
 350. Id. at 656.  
 351. Id. at 650. 
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Georgia’s claim that “exposure to obscene materials may lead to deviant 
sexual behavior or crimes of sexual violence,” citing several scientific 
sources and concluding that there was “little empirical basis” for 
Georgia’s claim.352 Yet, the Court was quick to assert that where there is 
the danger that obscene materials will “fall into the hands of children,” 
the issues are quite different.353 
The Court reiterated the theme that exposure to obscene material 
may “exert a corrupting and debasing impact leading to antisocial 
behavior” or may have a “dominant tendency [to] ‘deprave or corrupt’ a 
reader” in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, where it considered the 
constitutionality of a state restriction on theatres showing obscene 
films.354 It held that a state could reasonably conclude that a causal 
connection exists between exposure to obscene material and antisocial 
conduct, absent conclusive scientific evidence or empirical data.355 Even 
Justice Brennan, who vigorously objected to restrictions approved by the 
majority as they affected consenting adults, endorsed the view that 
juveniles needed greater protection.356 He stated that exposure to 
obscene material may be “an intense emotional experience” of the nature 
of a “physical assault” if forced upon an unwilling person.357 
Today, almost fifty years after the Court issued its decision in 
Ginsberg, there remains little evidence that the types of materials 
restricted in Ginsberg are psychologically or physically harmful to 
minors.358 Existing studies on the impact of sexual content in media on 
children reveal, unsurprisingly, that the effects that such exposures on 
children vary, depending upon characteristics of the materials, the 
children, and the context. For example, research suggests that materials 
that incorporate violence or depict behavior or attitudes that are 
demeaning or degrading to women or others can have negative 
impacts.359 On the other hand, media can serve as positive teaching tools, 
educating about contraception, sexually transmitted diseases, and 
 
 352. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969). 
 353. Id. at 567. 
 354. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54–55, 63 (1973); Id. at 79 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 506 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).  
 355. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 63. 
 356. Id. at 106 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenters took this position despite their view that, 
in general, “the effort to suppress obscenity is predicated on unprovable, although strongly held, 
assumptions about human behavior, morality, sex, and religion.” Id. at 109. 
 357. Id. at 106–07. 
 358. See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY & THE INTERNET (D. 
Thornburgh & H. S. Lin eds. 2002) [hereinafter NAS, Pornography]; S. Liliana Escobar-Chaves et al., 
Impact of the Media on Adolescent Sexual Attitudes and Behaviors, 116 PEDIATRICS 303 (2005); 
ALTHEA C. HUSTON ET AL., MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF SEXUAL CONTENT IN THE MEDIA: A REPORT TO THE 
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (1998), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED445363.pdf. 
 359. NAS, Pornography, supra note 358, at 149–55. 
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positive sexual behaviors.360 The limited research available is 
contradictory on questions such as whether viewing media with sexual 
content promotes earlier initiation of sexual activity or other 
behaviors.361 Conclusions from the existing data, particularly 
attributions of causality, must be cautious because of methodological 
limitations imposed by ethical constraints.362 Overall, however, there is 
little support for the notion that depictions of nudity without more and 
exposure to many types of materials with sexual images or themes have 
harmful effects on a youthful audience. Critically, most relevant to the 
effects on children are the nature of the materials, the messages 
contained in them, and the context in which they are portrayed. When 
sexual materials incorporate violence, abuse, degradation, or other 
disturbing themes, the effects may be detrimental. 
How important is empirical substantiation of the risks of harm to 
minors in Ginsberg and cases like it? To the extent that the state relies 
on factual assertions about the impact of certain experiences, exposures, 
or stimuli on children’s development, scientific investigation of the 
phenomena reflects the most likely avenue to the determination of their 
veracity. Yet, as noted above, the Ginsberg Court endorsed dual 
justifications for state regulation of sexually explicit materials. As is often 
the case when multiple justifications for a law are advanced, it is not 
readily apparent whether either basis is analytically necessary and/or 
sufficient. In Ginsberg, are governmental regulations that enhance 
parental discretion regarding children’s access to the regulated materials 
constitutional even if there is insufficient evidence that the restriction 
also furthers the state’s independent interest in protecting children’s 
welfare? If the answer is yes, then substantiation of assumptions about 
the dangers to children of exposure to the materials is unnecessary. All 
that must be demonstrated is that the regulation furthers parental 
choice.363 Thus, unanswered questions include whether promotion of 
parental discretion is the weightier of the goals and whether our 
constitutional doctrine regulating children and the family permits or 
requires such an approach.364 
 
 360. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Policy Statement—Sexuality, Contraception, and the Media, 126 
PEDIATRICS 576, 578–79 (2010). 
 361. See, e.g., NAS, supra note 358, at 154. 
 362. Id. at 155–60. 
 363. This role of regulations restricting minors’ access to speech in promoting parental choice is 
revisited below, in the context of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants’ Association. See infra notes 
452–457 and accompanying text. 
 364. For an excellent analysis of free speech doctrine and children, within the context of constitutional 
jurisprudence of the family more generally, see Guggenheim, supra note 332, at 729–65. 
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2.   Children’s Exposure to “Indecent” Speech 
Over a decade after Ginsberg, in Federal Communications 
Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court upheld Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) restrictions on the broadcast of a 
satiric George Carlin monologue entitled “Filthy Words.”365 A man who 
heard the broadcast while driving in his car with his “young son” (whose 
age was not specified) complained to the FCC about the airing. The FCC 
objected to the broadcasting of the monologue during hours when 
children might be listening because it viewed the broadcast as “indecent,” 
containing words referring to “excretory or sexual activities or organs.”366 
The FCC’s authority to license permits it to regulate broadcasts 
determined to be “obscene, indecent, or profane.” Here, the Court upheld 
the FCC’s action, although it did not specify what it viewed as harmful to 
children about such exposure beyond mentioning that “Pacifica’s 
broadcast could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an instant.”367 The 
Court did not indicate how such enlargement might have harmed 
children, although we can assume that it would have likely greatly 
annoyed the children’s parents and other adults within earshot of any 
subsequent mimicry by the children. The Court did not assert that 
hearing the broadcast would incline children toward performing 
antisocial acts beyond reciting the offensive words, nor did it argue that 
the speech would otherwise harm the children emotionally. 
In concurrence in Pacifica, Justice Powell suggested that children’s 
lessened capacity for choice may hinder their ability to “protect 
themselves from speech which, although shocking to most adults, 
generally may be avoided by the unwilling through the exercise of choice. 
At the same time, such speech may have a deeper and more lasting 
negative effect on a child than on an adult.”368 Justice Powell referred to 
the language in the monologue “as potentially degrading and harmful to 
children as representations of many erotic acts.”369 By contrast, Justice 
Brennan, in dissent, asserted that, because the monologue was not erotic, 
it was not obscene, and therefore was protected speech, even with respect 
to children.370 He opined that “‘[s]peech that is [not] obscene as to 
youths . . . cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas 
or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.’”371 
 
 365. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 366. Id. at 739. 
 367. Id. at 749. 
 368. Id. at 757–58. 
 369. Id. at 758. Ironically, the point of Carlin’s monologue was to poke fun at society’s inhibitions 
and fears about the ramifications of saying and hearing the more commonly used “dirty words.” His 
position was that, contrary to popular myth, no harm would follow such exposures. 
 370. Id. at 767 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 n.10 
(1975) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971))). 
 371. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 768 (quoting Ernoznik, 422 U.S. at 213–14). 
WEITHORN-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/17  12:39 AM 
December 2017]           JURISPRUDENCE OF CHILDREN’S VULNERABILITY 255 
The Court had the opportunity in subsequent cases to consider other 
challenges to the constitutionality of restrictions on broadcast media 
regarding sexually explicit or allegedly indecent speech alleged to be 
harmful to children. Most recently, the Court considered the same FCC 
provision at issue in Pacifica in Federal Communications Commission v. 
Fox Television Stations, Inc. The case was decided by the Court first in 
2009 (Fox I),372 and then again after remand in 2012 (Fox II).373 The 
provision, under which Congress authorizes the FCC to sanction those 
who “utter[] any obscene, indecent, or profane language” over radio or 
television, had been interpreted relatively narrowly after Pacifica, with 
few enforcement actions in subsequent years.374 The FCC, in addition, 
issued policy guidelines for broadcasters, seeking to specify what 
constitutes indecent material and noting that for nonliteral expletives, 
“deliberate and repetitive use” rather than “passing or fleeting” 
references would be considered indecent.375 Yet, in responding to 
complaints regarding an expletive used by one award recipient at the 
2002 Billboard Music Awards broadcast by Fox, and two expletives used 
by another award recipient at the 2003 Billboard Music Awards, the FCC 
determined that the language was indecent, and sanctioned the 
network.376 Ultimately, the case was remanded, and the FCC’s actions 
were held unconstitutional in Fox II on the ground that the networks did 
not have fair notice of the change in FCC policy.377 The First Amendment 
issues were not reached.378 Yet, for our purposes, language in the 
majority opinion in Fox I, authored by Justice Scalia in response to the 
Court of Appeals decision below challenging the lack of evidence of harm 
to children from the sanctioned language, is noteworthy in its concerns 
about children: 
There are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be 
marshaled, and the harmful effect of broadcast profanity on children is 
one of them. One cannot demand a multiyear controlled study, in 
which some children are intentionally exposed to indecent broadcasts 
(and insulated from all other indecency), and others are shielded from 
all indecency. It is one thing to set aside agency action . . . because of 
failure to adduce empirical data that can readily be obtained. (Citation 
omitted.) It is something else to insist upon obtaining the 
unobtainable. Here it suffices to know that children mimic the behavior 
they observe¾or at least the behavior that is presented to them as 
normal and appropriate. Programming replete with one-word indecent 
expletives will tend to produce children who use (at least) one-word 
 
 372. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (Fox I). 
 373. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) (Fox II). 
 374. Id. at 2313–14. 
 375. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 508. 
 376. Id. at 510–511. 
 377. Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2317. 
 378. Id. at 2320. 
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indecent expletives. Congress has made the determination that 
indecent material is harmful to children . . . . If enforcement had to be 
supported by empirical data, the ban would effectively be a nullity.379 
Thus, not much had changed in the Court’s view of what types of 
speech could be restricted on broadcast media in the three decades 
between Pacifica and Fox I, in that bare assertions of harm to minors did 
not require empirical support. In addition, however, Justice Scalia’s 
articulation of the mechanisms of harm¾“that children mimic the 
behavior they observe”¾is eerily pertinent to the Court’s later decision 
in Brown, penned by Justice Scalia, and will be discussed below.380 
3.   Children’s Exposure to Speech in School Settings 
In four cases reviewing the constitutionality of children’s freedom of 
expression in schools, the Court has revealed substantial inconsistency 
and doctrinal confusion. In 1969, in a landmark case extolling the virtues 
of free speech as “the basis of our national strength and of the 
independence and vigor of Americans,” the Court upheld the right of high 
school and junior high school students to express a political opinion by 
wearing a black armband reflecting their opposition to the Vietnam 
War.381 In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District, the Court reinforced the authority of schools to regulate the 
conduct of students, including restriction of student speech, where there 
is a “showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would ‘materially 
and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school.’”382 While the case is most 
frequently cited for its holdings that “[s]tudents in school as well as out 
of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution,” and that “[n]either 
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech 
or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”383 I focus now on the Court’s 
views of students as audience members. 
The Court was not concerned that the junior high and high school 
audience observing the silent antiwar protest would be harmed by the 
possibility of “discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompan[ies] 
an unpopular viewpoint,” or the minor interruption of the status quo 
(that is, the discussion among students).384 Justice Stewart, in 
concurrence, citing Ginsberg, reminded the Court that, in some cases, 
although seemingly not under the circumstances of this case, “[a s]tate 
may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated 
 
 379. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 519. 
 380. See infra notes 441–445 and accompanying text. 
 381. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 (1969). 
 382. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 383. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511, 506. 
 384. Id. at 509, 514. 
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areas, a child¾like someone in a captive audience¾is not possessed of 
that full capacity or individual choice which is the presupposition of First 
Amendment guarantees.”385 Justice Black’s dissent in Tinker is perhaps 
one of the most interesting of the several opinions filed. While 
acknowledging that no substantial disruption occurred as a result of the 
student’s silent protest, he expressed deep concern about the effects on 
students from the implicit permission this case provides for defiance of 
“orders of school officials to keep their minds on their own 
schoolwork.”386 He hailed the decision as “the beginning of a new 
revolutionary era of permissiveness in this country fostered by the 
judiciary.”387 He continued: 
Uncontrolled and uncontrollable liberty is an enemy to domestic peace. 
We cannot close our eyes to the fact that some of the country’s greatest 
problems are crimes committed by the youth, too many of school age. 
School discipline, like parental discipline, is an integral and important 
part of training our children to be good citizens . . . . Here a very small 
number of students have crisply and summarily refused to obey a 
school order designed to give pupils who want to learn the opportunity 
to do so. . . . [A]fter the Court’s holding today some students in Iowa 
schools and indeed in all schools will be ready, able, and willing to defy 
their teachers on practically all orders. This is the more unfortunate for 
the schools since groups of students all over the land are already 
running loose, conducting break-ins, sit-ins, lie-ins, and smash-ins. 
Many of these student groups . . . have already engaged in rioting, 
property seizures, and destruction. They have picketed schools . . . and 
have too often violently attacked earnest but frightened students who 
wanted an education . . . . Students engaged in such activities are 
apparently confident that they know far more about how to operate 
public school systems than do their parents, teachers, and elected 
school officials. . . . [I]t is nothing but wishful thinking to imagine that 
young, immature students will not soon believe it is their right to 
control the schools . . . .388 
According to Justice Black, children are at risk of dangerous losses 
of self-control and flagrant disrespect for others when those supervising 
them are not sufficiently authoritarian in regulating expressions of 
individuality or independence¾a risk posited as deleterious to them and 
to their communities. Both Justice Black, and in a separate dissent, 
Justice Harlan,389 argued that the state’s authority to exercise discretion 
in “maintaining discipline and good order in their institutions,” was 
 
 385. Id. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649–50 (1968) 
(Stewart, J., concurring)). 
 386. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515, 518 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 387. Id. at 515, 518. 
 388. Id. at 524–25. 
 389. Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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given short shrift by the majority. As noted below, in subsequent cases, 
the Court’s majority did not explicitly reject the Tinker test, which 
grounded the constitutionality of restrictions of student speech on a 
“showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would ‘materially and 
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in 
the operation of the school’”390 for a test that favors relatively unchecked 
deference in the hands of school personnel on matters of student free 
expression. But there is little evidence of Tinker’s influence in those latter 
cases. 
In 1988, the Court, in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 
considered the constitutionality of a school district’s decision to 
discipline a student for giving a sexually suggestive speech in a high 
school assembly.391 Justice Burger’s majority opinion described the 
speech as “obscene,” “vulgar,” and “offensively lewd,” and suggested that 
it was “plainly offensive,” “acutely insulting to teenage girl students,” and 
likely to be “seriously damaging” to the youngest in the audience, who 
were “14 years old and on the threshold of awareness of human 
sexuality.”392 Yet, the majority offered no support for these asserted 
harms, although it reported that some students felt “bewildered or 
embarrassed by the speech[]”, others “hooted and yelled” (and therefore 
may have been disruptive to peers), and students lost lesson time in one 
class because a teacher “found it necessary to forgo a portion of the 
scheduled class lesson in order to discuss the speech with the class.”393 
Without articulating a particular test or standard of review, the 
Court cited Ginsberg and Pacifica Foundation as support in holding that 
the “School District acted entirely within its permissible authority in 
imposing sanctions upon Fraser in response to his offensively lewd and 
indecent speech.”394 Concurring in the Court’s decision to defer to the 
judgment of the school district, Justice Brennan disputed the majority’s 
characterization of the speech, finding it substantially more benign. In 
 
 390. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 391. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–78 (1986). The speech read as follows:  
I know a man who is firm¾he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character is 
firm¾but, most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. 
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take an issue 
and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts¾he drives hard, pushing and 
pushing until finally¾he succeeds. 
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end¾even the climax, for each and every one of you. 
So vote for Jeff for A. S. B. vice-president¾he’ll never come between you and the best our 
high school can be. 
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 392. Id. at 683–84. 
 393. Id. at 678. One might argue that the use of class lesson time to discuss the issues raised by the 
speech is as valuable, or more valuable, than following the predetermined lesson plan. 
 394. Id. at 685. 
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particular, he challenged the notion that this type of speech is harmful to 
younger students,395 concluding that the speech was no more “‘obscene,’ 
‘lewd,’ or ‘sexually explicit,’ than the bulk of programs currently 
appearing on prime time television,” and that “the language . . . used does 
not even approach the sexually explicit speech regulated in [Ginsberg], 
or the indecent speech banned in [Pacifica].”396 Justice Stevens, in 
dissent, argued that the assembly speaker, “an outstanding young man 
with a fine academic record . . . was probably in a better position to 
determine whether an audience composed of 600 of his contemporaries 
would be offended by the use of . . . a sexual metaphor¾than is a group 
of judges who are at least two generations and 3,000 miles away from the 
scene of the crime.”397 
Yet, Fraser went farther, in indicating that a school need not tolerate 
speech inconsistent with its “basic educational mission,” even where such 
speech is permissible outside of school. Without more, it is not fully clear 
what types of speech are inconsistent with that mission. Indeed, Fraser’s 
rationale was not well-explicated by the Court and has been criticized on 
that basis.398 The assertions that hearing the sexual allusions might be 
“seriously damaging” to the students is not particularly persuasive, and 
conveys a vision of children as highly susceptible to a range of unspecified 
harms from such exposures. The Court used the vulnerability images to 
assert that Fraser’s speech was inconsistent with the school’s mission, in 
light of its arguably exaggerated allegations of harms and disruption, 
since allowing speech that is harmful to students undercuts that mission. 
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court upheld a high 
school principal’s decision to delete two pages of a student-authored 
school newspaper issue that contained stories about three students’ 
experiences with pregnancy and an article on the impact of divorce on 
students.399 Although the students had used pseudonyms to protect the 
confidentiality of the persons who were the subjects of the stories, the 
principal had concerns about identifiability. The principal “believed that 
the article’s references to sexual activity and birth control were 
inappropriate for some of the younger students at the school.”400 The 
Court relied in part on Fraser’s holding that a school need not tolerate 
student speech inconsistent with its educational mission, and in part on 
the concept that even when a school tolerates student speech, it need not 
 
 395. Id. at 689 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 396. Id. at 677–78. 
 397. Id. at 692 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 398. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007). In Morse, Justice Roberts, writing for the 
majority, observed the lack of clarity as to what test the Fraser majority applied; see also Mark 
Strasser, Tinker Remorse: On Threats, Boobies, Bullying, and Parodies, 15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 11 
(2017). 
 399. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988). 
 400. Id. 
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affirmatively promote such speech through, for example, publication in 
a school-sponsored paper publication.401 The Court reinforced its 
message in Fraser that certain material may be inappropriate for the 
level of emotional maturity possessed by some students, and assigned to 
the school the authority to determine whether “student speech on 
potentially sensitive topics” such as teenage sexuality was 
inappropriate.402 In dissent, Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun 
reminded the majority of the Tinker test, and emphasized the 
pedagogical, social, and political value of encouraging free speech in the 
school environment.403 The dissenters implied that the majority’s 
position risked strangling youth’s free minds, hindering tolerance and 
consideration of diverse ideas and perspectives.404 
The Court expressed concerns about speech of a different nature 
when holding constitutional a school district’s confiscation of a banner 
unfurled by a student at an off-campus school-supervised function, and 
subsequent suspension of the student in Morse v. Frederick.405 In this 
case, a high school senior, Joseph Frederick, participated with his class 
in the Olympic Torch Relay as it passed through their community in 
Juneau, Alaska.406 As torchbearers and camera crews passed, he unfurled 
a large banner reading “Bong Hits 4 Jesus,” which was seen by school 
authorities as “encouraging illegal drug use, in violation of school 
policy.”407 Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts drew on prior 
precedents to emphasize that children’s rights in schools are not 
coextensive with the rights of adults, or with the rights of children outside 
of the school context.408 The Court devoted substantial discussion to the 
harms of drug use by children, justifying the restriction on Frederick’s 
speech by highlighting the importance of deterring and discouraging 
drug use in the mission of public schools.409 It observed that “[d]rug 
abuse can cause severe and permanent damage to the health and well-
 
 401. Id. at 266–67, 270–71. 
 402. Id. at 272. 
 403. Id. at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 404. Id. at 285–86 (“Tinker teaches us that the state educator’s undeniable, and undeniably vital, 
mandate to inculcate moral and political values is not a general warrant to act as ‘thought-police’ 
stifling discussion of all but state-approved topics and advocacy of all but the official 
position. . . . Otherwise educators could transform students into ‘closed-circuit recipients of only that 
which the State chooses to communicate.’”). In Tinker, the Court observed that because schools are 
“educating the young for citizenship,” their failure to protect “Constitutional freedoms” could “strangle 
the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere 
platitudes.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). 
 405. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 406. Id. at 397–98. 
 407. Id. at 398. 
 408. Id. at 406. 
 409. Id. at 407–08. 
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being of young people,” and citing its own prior decision in a case 
involving drug testing in the schools, it emphasized: 
School years are the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive 
effects of drugs are most severe. Maturing nervous systems are more 
critically impaired by intoxicants than mature ones are; childhood losses 
in learning are lifelong and profound; children grow chemically dependent 
more quickly than adults, and their record of recovery is depressingly poor. 
And of course the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon 
the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty, as the educational 
process is disrupted.410  
The Court cited data from the National Institutes of Health detailing 
the prevalence and some of the potential harms of illicit drug use by 
teens, and further noted that “Congress has declared that part of a 
school’s job is educating students about the dangers of illegal drug use,” 
backed by “billions of dollars to support state and local drug-prevention 
programs.”411 It then concluded that “[s]tudent speech celebrating illegal 
drug use at a school event, in the presence of school administrators and 
teachers, thus poses a particular challenge for school officials working to 
protect those entrusted to their care from the dangers of drug abuse.”412 
Yet, the Court failed miserably in demonstrating a relationship 
between the state’s purpose and the means used to achieve that purpose. 
Without explicitly indicating what role such a relationship plays in the 
constitutional analysis, the Court’s majority relied on constructs of 
children as susceptible to the physiological and psychological harms of 
drug abuse, and to influence or pressure from others, to provide the 
nexus between Frederick’s speech and the harms of drug abuse. The 
Court asserts that “peer pressure is perhaps ‘the single most important 
factor leading schoolchildren to take drugs,’” and that “students are more 
likely to use drugs when the norms of school tolerate such behavior.”413 
The Court desperately needed an analytic device of this type to try to 
demonstrate that children are specifically vulnerable to influence from 
messages such as those of Frederick, or from the school’s lack of formal 
condemnation of Frederick’s speech. 
In dissent, however, Justice Stevens was not persuaded that the 
Court had connected the dots between Frederick’s speech and the harms 
to children to be avoided.414 He questioned that Frederick’s classmates 
were as susceptible to influence by him as the majority suggested. 
Indeed, Justice Stevens suggested that students would likely see 
Frederick’s message as “dumb” and that it is highly “implausible” that the 
 
 410. Id. at 407 (quoting Vernonia School Dist. 473 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661–62 (1995)). 
 411. Id. at 407–08. 
 412. Id. at 408. 
 413. Id. at 408. 
 414. Id. at 441 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that it is necessary to show that the speech by 
Frederick “stands a meaningful chance of making otherwise-abstemious students try marijuana”). 
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message on the banner would persuade a student to change behavior 
regarding drug use.415 
Justice Alito, in concurrence, suggested an alternative test for the 
Court in these school speech cases. In so doing, he made even more 
explicit the reliance on vulnerability constructs as the centerpiece of the 
analysis. He proposed that the authority of the school to censor speech 
derived from some “special characteristic” of the school setting, which 
here is “the threat to the physical safety of students.”416 He characterized 
schools as “places of special danger,” where students are expected to 
remain “at close quarters with other students who may do them harm.”417 
In this case, that special danger was posed by “[s]peech advocating illegal 
drug use,” he concluded, which in turn justified the ban of such speech in 
schools. This dark image of students in captivity with dangerous others 
while in the custody of schools focuses on dangers inherent in the status 
of minority, including being subject to the authority and custody of 
others (that is, status-based vulnerability). 
The test emerging from the school speech cases permits limitations 
on student’s speech when the restricted speech is determined to interfere 
with an aspect of the school’s educational mission. Any alleged harm that 
is asserted to emanate from the restricted speech is treated as sufficient 
to limit student speech. It is difficult to argue with the Court’s statement 
in Frederick that deterrence of drug use by school children is “‘an 
important¾indeed, perhaps compelling’ interest,”418 and that children 
are especially vulnerable to the harms attending drug use. Justice 
Roberts observed that children are more likely to become addicted, and 
that their nervous systems are more likely than adults’ to be harmed by 
use of drugs¾perhaps permanently¾because of the ongoing 
developmental processes that characterize the maturational trajectory. 
Yet, the employment of this construct as a justification for restricting 
Frederick’s silly sign bears all of the indicia of a pretextual reliance on 
constructions of children’s vulnerability to avoid articulating the Court’s 
true rationale. 
Although the Court employs multiple vulnerability constructs to 
justify restricting student speech in the school setting, the assertions ring 
hollow. The likelihood of actual harms to students arising from the 
challenged speech across these cases seems de minimus at best, 
supported only by highly speculative causal assumptions about the 
relationship between the speech and the alleged harms. At the heart of 
the Court’s concerns, by contrast, is the reinforcement of the authority of 
the school administration to regulate student conduct perceived to be 
 
 415. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 444 (2007). 
 416. Id. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 417. Id. 
 418. Id. at 407. 
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inappropriate, particularly when students challenge such authority in as 
public a manner as did Fraser and Frederick.419 Yet, in light of the 
remaining vestiges of Tinker’s precedential influence, the Justices may 
assume that a test grounded primarily on deference to school 
administrators’ discretion regarding student speech would not pass 
constitutional muster. By contrast, couching restrictions in concerns 
about the welfare of allegedly vulnerable students invokes both parens 
patriae and police power interests in preventing objectionable student 
speech from interfering with the state’s mission to create a safe 
environment to educate and socialize the nation’s youth.420 
The message underlying the Court’s rulings in Fraser and Frederick 
are reminiscent of the dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Harlan 
in Tinker, and ring truer to the themes expressed in those dissents than 
with the need to protect children from the articulated dangers. In his 
Tinker dissent, Justice Black emphasized the importance of “school 
discipline” in “training our children to be good citizens . . .”421 He 
expressed the concern that student protests and the disregard for 
authority that they reflect is the first step in loss of control by the school 
administration.422 Justice Harlan opined that “school officials should be 
accorded the widest authority in maintaining discipline and good order 
in their institutions.”423 Although the Court does not formally adopt these 
positions, their rulings in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Frederick conform to 
this view, in that they rely on the asserted vulnerability of children to the 
cited harms in response to the suppressed speech. Whether the 
Constitution permits school administrators greater discretion in 
restricting student speech than Tinker appeared to suggest, perhaps for 
the reasons cited by Justices Black and Harlan, is a question worthy of 
debate. Yet, the Court’s misplaced focus on concerns about the 
vulnerability of the student audience sidetracks such an analysis. The 
Court’s asserted justifications, grounded in vulnerability constructions, 
are ultimately unpersuasive. 
Thus far, the cases discussed in this Part reveal images advanced by 
the Court of children as vulnerable to a range of harms affecting physical 
 
 419. Id. at 408. 
 420. Indeed, the Court cites language in Tinker warning that “schools may not prohibit student 
speech because of ‘undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance,’” or a “‘mere desire to avoid 
the discomfort or unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint,’” Morse v. 
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 508–09 (1969) and stating that “[t]he danger here is far more serious and palpable.”). 
 421. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 422. Id. at 524–26. 
 423. Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In conclusion, he offered a purported “workable 
constitutional rule”: that those complaining of a school action in student speech cases bear “the burden 
of showing that a particular school measure was motivated by other than legitimate school 
concerns¾for example, a desire to prohibit the expression of an unpopular point of view, while 
permitting expression of the dominant option.” 
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or psychological well-being¾some clearly specified and some not¾from 
exposure to certain types of speech. Departing dramatically from this 
protective approach, the Court rendered its 2011 decision in Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Association.424 
4.   Children’s Exposure to Violent Content 
In 2005, California passed a statute that restricted the sale or rental 
of violent video games to persons age eighteen or older, and required that 
the products be labeled “18” to signify that they are not to be sold or 
rented to persons under that age.425 Parents or other adults would not be 
restricted in purchasing or renting these products, either for their own or 
their children’s use. “The Act covers games ‘in which the range of options 
available to a player includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or 
sexually assaulting an image of a human being.’”426 The law was 
challenged by associations of companies that create and distribute the 
computer programs as an unconstitutional restriction of their First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
Researchers had been studying the effects of these types of video 
games on children for over a decade preceding the Court’s decision in 
Brown. Yet, for many decades prior to the Brown decision, psychologists 
had studied the effects of children’s exposure to violent media, such as 
films and television programs.427 Although, as the opinions in Brown 
reveal, there is ongoing debate in the relevant research communities as 
to the effects of video games with violent content,428 none of the 
prominent scientific associations considers the question of whether these 
products have detrimental effects on children to be a close call. 
For example, the American Psychological Association’s recent 
report by its Task Force on Violent Media concluded: “The research 
 
 424. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
 425. Id. at 789. 
 426. Id. 
 427. See, e.g., L. Rowell Huesmann, The Impact of Electronic Media Violence: Scientific Theory 
and Research, 41 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S6 (2007); L. Rowell Huesmann et al., Longitudinal 
Relations Between Children’s Exposure to TV Violence and Their Aggressive and Violent Behavior in 
Young Adulthood: 1977–1992, 39 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 201 (2003); NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL 
HEALTH, TELEVISION AND BEHAVIOR: TEN YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
EIGHTIES 36–44 (1982). 
 428. See, e.g., Barbara J. Wilson, Media Violence and Aggression in Youth, in HANDBOOK OF 
CHILDREN, MEDIA, AND DEVELOPMENT 237 (Sandra Calvert & Barbara Wilson eds., 2011); Craig A. 
Anderson & Wayne A. Warburton, The Impact of Violent Video Games: An Overview, in GROWING UP 
FAST AND FURIOUS 56 (Wayne Warburton & Danya Braunstein eds., 2012); Mark Coulson & 
Christopher J. Ferguson, The Influence of Digital Games on Aggression and Violent Crime, in THE 
VIDEO GAME DEBATE: UNRAVELING THE PHYSICAL, SOCIAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF DIGITAL 
GAMES 54 (Rachel Kowert & Thorsten Quandt eds., 2016); see also What’s in a Game? Regulation of 
Violent Video Games and the First Amendment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, 
Civil Rights and Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006). 
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demonstrates a consistent relation between violent video game use and 
increases in aggressive behavior, aggressive cognitions, and aggressive 
affect and decreases in prosocial behavior, empathy, and sensitivity to 
aggression.”429 In 2015, the American Psychological Association issued a 
Resolution in which it adopted the Task Force’s findings, noting among 
its conclusions that “all existing quantitative reviews of the violent video 
game literature have found a direct association between violent video 
game use and aggressive outcomes,” and that “[t]he link between violent 
video games exposure and aggressive behavior is one of the most studied 
and best established.”430 While acknowledging the areas of need for 
continuing research, both the Task Report and the Resolution emphasize 
the strength and consistency of the data base revealing negative impacts 
on children from use of these games. 
The American Academy of Pediatrics has also concluded that the 
scientific literature demonstrates that “[e]xposure to violence in media, 
including television, movies, music, and video games, represents a 
significant risk to the health of children and adolescents. Extensive 
research evidence indicates that media violence can contribute to 
aggressive behavior, desensitization to violence, nightmares, and fear of 
being harmed.”431 The American Academy of Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatry likewise concurred.432 
Although ethical restrictions limit the methodologies that can be 
employed to demonstrate causation between violent media and such 
efforts, the evidence for the links between these games and negative 
effects on children appears to be stronger than is the relationship 
between negative effects and any of the other types of speech that the 
Court has determined can be permissibly limited where minors are 
concerned. 
The most recent positions taken by these scientific and professional 
associations based on the empirical research followed Brown, and were 
 
 429. See, e.g., APA TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT MEDIA, TECHNICAL REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE 
VIOLENT VIDEO GAME LITERATURE 11 (2015), http://www.apa.org/pi/families/violent-media.aspx. 
 430. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, RESOLUTION ON VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES (2015), 
http://www.apa.org/about/policy/violent-video-games.aspx. 
 431. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Policy Statement—Media Violence, 124 PEDIATRICS 1495, 1495 
(2009); see also Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Policy Statement on Virtual Violence, 138 PEDIATRICS 1298 
(2016). 
 432. Video Games and Children: Playing with Violence, AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT 
PSYCHIATRY (2015) https://www.aacap.org/AACAP/Families_and_Youth/Facts_for_Families/ 
FFF-Guide/Children-and-Video-Games-Playing-with-Violence-091.aspx (noting that “[s]tudies of 
children exposed to violent media have shown that they may become numb to violence, imitate the 
violence, and show more aggressive behavior”); see also TV Violence and Children, AM. ACAD. OF CHILD 
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY (2014) https://www.aacap.org/AACAP/Families_and_Youth/Facts_for_ 
Families/FFF-Guide/Children-And-TV-Violence-013.aspx (noting that watching violent content on 
television can lead children to become numb or “immune” to the horrors of violence, to accept violence 
as a way to solve problems, and to imitate some of what they watch on television). 
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not available to the Justices when deciding the case. Yet, earlier versions 
of these organizations’ statements were available, as was much of the 
research that guided those associations’ positions, and were cited by 
Justice Breyer in his Brown dissent.433 The Court’s majority, however, in 
an opinion authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Kagan, Kennedy, and Sotomayor, struck down the California statute. It 
held that only three areas of speech were not protected by the First 
Amendment¾obscenity, incitement, and fighting words¾and that 
because the violent content of the games fell outside of these categories, 
it constituted protected speech.434 Determining that the games fell within 
the gamut of the First Amendment, it characterized the California statute 
as a content-based regulation (that is, limiting distribution of these 
games to minors because of the games’ violent content), requiring strict 
scrutiny review.435 Against this standard, Justice Scalia assessed the 
evidence advanced by California to demonstrate that the statute was 
justified by a compelling state interest, and that the regulation was 
necessary to achieve that interest. He concluded that the evidence was 
insufficient absent proof of a direct causal link between violent video 
games and harm to minors.436 Indeed, the burden the majority placed on 
California’s shoulders for marshalling definitive and unequivocal proof 
that “violent video games cause minors to act aggressively” was 
unusually rigorous, even in the context of strict scrutiny.437 
One critique of the majority’s decision is its departure from applying 
a more deferential standard of review when regulating minors’ exposure 
to allegedly harmful speech when there is no concomitant restriction on 
adults’ access to that speech.438 California analogized the restriction of 
sales and rentals to minors of violent video games in Brown to Ginsberg’s 
restrictions on access to sexually explicit magazines to minors. As 
contrasted with cases in which adults’ access would be restricted by a 
regulation justified by the impact of the speech on minors,439 the statutes 
 
 433. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 851–55, 858–72 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In his 
dissent, Justice Breyer included two appendices of scientific articles¾those “supporting the 
hypothesis that violent video games are harmful . . . and those not supporting/rejecting the hypothesis 
that violent video games are harmful.” Id. at 858. 
 434. Id. at 786. 
 435. Id. 
 436. Id. at 798.  
 437. Id. at 800. 
 438. See supra notes 339–340 and accompanying text. 
 439. See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). In this case, the Court struck as 
unconstitutional a Michigan statute that criminalized the possession, publication, sale, or other 
distribution of any materials that contained certain sexual or other language or images “tending to the 
corruption of the morals of youth …” with respect to adults and minors alike. Id. at 381–82. It held 
that the legislation was not sufficiently narrow, stating that the law would “reduce the adult population 
of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children.” Id. at 383; see also Sable Commc’ns of California, 
Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115, 126–29 (1989). 
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in both Brown and Ginsberg left adults’ access to the restricted materials 
unaffected. The analogy to Ginsberg would have led to a rational basis 
analysis of the restriction on minors’ access to materials asserted to be 
harmful to them. Justice Scalia relied instead on a narrow interpretation 
of Ginsberg as limited solely to obscenity. He rejected the analogy to the 
government’s interest in protecting minors from speech that might be 
harmful to children, even when the Constitution doesn’t permit 
restricting adults’ access.440 He stated: 
No doubt a State possesses legitimate power to protect children from 
harm, . . . but that does not include a free-floating power to restrict the 
ideas to which children may be exposed. “Speech that is neither 
obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription 
cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images 
that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.”441 
The Court’s decision to distinguish Brown from Ginsberg may have 
been determinative of the outcome. Once the rigors of strict scrutiny were 
applied to the state’s regulation, the burden was difficult to overcome. 
Arguably, no database could have satisfied Justice Scalia. Yet, the 
rejection of Ginsberg and reliance instead on United States v. Stevens, a 
case decided the prior year that involved restriction of minors’ and 
adults’ access to materials that depicted animal cruelty for commercial 
gain,442 was not required, and has been criticized by scholars.443 
Although Justice Scalia’s opinion in Fox I applied a different 
standard than Brown¾because Fox I addressed regulation of broadcast 
media444¾Justice Scalia’s views about how children are affected by what 
they watch, and about the role of empirical studies to support regulatory 
choices, provide a stark contrast with Brown. In Fox I, he had concluded 
that in the case of “propositions for which scant empirical evidence can 
be marshaled,” such as “the harmful effect of broadcast profanity on 
children,” governmental action should not be struck down “because of 
failure to adduce empirical data that [is] unobtainable.”445 He continued 
 
 440. Brown, 564 U.S. at 794–95. 
 441. Id. (citing Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1975)). 
 442. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 443. See, e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 332; Martha Minow, The Big Picture: Justice Breyer’s 
Dissent in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, in Essays in Honor of Justice Stephen G. 
Breyer, 128 HARV. L. REV. 416, 469 (2014). But see Erick D. Reitz, Children and Categorization: 
Maintaining A Standard for Recognizing Speech Categories in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011), 91 NEB. L. REV. 998 (2013). 
 444. The government is permitted substantially greater leeway in regulating broadcast media to 
shield children and others from allegedly inappropriate content. “The justification for this 
differentiation is that publicly available broadcast media is easily transmitted into the private realm of 
the home and has the potential to be consumed by unsupervised children with access to radios and 
televisions, as well as to offend non-consenting adults who have not been warned about the indecent 
content of the programming.” Petrich, supra note 325, at 92–93. 
 445. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (Fox I). 
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in Fox I: “Here it suffices to know that children mimic the behavior they 
observe¾or at least the behavior that is presented to them as normal 
and appropriate. Programming replete with one-word indecent 
expletives will tend to produce children who use (at least) one-word 
indecent expletives.”446 To the extent that Justice Scalia’s reasoning in 
Fox I has merit, one might speculate as to the possible impact of repeated 
perpetration of virtual violence against others via the video games 
regulated by California. 
In Fox I, Justice Scalia described minors as highly suggestible. He 
implied that they are vulnerable because of their tendency to learn 
through imitation, making them susceptible to the influence of whatever 
they view on television, including repetition of indecent or lewd 
language. In Fox I, Justice Scalia suggested that this phenomenon was so 
fundamental and obvious to the Court that it need not look to social 
science for confirmation. His opinion for the majority in Brown rejected 
the premise that minors are particularly vulnerable to media influences 
in the form of violent video games. This conclusion persisted, even in the 
face of an empirical research base demonstrating a strong relationship 
between violent video games and undesirable effects on minors.447 This 
juxtaposition casts substantial doubt on the sincerity of Justice Scalia’s 
rhetoric about the role of science in testing legislative and regulatory 
assumptions about children’s development, and on the fairness of his 
assessment of the research presented by both sides in Brown. 
In his Brown concurrence, Justice Alito indicated he would strike 
the statute as impermissibly vague, yet criticized the majority’s reliance 
on Stevens rather than Ginsberg.448 He bemoaned the result of the 
majority’s decision, which he observed allows a state to “prohibit the sale 
to minors of what Ginsberg described as ‘girlie magazines,’” while tying 
the state’s hands in preventing “children from purchasing the most 
violent and depraved video games imaginable.”449 To illustrate the 
horrors depicted in the videos, he explained: 
 
 
In some of these games, the violence is astounding. Victims by the 
dozens are killed with every imaginable implement, including machine 
guns, shotguns, clubs, hammers, axes, swords, and chainsaws. Victims 
 
 446. Id. (emphasis added). 
 447. See supra notes 428–432 and accompanying text. Arguably, in Brown, the Court imposed 
unrealistic standards on the body of scientific data, and gave inappropriate weight to contradictory 
studies. For a critical analysis of the scientific data provided in the amicus curiae briefs submitted in 
this case, see Deanne Pollard Sacks, Do Violent Video Games Harm Children? Comparing the 
Scientific Amicus Curiae “Experts” in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 106 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1 (2011). 
 448. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 813 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 449. Id. at 814. 
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are dismembered, decapitated, disemboweled, set on fire, and chopped 
into little pieces. They cry out in agony and beg for mercy. Blood 
gushes, splatters, and pools. Severed body parts and gobs of human 
remains are graphically shown. In some games, points are awarded 
based, not only on the number of victims killed, but on the killing 
technique employed. 
It also appears that there is no antisocial theme too base for some in 
the video-game industry to exploit. There are games in which a player 
can take on the identity and reenact the killings carried out by the 
perpetrators of the murders at Columbine High School and Virginia 
Tech. The objective of one game is to rape a mother and her daughters; 
in another, the goal is to rape Native American women. There is a game 
in which players engage in “ethnic cleansing” and can choose to gun 
down African-Americans, Latinos, or Jews. In still another game, 
players attempt to fire a rifle shot into the head of President Kennedy 
as his motorcade passes by the Texas School Book Depository.450 
In a powerful dissent, Justice Breyer alone made several points. For 
example, he referred to the restriction of free speech under the California 
statute as “modest”: 
The statute prevents no one from playing a video game, it prevents no 
adult from buying a video game, and it prevents no child or adolescent 
from obtaining a game provided a parent is willing to help. All it 
prevents is a child or adolescent from buying, without a parent’s 
assistance, a gruesomely violent video game of a kind that the 
industry itself tells us it wants to keep out of the hands of those under 
the age of 17.451 
This point is critical. As Guggenheim emphasizes, Brown, like 
Ginsberg, was all about restricting minors’ access to certain materials 
while leaving adults’ access unaffected, and while allowing¾perhaps 
even facilitating¾parental decisions to exercise discretion in whether to 
make the materials accessible to their children as they so choose.452 As 
such, Ginsberg, not Stevens, was the proper precedent to which to the 
regulation at issue in Brown should be analogized.453 While some may 
disagree that children’s access to either sexually explicit or violent 
materials should be limited in this way, to the extent that regulations of 
children’s access to allegedly harmful speech do not affect adults’ access 
to speech, application of rational basis rather than strict scrutiny is in 
accord with the state’s greater reach in regulating the lives and conduct 
of minors and its deference to parental choice. 
 
 450. Id. at 818–19. 
 451. Id. at 847–48 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This latter point is important. One could, as 
Guggenheim does, propose a statute that avoids the vagueness problems identified by Justice Alito, by 
limiting minors’ access to those video games that the industry voluntarily labels as inappropriate for 
minors. See Guggenheim, supra note 332, at 772–73. 
 452. Guggenheim, supra note 332, at 748–49. 
 453. Id. 
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The Court has traditionally respected parental authority and 
supervisory roles in the lives of minors. While departures from this 
default rule do and should exist, the majority’s opinion that there is 
justification for dispensing with such supervision in the case of violent 
video games is unpersuasive.454 Justice Breyer correctly emphasized that 
where the state’s dual regulatory interests in protecting children’s  
well-being and promoting parents’ authority in raising children “work in 
tandem,” as they do in Brown, the state may “advance its interests in 
protecting children . . . through a default rule” that locates the choice in 
parental discretion.455 This conclusion is consistent with the  
“long-recognized compelling state interest in protecting the parental 
claim to authority in directing the rearing of one’s own children, with 
laws aiding that responsibility.”456 In light of the supervisory challenges 
confronting working parents of school-aged children in modern-day 
America, observed Justice Breyer, the state’s regulatory assistance is 
much needed.457 
The alternative to applying rational basis to cases like Ginsberg and 
Brown is to reject distinctions between minors and adults and consider 
the age-based regulations in a manner analogous to content-based 
restrictions on adult speech. This is, of course, far more respectful of 
minors’ constitutional rights than is rational basis, and sets the bar high 
in terms of the quality of scientific evidence necessary to demonstrate 
allegations of harm justifying governmental restrictions.458  
Yet, importantly, Justice Breyer did not argue for a different level of 
scrutiny. He and concluded that the evidence supporting California’s law 
at issue in Brown met that weighty burden. Focusing on minors’ 
vulnerability, and citing the Court’s recent Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, Justice Breyer observed that minors “are ‘more 
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,’ 
and that their ‘character . . . is not as well formed as that of an adult.’”459 
He continued: “And we have therefore recognized ‘a compelling interest 
in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors.’”460 
With specific attention to violent video games, Justice Breyer discussed 
 
 454. Id. 
 455. Brown, 564 U.S. at 849.  
 456. Minow, supra note 443, at 473.  
 457. Brown, 564 U.S. at 849. 
 458. Ross, supra note 317, at 521 (arguing that “[w]hen sensitive matters of freedom of speech 
collide with images of children’s vulnerability,” the state must be required to demonstrate a compelling 
interest in shielding children through the specific regulation of speech, the nexus between the 
regulated speech and the specific harm, and that the regulation in question “will alleviate the 
articulated harm.”). 
 459. Brown, 564 U.S. at 850 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005); Sable 
Commc’ns of California, Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)). 
 460. Brown, 564 U.S. at 849. 
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the scientific evidence in the briefs, and supplemented those documents 
with his own review of additional meta-analyses and policy documents. 
He concluded that the California legislature had sufficient evidence to 
determine that it had a compelling interest in regulating children’s access 
to these materials, and that its means for achieving such regulation was 
the narrowest means available.461 Justice Breyer pointedly emphasized 
the “serious anomaly in First Amendment law” that the majority’s 
decision creates when one compares what can be constitutionally 
restricted under Ginsberg, and what is permitted under Brown.462 
Harvard Law School Dean Martha Minow regards the following contrast 
by Justice Breyer as one of the most important insights emanating from 
the Brown decision.463 
[W]hat sense does it make to forbid selling to a 13-year-old boy a 
magazine with an image of a nude woman, while protecting a sale to 
that 13-year-old of an interactive video game in which he actively, but 
virtually, binds and gags the woman, then tortures and kills her? What 
kind of First Amendment would permit the government to protect 
children by restricting sales of that extremely violent video 
game only when the woman¾bound, gagged, tortured, and killed¾is 
also topless?464 
Striking the right balances in determining what types of exposures 
to speech should be easily accessible to children versus controlled by 
adults is fraught with challenges. Yet, as most family law scholars writing 
about Brown have reminded readers, deference to parental authority is 
typically weighted heavily in the calculus. One may argue that the balance 
should be struck differently, and that the state’s or children’s interests 
should be given more weight in specific situations. Yet, children’s 
unfettered access to gruesomely violent video games seems an unlikely 
place to change directions. As Dean Minow points out:  
Democracy requires participation by people who know how to make 
choices; children sometimes learn by making choices for themselves 
but on other occasions learn through the choices made by parents, 
teachers, and democratically elected government . . . If minors can 
obtain with no adult guidance violent video games identified by their 
distributors as inappropriate for minors, they may be shaped before the 
adults in their lives have a chance to weigh in. If the social science 
evidence of harm from playing such games is valid, democratic 
processes in the future may choose more aggression, more toleration 
of violence, and reduced sensitivity to human suffering.465 
I have devoted substantial space to a discussion of Brown because it 
departs so dramatically from the Court’s arguably overprotective 
 
 461. Id. at 855. 
 462. Id. at 856. 
 463. Minow, supra note 443, at 475. 
 464. Brown, 564 U.S. at 857. 
 465. Minow, supra note 443, at 476. 
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jurisprudence that regulates and restricts minors’ access to various forms 
of speech. The disconnect between our society’s willingness to censor 
materials with sexual content versus violent content is striking, and flies 
in the face of available evidence as to the harms children experience from 
such exposures.466 Of course, sexual content can be violent and violent 
content can be sexual¾rendering it all the more essential that empirical 
research findings be parsed and interpreted carefully. Yet, assuming we 
can disentangle and keep separate these two categories for the purpose 
of discussion, our society’s discomfort with children’s and adolescents’ 
exposure to information, speech, and images relating to sex, while 
tolerating relatively unfettered proliferation of violent materials 
available for the consumption of minors, deserves rethinking.467 Brown 
brings these contrasting views and associated practices into sharp relief, 
given that the distinction is now seared into our nation’s First 
Amendment law. Additionally, Brown underscores, like no case before it, 
the inconsistencies in the Court’s constructions of children’s 
vulnerability across its free speech cases. 
What is Brown really about? As noted above, many commentators 
suggest that it should have been about state support for parental control 
over whether their children can access violent video games, an approach 
that arguably does not rely as heavily on empirical validation that minors 
are particularly vulnerable to psychological or physiological harm from 
exposure to these materials. But, perhaps Brown is also about something 
else. Ashutosh Bhagwat, in discussing Ginsberg and some of its  
pre-Brown progeny, reminds us that in Ginsberg the Court focused on 
the “ethical and moral development[al]”468 effects of youth’s exposure to 
the regulated materials.469 He concludes that the: 
empirical attacks on the government’s purported independent interest 
in protecting children miss the point. They challenge an assertion 
which is not being made, and fail to address the true question: whether 
the State has a legitimate or compelling interest in inculcating moral 
and ethical values in children by controlling their access to indecent 
materials as a step towards creating a morally virtuous citizenry.470 
 
Thus, to the extent one examines Brown, and indeed, all of First 
Amendment cases reviewed in this Section through this lens, they fall in 
line with one another to a greater extent. Indeed, as Bhagwat emphasizes, 
whereas children’s vulnerability to psychological harm from certain 
exposures can be subjected to empirical study and its “proof” evaluated, 
 
 466. Ross, supra note 317, at 505. 
 467. See, e.g., KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT 124–63 (2003). 
 468. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968). 
 469. Bhagwat, Protecting Children, supra 259, at 685. 
 470. Id. 
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“ethical and moral questions, however, by their very nature [are] not 
susceptible to empirical or scientific proof; rather their answers exist in 
the eyes of the beholder.”471 Despite the seeming clarity such a lens brings 
to some of the First Amendment cases that posit harm to children as a 
basis for restricting children’s access to speech, it is exceedingly troubling 
if children’s access to speech hinges primarily on governmental actors’ 
and judges’ vague and value-laden notions as to what promotes 
children’s development into moral future citizens, rather than on 
scientifically supported evidence of psychological or physiological harm.  
CONCLUSION 
Children are persons who are not-yet-fully-developed and are 
engaged in a rapid process of development. Developmental science 
supports the general premise that minors differ from adults on a wide 
range of dimensions that may mesh with notions of what it means to be 
vulnerable. Legislators and other legal actors rely on many of these 
notions in drafting governmental policies, and jurists rely on constructs 
of children’s vulnerability in reviewing the policies’ constitutionality. Yet, 
there has been little targeted analysis and scrutiny of vulnerability 
constructs and how they are applied in constitutional jurisprudence. This 
Article is an invitation to begin a more earnest analysis of the concept of 
children’s vulnerability as it relates to such jurisprudence, and offers a 
modest initiation of this process. 
This Article presented a taxonomy of children’s vulnerability 
derived from and relevant to the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence relating to children and adolescents, informed by 
scholarship across disciplines, including fields such as bioethics, 
philosophy, psychological science, and developmental neuroscience. It 
proposed five categories of vulnerability: harm-based vulnerability; 
influence-based vulnerability; capacity-based vulnerability; status-based 
vulnerability; and dependency-based vulnerability. After providing a 
sociohistorical context and some basic understandings about children’s 
development from the scientific literature, I examined selected cases 
falling within the first vulnerability category of harm-based vulnerability. 
This analysis revealed substantial variability in the way in which the 
Court has employed vulnerability constructs. In some instances, the 
Court has regarded these constructs as social facts requiring empirical 
scientific support within the dictates of the applicable constitutional 
doctrine. Most notably, in determining the constitutionality of closed-
circuit television techniques for courtroom testimony of alleged victims 
of child abuse, the Court consumed and fairly applied contemporaneous 
psychological science. Furthermore, although cases considering the 
 
 471. Id. 
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effects of using children in the creation of child pornography did not 
delve into relevant research to as great an extent, the Court’s conclusions 
there are generally consistent with such findings. By contrast, the Court’s 
jurisprudence in considering children as recipients of speech in schools, 
or as the audience for sexually-explicit or violent speech, presented 
vulnerability constructs that are at odds with scientific research. Indeed, 
the Court often failed in the first instance to articulate with precision or 
apparent honesty the state’s interest in such regulation. In these cases, 
notions of children’s vulnerability are strategically manipulated, allowing 
the Court to achieve certain results, while side-stepping elucidation of a 
credible account of its underlying rationales. 
Further examination of judicial constructs of children’s 
vulnerability, and scrutiny of the relationship of legislators’ and judges’ 
assertions about children’s nature and functioning, as proposed here, 
may not change the results of cases. Yet, where the Court makes “factual” 
assertions about children’s characteristics or functioning¾the subject 
matter of developmental science¾these assertions should be measured 
against the body of relevant scientific knowledge. With respect to the 
Court’s use of science more generally, UC Hastings Dean David Faigman 
suggests that “[t]o the extent that taking facts seriously will accomplish 
anything, it is hoped that it will lead the Court to be more plainspoken 
about what the reasons for what it does.”472 Along similar lines, Professor 
Gary Melton hopes that challenging the scientific basis of developmental 
assumptions about children by the courts will promote “intellectual 
honesty” possibly forcing judges “to identify the real bases of their 
decisions.”473 
Constitutional cases must, in the first instance, be decided based on 
constitutional principles. Yet, where the Justices invoke 
characterizations of children’s vulnerability to determine, for example, if 
a governmental purpose or means survives constitutional scrutiny, those 
characterizations must also be scrutinized. Concepts of children’s 
vulnerability¾as assertions of phenomena that exist in the real  




 472. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS, supra note 13, at 185. 
 473. Melton, supra note 16, at 240–241. 
